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A man with a knife wedged against his spine was transferred from 
an emergency department because he did not have insurance.1  
The transferring hospital refused to remove the knife unless he 
paid $1,000 cash in advance of treatment.2 
A woman mistakenly identified as uninsured was turned away from 
two private hospitals during the early stages of giving birth—even 
though fetal monitoring indicated fetal distress.  By the time the 
patient reached the county hospital, her child died.3 
INTRODUCTION 
Patient dumping4  represents a cold, unconscionable disregard for 
human life.  The act of patient dumping occurs when patients 
presenting in the emergency department are denied emergency 
medical care or stabilizing treatment based on economic5 or non-
                                                          
 1. George J. Annas, Your Money or Your Life:  “Dumping” Uninsured Patients from 
Hospital Emergency Wards, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 74, 74 (1986).  For a critique on 
“anecdotal advocacy,” see David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA:  Past 
Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 53-54 (1998) (referring to “horror 
stories,” the “anecdotal sword,” and reliance on anecdotes as “intellectually sloppy”).  
But see Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 744 (1997) 
(explaining the possible value of anecdotal evidence while pointing to author 
Catherine MacKinnon who writes on pornography and includes stories of prostitutes, 
rape victims, and pornographic models and actresses). 
 2. Annas, supra note 1, at 74. 
 3. H.R. REP. NO. 100-531, at 6-7 (1988). 
 4. See Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994) (defining 
“patient dumping” as when hospitals refuse to provide emergency medical treatment 
to indigent, uninsured patients or when they transfer those patients before their 
emergency conditions are stabilized). “Patient dumping” is prohibited by federal 
legislation known as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). 
 5. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers:  Medical Practice as Social 
Triage, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494, 495 (1984) [hereinafter Harvard Medical School 
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economic6 grounds, such as the patient’s race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, or contraction of a socially unacceptable disease.7  
Evidence suggests that patient dumping is rising8 and that it is 1.7 
                                                          
Study] (noting that the financial interests of private hospitals and physicians 
motivated some transfers). 
 6. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 
1990) (including the following reasons for discriminatory non-treatment of patients:  
“prejudice against the race, sex, or ethnic group of the patient; distaste for the 
patient’s condition (e.g., AIDS patients); personal dislike or antagonism between the 
medical personnel and the patient; disapproval of the patient’s occupation; or 
political or cultural opposition”); Hines v. Adair County Pub. Hosp. Dist. Corp., 827 
F. Supp. 426, 431 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (referring to characteristics such as age, race, sex, 
national origin, financial or insurance status, medical condition, social status, or 
politics as possible factors for discriminatory non-treatment).  State statutes have also 
attempted to curb discriminatory medical care by including specific language 
prohibiting such discrimination.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317(b) 
(West 1990) (including non-discrimination provisions that “[i]n no event shall the 
provision of emergency services and care be based upon, or affected by, the person’s 
race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, sex, preexisting medical 
condition, physical or mental handicap, insurance status, economic status, or ability 
to pay for medical services . . . .”); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.20201(2)(a) (Michie 2001) 
(stating that “[a] patient or resident will not be denied appropriate care on the basis 
of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, disability, marital status, sexual 
preference, or source of payment.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (2001) (noting 
that “the patient shall not be denied appropriate care on the basis of race, religion, 
color, national origin, sex, age, handicap, marital status, sexual preference, or source 
of payment . . . .”); ID. CODE § 39-1391(b) (Michie 1987) (providing that, if 
emergency care is provided, it must not be denied “to any person by reason of race, 
creed, national origin or financial ability to pay therefore”). 
 7. See Seth M. Manoach et al., Social Bias and Injustice in the Current Health Care 
System, 9 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 241, 242 (2002) (explaining that studies have 
indicated that Hispanic and African American emergency room patients face racial 
bias, even when the studies take patient preferences and socioeconomic differences 
into account).  Manoach also notes that poor and minority patients are routinely 
subject to injustices in emergency care.  Id. at 243.  See generally Scott Burris, Dental 
Discrimination Against the HIV-Infected:  Empirical Data, Law and Public Policy, 13 YALE J. 
ON REG. 1 (1996) (explaining a specific instance of discrimination involving HIV 
patients receiving inadequate dental care). 
 8. See infra notes 184-97 and accompanying text (describing the developing 
pattern of patient discrimination throughout the past decade); see also Manoach, 
supra note 7, at 241 (distinguishing between the care received by insured versus 
uninsured patients in the emergency room, despite the enforcement standards in the 
federal Emergency Medical Treatement and Active Labor Act (citing P. Braveman et 
al., Insurance-related Differences in the Risk of Ruptured Appendix, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
444, 444-49 (1994); J. Svenson & Carl W. Spurlock, Insurance Status and Admission to 
Hospital for Head Injuries:  Are We Part of a Two-tiered Medical System? 19 AM. J. 
EMERGENCY MED. 19, 19-21 (2001)).  Manoach also notes evidence in the press and 
academic medicine pointing to evidence of the double standard which discriminates 
against the poor, such as “attending supervision given to residents performing 
complicated procedures and referral for needed follow-up care.”  Manoach, supra 
note 7, at 241 (citations omitted); see also Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity and Analgesic 
Practice, 35 ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 11, 16 (2000) (detailing the problems shared by 
different ethnic groups in receiving emergency room care); Earl S. Ford & Richard S. 
Cooper, Racial/Ethnic Difference in Health Care Utilization of Cardiovascular Procedures:  A 
Review of the Evidence, 30 HEALTH SERVICE RESEARCH 237, 237-52 (1997) (interpreting 
evidence of health care practices between ethnic and racial groups); Ronald J. 
Ozminkowski et al., Minimizing Racial Disparity Regarding Receipt of a Cadaver Kidney 
Transplant, 30 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASE 749, 749-59 (1997) (noting a particular instance 
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times more likely to occur in for-profit hospitals than in not-for-profit 
hospitals.9  Data from 1986 to 1999 indicates that there has been an 
approximately 100-fold increase in patient dumping hospital 
violators10 and a 139-fold increase in patient dumping violations 
concerning the lack of performance of a “medical screening 
examination.”11 
Congress had truly noble intentions when it addressed patient 
dumping through passage of federal legislation known as the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).12 
However, EMTALA has been described as “sloppy,” “silly,”13 
“hopelessly flawed from its inception,” and “doomed for failure.”14  
                                                          
of discrimination with regard to a a transplant operation). 
 9. KAIJA BLALOCK & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH 
GROUP, QUESTIONABLE HOSPITALS:  527 HOSPITALS THAT VIOLATED THE EMERGENCY 
MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT:  A DETAILED LOOK AT “PATIENT DUMPING” 4 (July 
2001) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1]. 
 10. The actual number of hospital violators for the year 1986 was two.  JOAN 
STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, 140 
HOSPITALS NAMED FOR PATIENT DUMPING VIOLATIONS 23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3 (Apr. 1991) 
[hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2]; JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, PATIENT DUMPING CONTINUES IN HOSPITAL 
EMERGENCY ROOMS T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6 (May 1993) [hereinafter 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3].  The actual number of hospital violators for year 1999 was 
198.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
 11. Medical screenings are required by the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000).  The actual number of 
EMTALA violations in 1986 of the mandatory medical screening examination 
provision was zero.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, and T-17 to T-18 tbl.6.  
The actual number of EMTALA violations of the mandatory medical screening 
examination provision of EMTALA in 1999 was approximately 139.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3.  There has also been a 
thirty-seven-fold increase in patient dumping violations for failing to provide 
“necessary stabilizing treatment” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b).  PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 23 tbl. 2, 24 tbl. 3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, 
supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, and T-17 to T-18 tbl.6.  The actual number of 
EMTALA violations in 1986 for failure to provide necessary stabilizing treatment was 
two.  Id.  The actual number of EMTALA violations in 1999 for failure to provide 
necessary stabilizing treatment was seventy-four.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 
9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
 12. U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). 
 13. See Hyman, supra note 1, at 30 (concluding that EMTALA is more flawed than 
useful and such flaws create judicial interpretations and amendments that ensure 
that no one benefits from the statute). 
 14. See Lawrence E. Singer, Look What They’ve Done to My Law, Ma:  COBRA’s 
Implosion, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 113, 121 (1996) (reasoning that the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), by presenting itself as a strict liability 
measure while simultaneously requiring a negligence-like analysis, creates judicial 
confusion sufficient to threaten the usefulness of the legislation); see also Maria 
O’Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the Poor:  The 
Patient Dumping Dilemma, 199 BYU L. REV. 971, 973 (1992) (suggesting regulatory 
responses like EMTALA will not work, and Congress should focus on making 
insurance more affordable). Because EMTALA originated as part of the 
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, it is alternatively referred to in the 
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EMTALA has required  so many congressional amendments15 that it 
has been described as worse than having no legislation at all.16 
Inherent statutory ambiguity and widespread federal judicial 
discord compound the imperfections and shortcomings of 
EMTALA.17  These ambiguities and inconsistent judicial opinions 
have precluded effective EMTALA compliance and government 
enforcement.  For instance, although hospitals are strictly liable for 
EMTALA duties, it is the emergency physician’s conduct which will 
be dispositive regarding EMTALA compliance.18  However, the 
physician’s conduct will likely be judged by an objective negligence 
standard—in most instances, that is, because the federal circuits are 
split on just what standards apply to various provisions of EMTALA.19  
Similarly, the federal circuits are split regarding whether provisions of 
EMTALA are to be interpreted conjunctively or disjunctively.20  The 
confusion EMTALA has propounded, in both the legal and 
healthcare professions, has permitted an incentive for patient 
dumping,21 which has resulted in significant patient morbidity and 
mortality.22  Simply put, although EMTALA grants every person a 
                                                          
literature either as “COBRA” or “OBRA.” 
 15. EMTALA has been amended at least seven times since being signed into law 
and significant amendments occurred in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA) of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4009(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-56 to 1330–57 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000)); OBRA of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, § 6211, 103 Stat. 2106, 2245-49 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd 
(2000)); OBRA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4008(b), 4207(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 
1388-44, 1388-117 to 1388 –118 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000)). 
 16. See Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 JURIMETRICS 
J. 389, 396-97 (1988) (contending that amendments created to address COBRA’s 
ineffectiveness in preventing patient dumping create a false sense that the problems 
of the poor and uninsured are being addressed, thus inhibiting the creation of truly 
effective legislative solutions). 
 17. Singer, supra note 14, at 120. 
 18. As with other corporate entities, the knowledge of the agents (physicians) is 
imputed to the principal (hospital).  See ROBERT A. BITTERMAN, PROVIDING EMERGENCY 
CARE UNDER FEDERAL LAW:  EMTALA 19 (American College of Emergency Physicians 
2000) (explaining that, because physicians are agents of the hospital, EMTALA 
duties carry down to the physician).  Therefore, every statutory violation of EMTALA 
by a physician, with regard to regulatory enforcement and civil liability, creates direct 
liability on the part of the hospital.  See Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Brown, 674 N.E.2d 
1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an agent’s knowledge is imputed to 
the principal, even if the principal does not have actual knowledge of the event). 
 19. See infra notes 549-58 and accompanying text (explaining judicial confusion). 
 20. See infra notes 602-43 and accompanying text (explaining judicial confusion). 
 21. See Annas, supra note 1, at 74 (examining the incentives to deny the indigent 
and uninsured emergency care, resulting from the transformation of healthcare as a 
social benefit to healthcare as an economic enterprise); see also Editorial, Health and 
Hot Potatoes, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1985, at A20 (reporting Professor Uwe Reinhardt’s 
comments that economic incentives allow poor patients to “become the hot potatoes 
one hospital seeks to dump in the lap of another”). 
 22. See Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital:  A Prospective Study of 
467 Patients, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552, 555-556 (1986) [hereinafter Cook County 
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federal right to emergency medical care,23 it has been reported that 
government enforcement has “tragically failed” to control patient 
dumping.24 
Any proposed solution for patient dumping must consider the 
many complex issues of nationwide healthcare delivery, which 
include access to medical care for the indigent and underprivileged, 
financial compensation for emergency medical services provided by 
physicians and hospitals,25 and the dignified delivery of medical care 
without discrimination based on non-medical grounds.  Proposed 
solutions to patient dumping have included more federal legislation, 
segmental statutory resurrection of EMTALA, and even criminal 
actions against physicians and nurses.26 
                                                          
Hospital Study] (showing that patient dumping results in significant increases in 
complications and mortality among the transferred patients); David A. Ansell, MD & 
Robert L. Schiff, MD, Patient Dumping:  Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 
257 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1500, 1501 (1987) (noting that patients transferred to 
Chicago’s public Cook County Hospital suffered more than two times the mortality 
rate than those directly admitted). 
 23. See BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 15 (explaining that EMTALA creates a 
federal right for emergency care and additional causes of action if the physician fails 
to comply with these regulations) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd); see also Troyen A. 
Brennan, Review:  Moral Imperatives Versus Market Solutions:  Is Health Care A Right?, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 353 (1998) (asserting that common law emergency care rights 
have been strengthened by courts’ incorporation of state regulations, accreditation 
issues, and anti-discrimination law).  But see Annas, supra note 1, at 77 (arguing that 
the limited common law right to treatment in an emergency room for emergency 
condition, which was secure in the 1970s, has become threatened throughout the 
past decades). 
 24. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 18 (explaining that the 
Department of Health & Human Services has failed to effectively enforce COBRA 
patient dumping law because of its limited use of sanctioning authority); PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at 13 (noting the secrecy surrounding patient 
dumping activity within hospitals); JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, UPDATE ON PATIENT DUMPING VIOLATIONS 6 (Oct. 1994) 
[hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4] (noting that the increased number of 
complaints about patient dumping is not reflected in the number of cases brought to 
the attention of the Health Care Financing Administration Agency); see also Mary 
Jean Fell, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986:  Providing 
Protection from Discrimination in Access to Emergency Medical Care, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 
607, 608 (1994) (indicating that state regulatory and other early federal statutory 
attempts to address patient dumping have been ineffective); HEALTHCARE FACILITIES 
LAW § 6.2.2, at 428 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991) (stating that few states provide 
adequate enforcement provisions for patient dumping).  Dellinger also notes that 
early federal statutes were also ineffective in addressing patient dumping.  Id. 
§ 4.10.3. 
 25. The U.S. government’s response to the financial strains experienced by 
hospitals has been disheartening.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG), DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS), THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND 
LABOR ACT:  SURVEY OF HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 18 (Jan. 2001) 
[hereinafter DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY] (noting that hospitals are increasingly 
burdened by the lack of reimbursement for certain medical services provided to 
uninsured patients). 
 26. See infra notes 777-82 and accompanying text (discussing how, in some cases, 
courts have looked to the standard of care of the attending physician in order to 
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This Article proposes that any effective remedy for patient 
dumping requires an understanding of its cause, and that more 
federal legislation or government agency regulation would likely only 
increase the diverse and inconsistent opinions of the federal 
judiciary.  Rather, the time has come for state courts to recognize the 
true nature of patient dumping:  it is intentional, not based on 
negligence, and unrelated to medical issues involving patient care.  It 
exists in a zone outside the practice of medicine and within the realm 
of discrimination.  Accordingly, in an attempt to right this civil 
wrong, this Article offers a proposal for courts to recognize a new 
intentional tort of patient dumping as a state cause of action.  This 
Article proposes, however, that the recognition of such a tort be 
limited to circumstances where a patient’s transfer is based solely on 
economic or non-economic, non-medical discriminatory reasons 
resulting in patient harm and not where the transfer is a part of a 
medical decision regarding patient care. 
Although one intermediate state appellate court27 has recently 
attempted to sustain such a cause of action, on review it was 
overturned with arguably sophistic reasoning.28  Because there may be 
a reluctance to recognize a new intentional tort as part of our already 
burdened legal system, and rather an inclination to suggest 
segmental statutory resurrection of EMTALA, this Article examines 
the extensive imperfections, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of 
EMTALA which, in our opinion, lay to rest any hopes of meaningful 
resurrection. 
This Article addresses the need for and elements of a new cause of 
action for patient dumping.  Part I explains the basis for patient 
dumping, the incentive to dump, and congressional concerns. Part I 
also considers the epidemiology and persistence of patient dumping 
from 1986-2001.  Part II reviews the statutory topography and 
components of EMTALA.  Part III analyzes EMTALA on three fronts.  
First, we address inadequacies among emergency physicians, hospital 
staff, and the U.S. government in dealing with EMTALA.  Second, we 
discuss the extensive judicial inconsistencies surrounding EMTALA, 
including the application of varied standards of care in evaluating 
                                                          
implicate them in patient dumping suits). 
 27. See Coleman v. Deno, 787 So. 2d 446 (La. Ct. App. 2001) aff’d in part, modified 
in part, and remanded by 813 So. 2d 303 (La. 2002) (holding that a doctor’s violation 
of the anti-dumping provision of EMTALA created a cause of action for an 
intentional tort of patient dumping). 
 28. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303 (La. 2002); see also infra Part III.E 
(recounting the court’s reasoning for overturning a patient dumping claim and 
discussing why this logic is flawed). 
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hospital conduct, confusion over the objective-negligence standard 
governing physician conduct, and the federal circuit discord 
regarding conjunctive or disjunctive interpretations of EMTALA 
provisions.  Part IV introduces the proposed new intentional tort of 
patient dumping by considering a prior judicial attempt to affirm 
such a tort in Coleman v. Deno.  Finally, Part V considers the basis of 
such a tort in law and outlines substantive elements which ought to 
constitute such a tort.  We conclude that creation of an intentional 
tort for patient dumping will be a more effective means of controlling 
patient dumping than the statutory provisions in EMTALA. 
I. THE BASIS FOR PATIENT DUMPING 
Any proposed solution for patient dumping requires an 
understanding of the basis for its existence.  This understanding 
comes from considering the incentives for, epidemiology of, 
congressional concerns about, and persistence of patient dumping. 
 
A. Congressional Background 
On April 7, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
(COBRA)29 into law.  COBRA contained a Medicare and Medicaid 
amendment now commonly known as EMTALA.30  EMTALA was 
enacted during an era of escalation in the number of uninsured 
patients31 that paralleled increasing reports of “patient dumping.”32  
Some emergency physicians and hospitals had reportedly denied 
emergency medical care to indigent and uninsured patients or 
transferred them to a public or charity hospital without first 
stabilizing their emergency medical condition.33  Frequently, the 
transferred patients had medical or surgical conditions which 
rendered them unstable or critically ill, or were pregnant and in 
labor.34 
                                                          
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). 
 30. Id. § 9121(b). 
 31. See Equal Access Hearings, supra note 51, at 6-7 (explaining the congressional 
intent when enacting EMTALA to set up compliance standards for hospital 
regarding patient dumping). 
 32. Cook County Hospital Study, supra note 22, at 552; see also Ansell, supra note 22, 
at 1500 (noting that reports of patient dumping and denial of emergency medical 
were not just anecdotal); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that Congress intended EMTALA to address the patient 
dumping issue, and draws no distinction between insured and uninsured patients). 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, at 27 (1986). 
 34. Ansell, supra note 22, at 1500; Cook County Hospital Study, supra note 22, at 
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Congress was concerned that hospitals were abandoning 
emergency care patients as a cost-cutting measure,35 and knew that 
patient dumping decreased the quality of care received by the 
dumped indigent or uninsured patients.36  This decreased care 
ultimately led to higher morbidity and mortality levels.37  Congress 
created EMTALA to provide adequate emergency medical services to 
the indigent and uninsured who seek emergency care.38 
                                                          
552. 
 35. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, at 27 (quoting the House Ways and Means 
Committee as saying that the patient dumping situation “has worsened since the 
prospective payment system [PPS] for hospitals became effective”).  The Committee 
stressed that EMTALA’s purpose was to “provide a strong assurance that pressures 
for greater hospital efficiency are not to be construed as license to ignore traditional 
community responsibility and loosen historic standards.”  Id.; see also Brodersen v. 
Sioux Valley Mem’l Hosp., 920 F. Supp. 931, 939 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (noting that 
EMTALA was principally designed by Congress to prevent “patient dumping”); 
Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
Congress’s main concern was to insure that hospitals would not abandon the 
tradition of providing emergency care to everyone, in light to the increased pressure 
to decrease costs yet increase efficiency).  Numerous congressional committees 
voiced concerns about these cost-cutting measures, such as the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, which reported: 
The Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing number of reports 
that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with 
emergency conditions if the patient does not have medical insurance. The 
Committee wants to provide a strong assurance that pressures for greater 
hospital efficiency are not to be construed as license to ignore traditional 
responsibilities and loosen historic standards. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, at 27.  The House Judiciary Committee agreed: 
In recent years there has been a growing concern about the provision of 
adequate emergency room services to individuals who seek care, particularly 
as to the indigent and uninsured.  Although at least twenty-two states have 
enacted statutes or issued regulations requiring the provision of limited 
medical services whenever an emergency situation exists, and despite the fact 
that many state court rulings impose a common law duty on doctors and 
hospitals to provide necessary emergency care, some are convinced that the 
problem needs to be addressed by federal sanctions . . . .  The Judiciary 
Committee shares the concern of The Ways and Means Committee that 
appropriate emergency room care be provided to patients faced with 
medical emergencies and active labor. 
Id. 
 36. Equal Access Hearing, supra note 51, at 6-7. 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, at 27. 
 38. See Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating 
that “all Americans, regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital will 
provide what services it can when they are truly in physical distress” and stating that 
Congress enacted EMTALA to address its concern with the practice of patient 
dumping) (quoting 131 CONG. REC. S13904 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of 
Sen. Durenberger)); see also Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 
349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the main intent of EMTALA is to provide an 
avenue for uninsured and poor patients to receive treatment and additionally 
provide an alternative remedy, if they do not receive treatment); H.R. REP. NO. 99-
241, at 27 (stating that the concern was to ensure that the poor and uninsured 
received adequate emergency room care); 131 CONG. REC. S28569 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 
1985) (statement of Sen. Dole) (quoting EMTALA co-sponsor Senator Robert Dole 
as denouncing “patient dumping” for “purely financial reasons”). 
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EMTALA requires that hospitals conduct a “medical screening 
examination”39 and provide “necessary stabilizing treatment”40 to any 
patient seeking emergency medical care in a hospital emergency 
department.41  The examination’s purpose is to determine whether 
the person suffers from an “emergency medical condition.”42  If an 
individual suffers from such a condition,  either necessary emergency 
stabilizing care must be provided43 or the patient must be transferred 
in accordance with EMTALA provisions.44 
Although the clear legislative history45 and purpose of EMTALA was 
to prevent indigent “patient dumping,”46 the statute’s language is not 
narrowly tailored47 and contains numerous undefined terms and 
ambiguities.48  For example, there was initially great judicial 
confusion as to whether EMTALA applied to “all” individuals or 
                                                          
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). 
 40. Id. § 1395dd(b). 
 41. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 51, at 6-7; see also Gatewood v. Wash. 
Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (admitting that, 
although it does not create a federal cause of action for what has been considered 
malpractice claims in the past, the law does reach “any individual seeking emergency 
room care”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
 43. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1). 
 44. See generally id. § 1395dd(c). 
 45. See Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding 
that the legislative history of EMTALA shows that Congress intended the act to 
prevent hospitals from refusing to treat the uninsured); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1039 
(describing EMTALA as “designed principally to address the problem of ‘patient 
dumping’”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, at 27 (1986) (noting that, according to its 
legislative history, Congress enacted EMTALA to combat the growing problem of 
patient dumping). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, at 27; see Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 
856 (4th Cir. 1994) (defining “patient dumping” as “the practice of refusing to 
provide emergency medical treatment to patients unable to pay, or transferring them 
before emergency conditions were stabilized”); Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the 
Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that EMTALA’s primary 
purpose was to insure that patients who do not normally have access to emergency 
care are not neglected by hospitals). 
 47. See Brooker, 947 F.2d at 414 (finding that the language of EMTALA fails to 
specify specific economic criteria limiting  the types of individuals covered by the 
Act); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040 (noting that EMTALA does not distinguish between 
the insured or uninsured). 
 48. A three-tier court split occurred with respect to the conflict and relationship 
between EMTALA’s legislative history and the statute’s plain language.  Jones v. 
Wake County Hosp. Sys., 786 F. Supp. 538, 542-43 (E.D.N.C. 1991).  First, some 
courts, relying heavily on legislative history, have required proof of an improper 
economic motive on the part of the hospital as an essential element of an EMTALA 
claim.  Evitt v. Univ. Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).  Second, some 
courts have held that EMTALA does not require a plaintiff to prove an improper 
economic motive but does require a showing of some improper motive.  Cleland v. 
Bronson Healthcare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 266 (6th Cir. 1990).  Third, other 
courts have rejected the motive requirement altogether, choosing to rely solely on 
the plain language of the statute.  Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1037. 
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solely to the poor.49  More recently, EMTALA has been interpreted as 
applying to any person who “comes to an emergency department,” 
regardless of their financial status.50 
B. Incentive to Dump Patients 
The incentive to dump patients has arisen from both economic 
and non-economic causes.  Non-economic incentives for which some 
hospitals and physicians have been known to dump patients include 
discrimination based on a patient’s race, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation, as well as a fear of personal liability.51  Some physicians 
have even been known to discriminate against patients with certain 
diseases or undesirable conditions by refusing to treat them.52 
Economic incentives for patient dumping typically revolve around 
four aspects of healthcare and its administration:  the increasing 
number of uninsured;53 healthcare cost containment measures; the 
                                                          
 49. Early in the evolution of the interpretation of EMTALA, some courts believed 
that EMTALA applied only to the poor.  See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (finding that 
EMTALA addresses care of poor patients, not “unfortunate consequences that 
occurred to any and all patients”); Thornton v. S.W. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 
1132 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[t]he Act requires hospitals to give emergency aid 
to indigent patients . . . .”); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Kan. 1990) 
(“Indigent persons denied emergency medical care possess a private cause of action 
under the Act.”); Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 498 (upholding summary judgment for the 
defendant hospital where the plaintiff presented no evidence that she was turned 
away from hospital for economic reasons); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Med. 
Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that EMTALA was designed to 
prevent hospitals from turning patients away because of inability to pay); Thompson 
v. St. Anne’s Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (explaining that EMTALA is 
aimed at preventing hospitals both from transferring and simply rejecting indigent 
patients); Bryant v. Riddle Mem’l Hosp., 689 F. Supp. 490, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1988) 
(noting that EMTALA intended to address the problem of patient dumping). 
 50. See, e.g., Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (rejecting the lower court’s economic 
restriction on EMTALA because “this statute applies to any and all patients.”). 
 51. See Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 
1367 (5th Cir. 1991) (establishing that the physician was not concerned about the 
patient’s ability to pay, but rather transferred the woman for fear of malpractice 
liability); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing numerous non-economic reasons why a hospital might give sub-
standard care, including, “prejudice against the race, sex or ethnic group of the 
patient”); Hines v. Adair County Pub. Hosp. Dist. Corp., 827 F. Supp. 426, 431 (W.D. 
Ky. 1993) (asserting that race, national origin, sex, social status, financial status, and 
politics can be possible factors for an EMTALA claim based on discriminatory non-
treatment); Equal Access to Health Care:  Patient Dumping:  Hearing before a Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong. 1-2 (1997) (statement of Hon. 
Ted Weiss, Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental 
Relations) [hereinafter Equal Access Hearings] (establishing that patient dumping can 
result from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or appearance). 
 52. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 51, at 111 (testimony of Dr. Relman) 
(indicating that the diseases and conditions avoided by physicians included 
tuberculosis and AIDS). 
 53. Any reference to uninsured individuals throughout this Article includes the 
underinsured as well. 
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common law no-duty rule; and ineffective state statutory responses.54  
Increases in the number of uninsured individuals have caused a 
significant strain on the ability of hospitals and physicians to provide 
care to the indigent while remaining solvent.55  With an increase in 
the number of uninsured individuals, there has been a documented 
increase in the number of patients being dumped.56 
Both governmental57 and private58 cost containment measures have 
                                                          
 54. See generally Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping:  Sharpening the 
COBRA’s Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1193-1204 (1986) (explicating the 
relationship of these four factors to the increase in patient dumping and noting that, 
despite a tradition of providing charity care, hospitals are more inclined than ever 
before to dump uninsured people who are unable to pay for medical costs). 
 55. See id. at 1192 (asserting that, due to the modern trend of providing 
healthcare as an employment benefit, millions of unemployed Americans are also 
uninsured).  Furthermore, poor minorities and rural residents are more likely to be 
uninsured.  1 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH 
CARE:  A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY 
OF HEALTH SERVICES 94 (Mar. 1983).  The number of uninsured was particularly 
important in setting the stage for patient dumping in the years immediately prior to 
enactment of EMTALA when cuts in the Medicaid program resulted in Medicaid 
covering less than forty percent of the poor in 1984, as compared to seventy percent 
in 1965.  Robert Reinhold, Treating an Outbreak of Patient Dumping in Texas, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 1986, at E4. 
 56. See Michael A. Dowell, Hill-Burton:  The Unfulfilled Promise, 12 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 153, 153 (1987) (documenting the rise in uninsured from 28.7 to 35.1 
million between 1979 and 1984, which coincided with a new “competitive healthcare 
marketplace,” creating greater incidents of patient dumping); see also Manoach, supra 
note 7, at 241-42 (remarking that the difference in care between insured and 
indigent patients will increase as more hospitals turn to managed care). 
 57. See Treiger, supra note 54, at 1194 (explaining how the prospective payment 
system under which Medicare now operates provides a predetermined sum to the 
hospital for given diagnoses).  Congress adopted a prospective payment system in 
1983 to curb Medicare expenditures.  Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 
No. 98-21, § 601(c)(1), 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww 
(2000)); see also Bruce C. Vladeck, Ph.D., Medicare Hospital Payments by Diagnosis-
Related Groups, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576, 576 (1984) (tracking the 
development of Medicare’s current prospective payment system as a response to the 
widely varied charges of hospitals under the former “reasonable cost” 
reimbursement); Ronda Kotelchuck, Poor Diagnosis, Poor Treatment:  How the DRG 
System Affects Hospitals That Serve the Poor, 16 HEALTH/PAC BULL. 7, 7 (1985) 
(critiquing Medicare’s prospective payment system as one that has a “built in bias” 
against public hospitals that treat the overwhelming majority of Medicare patients); 
Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare Prospective Payment Systems:  
One Administrative Model for Allocation of Medical Resources Under a Government Health 
Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REV. 1151, 1170 (1986) (explaining the prospective 
payment program, where Medicare pays hospitals a “fixed price for each Medicare 
case based on the DRG [diagnosis-related group] in which the patient’s particular 
condition falls”). 
 58. Examples of private cost containment measures include the growth of 
managed care and health maintenance organizations as payers for millions of 
insured.  See Diane E. Hoffman, Emergency Care and Managed Care—A Dangerous 
Combination, 72 WASH. L. REV. 315, 327-40 (1997) (detailing the harm to both 
patients and providers resulting from the conflict between accessing emergency care 
and managed care cost-controlling restrictions on emergency room visits). 
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served as an incentive for patient dumping.  While hospitals have 
struggled to maintain fiscal solvency with respect to various cost 
containment strategies, such strategies have served as an incentive to 
treat fewer poor patients, and have increased the likelihood of 
patient dumping.59 
The common law no-duty rule also serves as a foundation for 
patient dumping.  Under the common law, neither hospitals60 nor 
physicians61 have an affirmative duty to treat patients; therefore, 
either hospital or physician, or both, may acquiesce to economic 
pressures and refuse to treat individuals with emergency medical 
conditions.62  Although numerous courts have attempted to 
reconsider the no-duty rule through theories of “undertaking,”63 
                                                          
 59. Kotelchuck, supra note 57, at 7 (declaring that private hospitals will adjust to 
new cost containment measures by “being highly selective in choosing . . . the 
patients they treat”); Treiger, supra note 54, at 1194 (noting that, despite a tradition 
of social responsibility, hospitals have more incentive to dump uninsured patients 
because of financial constraints of cost containment measures); Arnold S. Relman, 
Economic Considerations in Emergency Care:  What are Hospitals For?, 312 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 372, 373 (1985) (announcing that patient dumping will become more 
prevalent as hospitals seek to maintain their economic security in the face of cost 
containment provisions). 
 60. See Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (holding that hospitals commonly are not under any state common law duty to 
treat patients; when cost containment measures are forced upon them, patient 
dumping increases); Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 157 So. 224, 225 (Ala. 
1934) (asserting that a private hospital does not have a duty to treat patients it deems 
unacceptable and need not give a reason for its refusal of treatment); WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373-75 (5th ed. 
1984) (explaining that liability is imposed for intentional or negligent misfeasance 
but not for nonfeasance, unless there is a special relationship between the parties). 
 61. See Wendy W. Brea, Comment, Preventing “Patient-Dumping”:  The Supreme 
Court Turns Away the Sixth Circuit’s Interpretation of EMTALA, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 615, 621 
(1999) (stating that a physician, under the common law, is not duty bound to treat a 
patient where no doctor-patient relationship exists); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 
1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (determining that, although defendant was the only available 
physician, he was free to refuse treatment and was not required by his state medical 
license to do so); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. App. 1969) (holding that 
a physician-patient relationship had not been established and thus the physician had 
no duty to accept the person as a patient); cf. Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 777 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (determining that when a physician accepts payment to cover 
the services of an emergency department, the physician assents to the bylaws, rules, 
and regulations as a personal, contractual obligation; thus the physician’s duty to 
treat may arise derivatively from contract with hospital). 
 62. The common-law no-duty rule also may influence the non-economic 
discriminatory causes of patient dumping such as fear of personal liability.  See 
Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1367 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (quoting Dr. Burditt: “until DeTar Hospital pays my malpractice 
insurance, I will pick and choose those patients that I want to treat.”).  
 63. See Le Jeune Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1965) (deeming that initiation of treatment established a duty to the patient, 
thereby making the hospital liable for failure to treat); O’Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 
202 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (App. Div. 1960) (finding that a mere phone call from nurse 
to doctor was enough evidence to find the hospital provided adequate attention to 
the deceased). 
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custom,64 negligence,65 reliance,66 public policy,67 federal legislation,68 
or through combinations of theories,69 such attempts remain in the 
minority.70 
Lastly, ineffective state statutory legislation also has provided an 
incentive for patient dumping.71  Although numerous states have 
                                                          
 64. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961) 
(finding that hospital liability may be imposed if the patient relied on the “well 
established custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case”). 
 65. See Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. 1957) (holding that 
the hospital that released an unconscious man as a drunk without diagnosing or 
treating him was liable for negligence when the patient later died). 
 66. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 174 A.2d at 140 (concluding that, due to patient’s 
reliance on a hospital custom to render care, withholding such care creates liability 
on the part of the hospital). 
 67. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975) 
(stating that state statutes create a public policy that a hospital must provide 
emergency care, and as such, may not deny emergency treatment without cause); 
Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 610-11 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) 
(determining that, as a matter of public policy, licensed hospitals must provide 
emergency treatment to those in need, and may not transfer the patient until all 
necessary emergency care has been rendered).  See generally William J. Curran, 
Economic and Legal Considerations in Emergency Care, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 374, 374-75 
(1985) (discussing the overall implications of the Thompson case and the impact it 
will have on hospital policy). 
 68. The no-duty rule was also a target of prior federal legislation in 1946 known 
as the Hill-Burton Act.  Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-1 (1994).  However, the Act was considered a failure in respect to 
assuring that the poor have access to care.  Treiger, supra note 54, at 1198.  In 
exchange for the provision of federal monies for construction and modernization of 
hospitals, Hill-Burton hospitals were required to make their services available to all 
persons residing in the immediate geographical hospital locus and were required to 
provide a reasonable volume of free or below-cost care to any person unable to pay.  
42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(1), (e)(2); 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.501-.513, 124.601-.607 (2001).  The 
Hill-Burton Act was interpreted to require a certain level of annual uncompensated 
services to the poor, which was based on the financial status of the hospital, the 
nature and quantity of services provided by the hospital, and the need for 
uncompensated services within the area served by the hospital.  Corum v. Beth Israel 
Med. Ctr., 373 F. Supp. 558, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Treiger, supra note 54, at 
1198-1201 (critiquing the failures of the Hill-Burton Act, with analogies to the 
infirmities of EMTALA and noting the lack of both incentives for hospital to be in 
compliance with the Hill-Burton Act and punishments for those hospitals found 
disregarding these statutory requirements). 
 69. See Reeves v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 191 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1966) (combining of “undertaking” and negligence theory to find the hospital 
negligent for the misdiagnosis of hypertension that resulted in fatal blood clot on 
brain); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. 1969) (utilizing reliance theory 
and public policy to find duty-liability where the hospital had long-established the 
custom of accepting all persons for emergency treatment upon payment of a twenty-
five dollar fee, and plaintiff relied on such custom). 
 70. See generally Leonard S. Powers, Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 
MICH. L. REV. 1455 (1968) (providing exceptions to the no-duty rule); Fell, supra 
note 24, at 613-17 (discussing the “reliance exception” and the doctrine of 
abandonment as common law efforts to impose a duty upon hospitals to treat 
indigent patients). 
 71. See HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 24, § 6.2.2, at 428 (stating that few 
states provide effective enforcement provisions against patient dumping).  See 
generally Andrew J. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life:  Interpreting the Federal Act Against 
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enacted anti-patient-dumping statutes,72 statutory patient transfer 
regulations,73 or rules regarding the provision of emergency medical 
services to the poor,74 when such laws are considered in light of 
increasing patient dumping, they have been considered notoriously 
“ineffective.”75  The reasons underlying the ineffectiveness of state 
statutory anti-patient dumping regulations are similar to the reasons  
for the ineffectiveness of federal anti-patient dumping legislation:76 
unclear definitions,77 varied scope,78 poor monitoring,79 
                                                          
Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 190-97 (1989) (analyzing state statutory 
attempts to address patient dumping); Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency 
Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act:  Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of 
Improper Economic Motives, 67 N.D. L. REV. 1121, 1124 n.16 (1992) (summarizing 
various state statutory schemes addressing patient dumping). 
 72. Typical state statute anti-patient dumping legislation include:  CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 1317, 1317.2-2a, (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-15-101 to 
26-15-113 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 395.1041(3)(a) (Harrison 1998); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-40 to 31-8-46 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 321-232(b) (Michie 
2000); IDAHO CODE §§ 56-1011 to 56-1081B (Michie 2002); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
80/1 (West 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.400 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2113.4-40:2113.6 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-
307.1 to 19-308.2 (2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 51D, 70E(k) (Law. Co-op. 
1995); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.20201(2)(a) (Michie 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 
(2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 205.989(1) (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 439B.410(1)-(7) 
(Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-18.51c 
(West 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2805-b, 2806(1) (McKinney 2002); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 23-17-19.1(13), 23-17-26(a) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-345 (Law. Co-op. 
2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-140-511 (1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 311.022 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8-8(1) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 36.62.100, 70.170.060(2) (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.301(2) (West 
1997). 
 73. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1317-1317.6 (setting out specified 
requirements for patient transfer regulations, including a requirement that the 
hospital tell the patient the reason for the transfer). 
 74. Id.; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§ 2805-b (McKinney 2002).  Additionally, some states have enacted regulations 
prohibiting the denial of emergency medical care to uninsured patients.  Dowell, 
supra note 56, at 154 n.4; Summary of State Emergency Care:  Statutes and Case Law, 18 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 494 (1984). 
 75. See McClurg, supra note 71, at 197 (noting that half of U.S. states do not have 
emergency care statutes and those that do fail to include a private right of action). 
 76. See HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 24, § 4.10.3, at 324-26 (explaining 
that early federal statutes were also ineffective in addressing patient dumping). 
 77. See Michael A. Dowell, Indigent Access to Hospital Emergency Room Services, 18 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 483, 485-87 (1984) (arguing that one weakness of state 
emergency care statutes is their failure to define what constitutes a medical 
emergency).  For instance, there is no definition of “emergency” contained within 
the state statutes of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.400(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2001); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 23-17-26(a) (2001); or N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 8:43-12.1 (2002). 
 78. State statutory schemes are extremely variable in the scope of their coverage. 
For example, California’s law is quite comprehensive as compared to other states, 
requiring the provision of emergency medical care to the indigent and a patient 
transfer section similar to EMTALA.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000; CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 1317-1317.6.  The access to emergency medical care requires 
individual counties to provide medical assistance to the indigent through public 
hospitals or a social insurance program, and states: 
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[e]very county and every city and county shall relieve and support all 
incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, 
disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not 
supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, or by their own means, 
or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions. 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.  With respect to patient transfers, the California 
statute requires that hospitals with emergency departments provide emergency 
services and care to any person who arrives with a condition in which the person is in 
danger of loss of life, or serious injury or illness.  Id. § 1317(a).  In addition to 
including specific patient transfer procedures, the California statute further forbids 
transfer unless hospital personnel can determine, within reasonable medical 
probability, that the transfer—or delay caused by the transfer—will not create a 
medical hazard to the person.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.2(b)-(e). 
Other state statutes exhibiting varied scope include:  FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 
395.1041(3)(a) (Harrison 1999) (“Every general hospital which has an emergency 
department shall provide emergency services and care for any emergency medical 
condition when:  (1) Any person requests emergency services and care, or 
(2) Emergency services and care are requested on behalf of a person . . . .”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 31-8-42 (2001) (“Any hospital which operates an emergency service shall 
be required to provide the appropriate, necessary emergency services to any 
pregnant woman who is a resident of this state and who presents herself in active 
labor to the hospital.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321-232(b) (Michie 2000) (providing 
that emergency medical services may not be denied on the “basis of the ability of the 
person to pay therefor or because of the lack of prepaid health care coverage or 
proof of such ability or coverage”); IDAHO CODE §§ 56-1011 to 56-1018B (Michie 
2002); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/1 (West 2001) (“Every hospital . . . shall furnish 
such hospital emergency services to any applicant who applies for the same in case of 
injury or acute medical condition.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2113.6 (West 2001) 
(stating that hospital emergency medical services must be available and “free from 
discrimination based on race, religion, or national ancestry and from arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based on age, sex, or physical condition 
and economic status”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 51D (Law. Co-op. 1995) (“No 
acute hospital shall impose any discriminatory restrictions or conditions relating to 
admission, availability of services, treatment, transfer or discharge with respect to any 
patient.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20201(2)(a) (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 
(2001) (“No resident of this state shall be refused admission to or treatment in any of 
the institutions . . . because of his inability to pay all or any of said costs.”); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 439B.410(1) (Michie 1991) (“[E]ach hospital in this state has an 
obligation to provide emergency services and care, including care provided by 
physicians and nurses, and to admit a patient where appropriate, regardless of the 
financial status of the patient.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (1996); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 26:2h-18.51c (West 1996) (“Access to quality health care shall not be denied 
to residents of this State because of their inability to pay for the care.”); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 68-140-511 (2001) (providing broad based anti-discrimination protections by 
stating that hospitals should not discriminate against patients requiring emergency 
medical care due to their uninsured status or their race, sex, religion, creed, national 
origin or ability to pay); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.022 (Vernon 2001) 
(providing for criminal penalties if medical services are denied discriminatorily); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.170.060(2) (West 2002) (“No hospital shall adopt or 
maintain practices or policies which would deny access to emergency care based on 
ability to pay.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.301(2) (West 1997) (“No hospital providing 
emergency services may refuse emergency treatment to any sick or injured person.”); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-115(a) (Michie 1999) (“Emergency service and care shall be 
provided . . . to any person requesting such services or care, or for whom such 
services or care is requested.”).  For a review of state statutes, see generally Hylton, 
supra note 14, at 1023. 
 79. See S. REP. NO. 93-1285, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7842, 7900 
(reporting that Hill-Burton’s implementation by state agencies had been a “sorry 
performance”); Kevin O’Neil, Site Visits at 21 Hill-Burton Facilities Reveal Extensive 
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“non-existent or ineffective enforcement,”80 and minimal remedies.81 
C. Epidemiologic Basis of Patient Dumping 
That patient transfer from the emergency department 
disproportionately affects the poor and racial minorities and 
therefore inequitably reinforces racial and class inequalities of access 
to medical care has been well founded in three medical studies 
known as the:  (1) Harvard Medical School Study;82 (2) Cook County 
Hospital Study;83 and (3) National Association of Public Hospitals 
Study.84  These studies are briefly reviewed as they provide the context 
to understand the environment that led to the enactment of 
EMTALA, and furnish insight as to the type of EMTALA enforcement 
the American public should have expected. 
                                                          
Noncompliance, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 404, 406-07 (1982) (noting that some form of 
non-compliance was uncovered in all but one of the twenty-one sites visited). 
 80. See Dowell, supra note 56, at 161-68 (1987) (stating that the Department of 
Health and Human Services has been criticized by the Senate, House, and General 
Accounting Office as “poorly enforcing uncompensated care compliance”); Dowell, 
supra note 77, at 487 (explaining specific state statutes and their lack of effectiveness 
in ensuring that everyone receives equal treatment in emergency rooms); Fell, supra 
note 24, at 619 (describing how the state statutes protecting emergency treatment 
have failed); Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?:  The Evolution of the Legal Duty to 
Provide Emergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21, 54-57 (1989) (asserting the limited 
potential of most state laws due to the fact that many laws still lack implementing 
regulations and those that do have such regulations impose only minimal fines for 
violations). 
 81. See Rothenberg, supra note 80, at 56-57 (remarking that, even if a state has 
passed these statutes protecting emergency room care, the statutes do not carry 
effective remedies if they are violated).  For example, although the Texas statute 
carries criminal sanctions, it is mostly limited to misdemeanors, except that if, as a 
direct result of the offense the person denied emergency services dies, the offense 
then becomes a felony of the third degree.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 4438(a) (Vernon 2001).  Most states impose minimal fines.  See, e.g., MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-308.2(b)(2) (1990) (providing for a fine not to exceed 
$1000 for transferring a patient in violation of this section of the code); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 146.301(7) (West 1997) (indicating that a violating hospital may be fined no 
more than $ 1000). 
 82. Harvard Medical School Study, supra note 5, at 494.  This study is referred to in 
the legal literature as the “Harvard Medical School” study; however, the patient 
population studied consisted of patient transfers to Highland General Hospital, the 
major public acute care facility in Alameda County, Oakland, California.  Id.  It was 
the researchers of the study, rather than the patients of the study, who were Harvard 
affiliated.  Id. 
 83. Cook County Hospital Study, supra note 22, at 552. 
 84. DENNIS ANDRULIS & LARRY GAGE, NATIONAL ASS’N OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS, 
PATIENT TRANSFERS TO PUBLIC HOSPITALS:  A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT (Apr. 1986). 
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1. Harvard Medical School Study 
The Harvard Medical School Study reviewed 458 patient transfers85 
to Highland General Hospital Emergency Department during a six 
month period of time in 1981.86  This study found that eighty-five 
percent of patients “imperiled by transfer”87 were uninsured,88 and 
thirty-three cases were judged as having received “substandard care” 
at the transferring hospital.89  Although the reason for transfer was 
infrequently recorded,90 no evidence was present that indicated any 
transfer occurred because of lack of beds,91 and only one patient was 
explicitly transferred for a medical indication or service which was 
not provided at the original transferring hospital.92  During the six 
months of the study, only thirteen patients with private insurance 
                                                          
 85. Harvard Medical School Study, supra note 5, at 494.  Only the charts of twenty-
two percent of the patients transferred were reviewed.  Id. at 496. The study only 
excluded psychiatric patient transfers.  Id. at 495.  Demographic data was obtained 
from computerized billing records and patient medical charts.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 494.  The actual study period was from January 1, 1981, through June 
30, 1981.  Id. at 495.  The Harvard Medical School Study suffered from a lack of 
definition of categories and criterion.  Id.  For instance, whereas four physicians 
reviewed patient charts for inclusion of patients into a “high risk” group, the patient 
transfer was “judged dangerous” if all four clinician-reviewers agreed that the patient 
was either (a) at risk of life-threatening complications in transit, or (b) that accepted 
medical practice would require immediate therapy that was delayed by the transfer.  
Id.  However, what the clinician-reviewers considered as “life-threatening 
complications” was not defined in this study.  Id.  The criterion for what was 
“accepted medical practice” was similarly not defined.  Id.  Criteria for inclusion into 
“high risk” group of transferred patients were:  (1) admission to the Intesive Care 
Unit (ICU), Operating Room, or Obstetrics suite; (2) pre-transfer diagnosis of stab 
wound, gun shot wound, motor vehicle accident, fracture or dislocation.  Id. 
Further, the study included “borderline cases.” Id.  But exactly what the clinician-
reviewers considered as “borderline cases” was not defined.  Id.  Although some 
“borderline cases” were identified in which continuous observation or immediate 
treatment might have been preferable (e.g., acute suppurative appendicitis, seizures 
other than status epilepticus, ingestion of undetermined substances), such cases were 
not categorized as “dangerous.”  Id.  Additionally, the study noted that in thirty-three 
cases, “transfer was judged to have jeopardized the patient;” and that such care was 
categorized as “substandard” care.  Id. at 495-96.  However, what the clinician-
reviewers considered as “jeopardized” was not defined in the study.  Id.  The clinical 
conditions, which were the basis for judgment that “substandard care” (thirty-three 
transferred patients) fell into five categories:  (1) cardiac or neurological disorders 
causing life-threatening emergencies; (2) inadequate evaluation or inadequate 
treatment of  central nervous system (3) high risk of exhaustion during transfer; 
(4) undiagnosed traumatic pneumothoraces and/or hemothoraces requiring chest 
tube placement after transfer; (5) severe orthopaedic injuries for which immediate 
therapy was desirable.  Id. 
 87. One can only imagine what was meant by “imperiled by transfer;” the term 
was not specifically defined in this study.  Id. at 495. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 496. 
 91. Id. at 495. 
 92. Id. 
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were transferred,93 and none of those patients jeopardized by transfer 
were privately insured.94 
The authors of the Harvard Medical School Study concluded that 
“in some cases transfers were motivated by financial interests of 
private hospitals and physicians.”95  Further, the study noted that 
“there is evidence that transfer was racially inequitable.  Minority 
patients represented forty-five percent of all those transferred and 
fifty-eight percent of those jeopardized by transfer, although only 
thirty-three percent of the county’s population are “non-White.”96  In 
the community studied, “transfer is a common and potentially 
dangerous medical intervention which appears to reinforce racial 
and class inequalities of access to medical care.”97 
2. Cook County Hospital Study 
The Cook County Hospital Study consisted of a review of 500 
consecutive transfers during a six-week period from November 1983 
to January 1984.98  Eighty-nine percent of the transferred patients 
                                                          
 93. Id. at 496. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 494; see Hyman, supra note 1, at 45 (critiquing this medical study from a 
lawyer’s perspective by addressing the study’s limitations). 
 98. Cook County Hospital Study, supra note 22, at 552.  During this time period, 
there were a total of 602 patient transfers, but only 500 patient admissions were 
included in the study.  Id. at 553.  Only those patients who were subsequently 
admitted to the medical or surgical service were included in the study; patients 
admitted to Ob/Gyn or Pediatrics, or who were discharged from the emergency 
department were excluded.  Id. at 552.  This study consisted of medical chart review 
and patient interviews.  Id. at 552, 553.  Methodologically, the Cook County Hospital 
Study analyzed the following factors:  (1) patient demographics (age, gender, 
ethnicity, employment and insurance status); (2) number of transfers per year; 
(3) reason for transfer; (4) admission to ICU; (5) length of hospital stay; (6) patient 
charges; (7) clinical outcome; (8) stability of the patient’s condition at the time of 
transfer (assessment of stability required consensus among all four physician 
reviewers); (9) treatment delay caused by transfer; (10) informed consent; (11) costs 
incurred by Cook County Hospital; and (12) the number of hospitals which 
transferred to Cook County.  Id. at 552. 
In respect to the assessment of “stability,” patients whose conditions were classified 
as “unstable” had clear evidence of at least one of the following conditions at the 
transferring hospital:  (1) shock (systolic blood pressure of < 100 mm Hg with 
clinical signs of shock); (2) acute cardiac or respiratory insufficiency (arterial partial 
pressure of oxygen < 60 mm Hg, respiratory acidosis, or evidence of severe 
respiratory distress); (3) severe acute metabolic abnormalities, such as diabetic 
ketoacidosis, other unexplained causes of metabolic acidosis, hypoglycemia, or 
severe hyponatremia; (4) abnormal mental status examination or focal neurological 
deficits caused by trauma; (5) abnormal mental status or acute complicated 
cerebrovascular accidents of nontraumatic origin; (6) severe anemia or active 
internal bleeding (with evidence of a dropping hematocrit (HCT) or HCT of less 
than 25% percent, shock, or blood loss of at least 500 ml), a low or dropping HCT, 
vital-organ or vascular injury, unstable spinal fractures, flail chest, or severe facial 
burns; (7) acute abdominal conditions with signs of peritonitis or perforation; (8) 
_ZITO1.DOC 12/12/2002  10:04 AM 
2002] THE INTENTIONAL TORT OF PATIENT DUMPING 193 
were Black or Hispanic,99 and eighty-one percent were unemployed.100  
Most of the patients—eighty-seven percent—were transferred 
because they lacked adequate medical insurance.101  Twenty-four 
percent of the patients transferred were in an unstable clinical 
condition at the transferring hospital at the time of transfer.102  Only 
six percent of the patients had given written informed consent for 
transfer.103  Twenty-two percent required admission to an intensive 
care unit (ICU).104 
This study concluded that patients were transferred to public 
hospitals predominately for economic reasons,105 in spite of the fact 
that many of them were in an unstable condition at the time of 
transfer.106  Patient transfers so disproportionately affected the poor 
and racial minorities that the study raised serious doubts as to the 
private health sector’s ability to consider the condition and well-being 
of patients objectively,107 given the strong economic incentives to 
transfer the uninsured.108 
3. National Association of Public Hospitals Study 
The National Association of Public Hospitals study surveyed twenty-
six public hospitals over a two-week period in 1985.109  This survey 
found that, of 1066 transfer patients, forty-seven percent were 
uninsured and eighteen percent were Medicaid patients.110  The study 
noted that most of the transferred patients were in “serious” 
                                                          
severe hypertension (blood pressure 200/130 mm Hg, with signs of end-organ 
damage); or (9) potentially life-threatening infections (e.g., meningitis, suspected 
sepsis, or complicated infections in diabetic patients or other compromised hosts).  
Id. 
If a patient had a surgical condition, the concurrence of a fifth physician-reviewer 
(board-certified surgeon) was required for the patient to be denominated as 
unstable.  Id.  Treatment delay was defined as the time that elapsed from the transfer-
request phone call to Cook County Hospital until the time the patient was 
discharged from the Cook County Hospital Emergency Department.  Id. 
 99. Id. at 553. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  Forty-six percent of the transfer patients were public aid-Medicaid 
recipients; while another forty-six percent had no insurance at all.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 554. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 553.  The proportion of transferred medical-service patients who died 
was 9.4%, more than twice the proportion of medical-service patients who were not 
transferred.  Id. at 552, 555. 
 105. Id. at 556. 
 106. Id. at 552. 
 107. See id. at 556 (finding that “economic reasons” were what prompted patient 
transfers from other hospital emergency departments to Cook County Hospital). 
 108. Id. 
 109. ANDRULIS, supra note 84. 
 110. Id. 
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condition:  seventy-three percent of the transferred patients required 
emergency services at the receiving hospital, while fifty-four percent 
of uninsured patients requiring emergency treatment at the receiving 
hospital required admission.111 
D. Persistence of Patient Dumping 
Since the enactment of EMTALA in 1986, patient dumping has 
been the subject of little analysis.112  To begin to appreciate the extent 
of penetration of patient dumping into the healthcare system, and to 
understand the extent to which EMTALA and government 
enforcement of EMTALA has been ineffective, one must understand 
the environment in which patient dumping occurs. 
1. The emergency department environment 
In the United States there are approximately 3934 emergency 
departments.113  Physicians who staff the emergency departments have 
varied training and educational backgrounds.  In the year 2000, there 
were approximately 32,000 physicians practicing emergency 
medicine,114 but only 17,300 were board certified by the American 
Board of Emergency Medicine.115  Although board certification is not 
required by law for any physician to practice emergency medicine, 
such certification indicates that a physician has undergone at least 
                                                          
 111. Id. 
 112. See generally Lynn Healey Scaduto, Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act Gone Astray:  A Proposal to Reclaim EMTALA for Its Intended 
Beneficiaries, 46 UCLA L. REV. 943, 953-63 (1999) (noting that the courts have 
addressed patient dumping in EMTALA cases since its passage in 1986, but that little 
else has been done to address the problem). 
 113. LINDA F. MCCAIG & NGHI LY, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NAT’L 
HOSPITAL AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE SURVEY:  1999 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT SUMMARY 
2 (Apr. 2002).  The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) and the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) differ in their assessment of how many emergency 
departments exist in the United States.  Id.  For instance, the CDC reports that there 
were 4005 hospitals with emergency departments in 1997, which decreased to 3934 
in the year 2000.  Id.  However, the ACEP reported that in 1997 there was a total of 
4945 U.S. hospitals which had emergency departments.  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS,  EMERGENCY MEDICINE STATISTICAL PROFILE (July 2001) 
[hereinafter ACEP], at http://www.acep.org/1,381,0.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2002).  
The drop in emergency departments seeing patients is also reflected by the fact that 
in 1994 there were as many as 4791 U.S. hospitals with emergency departments.  Id. 
 114. ACEP, supra note 113, at 1.  This figure was as of July 2001.  Id. 
 115. Id.  “The American Board of Emergency Medicine (ABEM) was [first] 
recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) and the American 
Medical Association (AMA) as the 23rd medical specialty member board” in 1979.  
American Board of Emergency Medicine [hereinafter ABEM], at 
http://www.abem.org/whatis/main.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2002).  As of July 2001, 
there were approximately 1078 physicians board certified in emergency medicine by 
the American Osteopathic Board of Emergency Medicine.  ACEP, supra note 113, at 
1. 
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three years of post-graduate medical training.116  This training 
includes education in emergency medicine as well as other medical 
disciplines.117  Emergency physicians who are not board certified in 
emergency medicine may have as little as one post-graduate year of 
internship or residency training following completion of medical 
school, or may be trained in other specialties of medicine.118 
The extent to which patient dumping occurs in emergency 
departments has not been well studied.  However, while no one 
cumulative source of data is available,119 a careful analysis of all 
available data sources indicates that patient dumping is on the rise.120  
While an accurate estimation of the incidence of patient dumping is 
unavailable,121 one fifteen-year-old study estimated that 250,000 acts of 
patient dumping—in the form of patient transfers—occurred 
annually.122  Despite being frequently cited,123 that figure represents 
                                                          
 116. ACEP, supra note 113, at 1.  Upon completion of an emergency medicine 
residency, the physician then must successfully pass both a written and oral 
examination to be recognized as board certified in emergency medicine.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Association of Emergency Physicians Membership Summary, at 
http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic729.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).  For 
example, emergency physicians may be trained, or partially trained, in other medical 
specialties such as internal medicine, pediatrics, family medicine, or surgery.   
 119. Remarkably, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) does 
not maintain a centralized updated accounting of patient dumping EMTALA 
complaints or violations.  Telephone Interview with Scott Hutchison, Project Analyst, 
Office of Inspector General, Office of Evaluation and Inspections, San Francisco 
Regional Office, Department of Health and Human Services, The Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, The Enforcement Process (Jan. 2002; Feb. 27, 
2002; Feb. 28, 2002); Telephone Interview with Doris Jackson, Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid, Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 
4, 2002). 
 120. See supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text (tracking date over the past two 
decades which illustrates the increase in many types of patient dumping activities). 
 121. See Scaduto, supra note 112, at 968-69 (describing the paucity of information 
on the subject). 
 122. Ansell, supra note 22, at 1500. 
 123. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 1 (“Four and a half years after the 
law went into effect, only 140 hospitals and three physicians responsible for 
approximately 165 violations of the law had been uncovered by government 
investigations, despite the 250,000 “dumping” incidents estimated to occur in 
American hospitals each year.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL:  OUR 
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE? 100 (1997) (“There are no reliable studies of the 
rates of transfer out of emergency rooms since the passage of EMTALA, but one 
study guesses that some 250,000 illegal transfers have taken place.”); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HRG #3, supra note 10, at ii (explaining that studies conducted prior to enactment of 
the “patient dumping” law suggested that 250,000 patients a year were denied 
emergency medical care for economic reasons); Lauren A. Dame, The Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act:  The Anomalous Right to Health Care, 8 HEALTH 
MATRIX 3, 8 (1998) (“Extrapolating from these studies and others, researchers 
estimated that as many as 250,000 patients a year in need of emergency care were 
being “dumped”—transferred from one hospital to another for economic reasons—
by the late 1980s.”); Scott E. Hamm, Power v. Arlington Hospital:  A Federal Court End 
Run Around State Malpractice Limitations, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 335, 338 (1993) (“In 1987, it 
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only an old estimation124 that has never been correlated with either 
total emergency department visits or resulting patient transfers to 
other medical facilities.125  More importantly, such an estimation has 
never been correlated with the lack of government enforcement.126 
To be meaningful, any discussion of patient dumping must be 
placed in context.  That is, patient dumping must be considered in 
light of the total emergency visits and transfers amongst medical 
facilities127 throughout the United States.  The emergency department 
visit and transfer data have been tabulated through the National 
Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS)128 for the years 
                                                          
was estimated that annually 250,000 emergency patients were transferred or 
discharged from health care facilities because of inability to pay for medical 
services.”); Hyman, supra note 1, at 50 (“The claim that 250,000 patients a year are 
dumped is impressive, but is based on generalizing from a skewed sample while 
simultaneously using an overbroad definition.”); Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn:  A 
Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV. 449, 465 (1994) (“One 
expert estimates that 250,000 Americans are wrongly transferred each year.”); Singer, 
supra note 14, at 128 (“One report estimated the incidence of dumping at 250,000 
cases per year.”); Julia Ali, Note, Does EMTALA Apply to Inpatients Located Anywhere in a 
Hospital?, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 581 n.4 (2001) (“Extrapolating from data in available 
studies, an estimated 250,000 patients were transferred for economic reasons.”); 
Bera, supra note 61, at 619 (“Some studies estimate that emergency facilities ‘dump’ 
at least 250,000 patients annually.”); Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Note, Son of Cobra:  
The Evolution of a Federal Malpractice Statute, 45 STAN. L. REV. 263, 266 (1999) (“One 
study estimated that 250,000 Americans were dumped annually.”); Scaduto, supra 
note 112, at 968 (“One 1987 article estimated that 250,000 acts of patient dumping 
occur annually.”); Clare Ansberry, Dumping the Poor:  Despite Federal Law, Hospitals Still 
Reject Sick Who Can’t Pay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1988, at A1 (reporting that 250,000 
patients are dumped annually). 
 124. Ansell, supra note 22, at 1500. 
 125. But see Hyman, supra note 1, at 49 (criticizing the study as overly expansive 
because it used a skewed sample and overbroad definitions). 
 126. See DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 15 (describing the poor 
state of data collection for EMTALA cases, which prohibits a comprehensive 
government enforcement program). 
 127. EMTALA applies to any “movement” of patients, which includes both patient 
transfer and discharge; however, as the 250,000 per year estimate relates to patient 
transfers, this Article will concentrate on the patient transfer application. Ansell, 
supra note 22, at 1500; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (2000) (defining the term 
“transfer” to mean, the movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside 
a hospital’s facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or 
associated, directly or indirectly, with) the hospital, but does not include such a 
movement of an individual who (A) has been declared dead or (B) leaves the facility 
without the permission of any such person. 
Id. 
 128. National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) is a national 
probability survey of visits to hospital emergency and outpatient departments of non-
Federal, short-stay, and general hospitals in the United States.  LINDA F. MCCRAIG & 
CATHERINE W. BURT, NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NAT’L HOSPITAL 
AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE SURVEY:  1999 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT SUMMARY 320 
(June 25, 2001) [hereinafter NHAMCS], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/ad/ad320.pdf.  NHAMCS, a part of the ambulatory care component of the 
National Health Care Survey that measures health care utilization across various 
types of providers, is conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics for 
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of 1992-1999. 
As noted in Table 1, during the period of 1992-1999, although 
emergency department visits increased from approximately 89.8 to 
102.8 million visits per year, a fourteen percent increase, facility 
transfers increased from approximately 1.1 to 1.8 million transfers 
per year, or a sixty-four percent increase.129 
 
TABLE 1 







1992133  255,029 89,796 1093 
1993134  257,782 90,266 1438 
1994135 260,327 93,402 1730 
1995136 262,803 96,545 1751 
1996137 265,228 90,347 1639 
1997138 267,783 94,936 1700 
1998139 270,248 100,385 1798 
1999140 272,690 102,765 1798 
 
130 131 132  133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140  
                                                          
the years of 1992-1999.  Id. 
 129. Infra notes 133-40 and accompanying table. 
 130. U.S. Census Bureau, Monthly Estimates of the U.S. Population Division, available 
at http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/national/nation1/inffile1-1.txt (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2002). 
  131.   NHAMCS, supra note 128 (representing data in thousands). 
  132.  Number of visits in thousands that were transferred to other facilities.  Id.  
Standard of error for facility transfers was calculated by the National Center for 
Health Statistics for the years of 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1999 only, and determined to 
be 85, 124, 141 and 181 respectively. Id. 
 133.  Linda F. McCraig, Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, Nat’l Hospital 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1992 Emergency Department Summary 3 (Mar. 
1994), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad245.pdf [hereinafter, McCraig, 1992 
Survey].  
 134.  Barbara J. Stussman, National Center for Health Statistics, Case Survey: 1993 
Emergency Department Summary 1 (Jan. 1996), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/a 
d/ad271.pdf [hereinafter Stussman, 1993 Survey].  
   135.  Barbara J. Stussman, Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, Nat’l Hospital 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1994 Emergency Department Summary 3 (May 
1996), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad275.pdf [hereinafter Stussman, 1994 
Survey]. 
   136.  Barbara J. Stussman, Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, Nat’l Hospital 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1995 Emergency Department Summary 3 (Apr. 
1997), at   http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad285.pdf [hereinafter Stussman, 
1995 Survey]. 
 137.  Linda F. McCraig & Barbara J. Stussman, Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, 
Nat’l Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1996 Emergency Department 
Summary 4 (Dec. 1997),  at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad293.pdf 
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Accordingly, the estimate of 250,000 illegal patient transfers, made 
in 1987 based on data from 1982 through 1984,141 may have historical 
significance, but it must be considered within the context of 
government efforts to curtail patient dumping.  The number of 
patients transferred from emergency departments as facility transfers 
each year, when compared with the yearly number of actual 
government confirmed EMTALA violations, is most revealing.142 
 
TABLE 2 








%  EMTALA 
Viol. / 
Transfers146 
1992147 1093 315 86 .008 
1993148 1438 340 76 .005 
1994149 1730 370 137 .008 
1995150 1751 457 163 .009 
1996151 1639 349 199 .012 
1997152  1700 448 230 .013 
1998153 1798 412 262 .014 
1999154 1798 n/a 322 .018 
143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154  
                                                          
[hereinafter McCraig, 1996 Survey]. 
 138.  Parivash Nourjah, Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, Nat’l Hospital 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1997 Emergency Department Summary 3 (May 6, 
1999), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad304.pdf. 
 139.   Linda F. McCraig, Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, Nat’l Hospital 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1998 Emergency Department Summary 3 (May 
2000), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad313.pdf [hereinafter McCraig, 1998 
Survey]. 
 140.  NHAMCS, supra note 128. 
 141. Ansell, supra note 22, at 1500. 
 142. See infra Table 2 (observing that the data in Table 2 documents the miniscule 
number of actual government confirmed EMTALA violations as compared to the 
large number of patients transferred from emergency departments as facility 
transfers). 
 143.  Representing the number of facility transfers in thousands. 
 144.  DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 8 fig. 3. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.   This value represents the percent of confirmed EMTALA violations with 
respect to the total of facility transfers as calculated by the National Center for 
Health Statistics for the years of 1992-1999.  Id.  This number is calculated using data 
presented in the “EMTALA Violations” column and the data presented in the 
“Facility Transfers” column.  Id. 
 147.  McCraig, 1992 Survey, supra note 133. 
 148.  Stussman, 1993 Survey, supra note 134.  
 149.  Stussman, 1994 Survey, supra note 135. 
 150.  Stussman, 1995 Survey, supra note 136. 
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As noted in Table 2, although the average number of emergency 
department facility transfers from 1992-1999 was approximately 1.6 
million patients per year, there was only an average of 384 EMTALA 
investigations and 184 EMTALA violations per year.155  Accordingly, 
government enforcement efforts were only able to detect patient 
dumping in an average of approximately 0.01% of emergency 
department facility transfers.156 
2. Patient dumping EMTALA violations 1986-1999 
No national data bank exists to monitor and track cumulative 
occurrences of patient dumping or EMTALA violations.157  Two sets of 
studies, however, provide insight into the magnitude of patient 
dumping and EMTALA violations:  the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) studies 
(DHHS-OIG),158 and the reviews conducted by the Public Citizen 
Health Research Group (PCHRG).159 
Between 1991-2001, the PCHRG published six studies which 
considered the incidence of EMTALA patient dumping violations 
with respect to DHHS and the Health Care Financing Administration 
Agency (HCFA) government investigations and enforcement.160  The 
                                                          
 151.  McCraig, 1996 Survey, supra note 137. 
 152.  Nourjah, supra note 138. 
 153.  McCraig, 1998 Survey, supra note 139. 
 154.  NHAMCS, supra note 128. 
 155. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying table. 
 156. Supra notes 143-54 and accompanying table. 
 157. See DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 15 (reporting that there is 
no uniform data collection format or complete database for EMTALA violations). 
 158. The mission of the OIG, a division of the DHHS, is to protect the integrity of 
the DHHS, as well as the health and welfare of beneficiaries served by them.  Id. at 1.  
The Office of Evaluation and Inspections (“OEI”) is one of several components of 
the OIG which conducts short-term management and program evaluations (called 
inspections) that focus on issues of concern to the DHHS, the United States 
Congress, and the public.  Id.  In that regard, the OIG conducted an inspection to 
evaluate the enforcement process for EMTALA, which was published in January 
2001.  Id. 
 159. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, ABOUT PUBLIC CITIZEN, at 
http://www.citizen.org/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (noting that the Public 
Citizen is a national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization founded by Ralph 
Nader in 1971 to represent consumer interests in Congress, the executive branch 
and the courts).  The Public Citizen Heath Research Group (PCHRG), headed by 
Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, is a division of Public Citizen which promotes research-based, 
system-wide changes in health care policy and provides government oversight 
concerning drugs, medical devices, doctors and hospitals and occupational health.  
The Health Research Group, About the Health Research Group, Public Citizen, at 
http://www.citizen.org/hrg/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2002). 
 160. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 
10; LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, 
PATIENT DUMPING IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOMS:  AN UPDATE BASED ON COMPLAINTS 
RECEIVED BY HHS BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1994 AND MARCH 31, 1995 1 (Mar. 1996) 
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six PCHRG studies were consistent in respect to nine conclusions. 
First, the PCHRG studies noted that complaints to HCFA of 
EMTALA patient dumping violations continued to increase,161 and 
that the agency’s attention to such complaints “clearly 
underrepresented”162 the frequency with which patient dumping 
continued to occur.163  Second, the PCHRG studies identified that 
DHHS’s enforcement record was consistently characterized as 
“meager,”164 “poor,”165 or “lax.”166  The PCHRG studies noted that even 
OIG’s own analysts criticized the enforcement scheme employed by 
the federal government.167  In that regard, the studies noted that 
there continued to be “vast discrepancies”168 in the rate of incidents 
reported and violations confirmed by each of HCFA’s ten regional 
                                                          
[hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5]; LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, HOSPITAL VIOLATIONS OF THE EMERGENCY 
MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT:  A DETAILED LOOK AT “PATIENT DUMPING” 6 
(Dec. 1997) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6]; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra 
note 10; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24. 
Although the name of the HCFA has been changed to Center for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services (CMS), because this Article uses data and information obtained 
from previous HCFA publications, we will continue to use the reference to HCFA, 
rather than CMS.  CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, INTRODUCING CMS, 
available at http://cms.hhs.gov/about/reorg.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). 
 161. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 26 tbl.5 (confirming EMTALA 
violations by 139 different hospitals); id. at 24 tbl.3 (noting the violation of EMTALA 
laws in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, 
supra note 10, at  T3-T11tbl.3 (reporting that, from 1986 through 1992, patient 
dumping violations had occurred in a total of thirty-two states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 6 (noting 
increased complaints of patient dumping incidents received by HCFA each year, and 
explaining that the number of cases brought to the agency’s attention “clearly 
underrepresents” the frequency with which patient dumping occurs); PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 2 (stating that hospital EMTALA violators were 
located in thirty states and Puerto Rico); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 
5 (describing that EMTALA complaints to HCFA continued to increase, again noting 
that this was indicative of the fact that the agency’s attention “clearly 
underrepresented” the frequency with which patient dumping continued to occur); 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 6 (noting 256 hospitals in forty-one 
states and Puerto Rico which were named as being responsible for patient dumping 
violations); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 12 (reporting the “ever-
increasing” numbers of EMTALA violations each year); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, 
supra note 9, at 1 (observing EMTALA violations in forty-six states as well as the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico). 
 162. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, 
supra note 24, at 6. 
 163. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, 
supra note 24, at 6. 
 164. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 2, 7 (noting that DHHS’s 
“meager enforcement record represented a serious failure of its responsibility to 
punish and deter [EMTALA] violations”). 
 165. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 9. 
 166. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 6. 
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offices.169 
Third, repeat hospital offenders were persistent throughout the 
PCHRG studies.170  Fourth, the DHHS consistently fined, but did not 
penalize hospitals for hospital EMTALA violations.171 
Fifth, HCFA’s policy of disclosing only a limited number of 
EMTALA violations to the public172 “kept [the public] largely in the 
dark about patient dumping violations”173 in their own community.174  
Sixth, DHHS had “tragically failed” to meet the challenge posed by 
congressional anti-patient dumping legislation.175  Seventh, the 
healthcare reform measure of universal health coverage176 was a key 
to ending the “unconscionable and deadly practice [of patient 
dumping].”177 
Eighth, the PCHRG studies consistently noted that regional HCFA 
offices were lopsided in their enforcement of EMTALA.178  For 
                                                          
 169. Id. 
 170. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 4-5 (referring to the eighty-five 
hospitals not penalized for their violations, including fourteen hospitals which had 
repeated EMTALA violations); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 6 (noting 
that twenty-three, or nine percent, of the hospitals were repeat offenders); PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 31 (reporting that out of the 527 hospitals in the 
study period 12.9% were repeat dumping offenders). 
 171. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 2 (identifying that 121 
hospitals which violated EMTALA were never penalized by DHHS); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HRG #3, supra note 10, at 6 (noting ninety-one percent of the 244 offending 
hospitals, including twenty-three repeat patient dumping offenders, were never 
penalized); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 2 (reporting only twenty-four 
hospitals, or nine percent, were penalized). EMTALA sanctions may include either 
monetary fines and/or a civil penalty of excluding a hospital from the Medicare 
program. 
 172. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 7 (observing that HCFA had a 
policy of disclosing only a limited number of EMTALA violations to the public); 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at ii (noting that in approximately sixty 
percent of cases wherein hospitals were penalized, the DHHS accepted a settlement 
term by which it agreed not to affirmatively publicize or to dicourtose the 
agreement). 
 173. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 24, at 13. 
 174. Id. at 4. 
 175. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 18; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, 
supra note 10, at 23-24; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 6 
(explaining that the economically-motivated patient dumping of uninsured patients 
that prompted the passage of EMTALA will continue to occur for economic—not 
medical—reasons which could result in harm to patients requiring emergency 
medical care); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 13 (remarking that 
patient dumping from American hospital emergency departments is a “dangerous, 
disgraceful but predictable accompaniment to the market-driven health care system 
in the richest nation in the world”). 
 176. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 8. 
 177. See id. at 6 (arguing that healthcare reform inclusive of uncompromised 
universal coverage “is needed to put a stop to this unconscionable and deadly 
practice [of patient dumping]”). 
 178. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 10, 11.  As noted in the table 
below, both HCFA Regions I and II, which had previously not confirmed any 
EMTALA violations during the first four and one-half years following the effective 
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instance, HCFA Regions I and II found no patient dumping violations 
in the first four and one-half years that EMTALA was in effect.179  
Ninth, the PCHRG studies revealed that for-profit hospitals were 
“greatly overrepresented” amongst patient dumping hospital 
EMTALA offenders.180 
                                                          
date of EMTALA, during the PCHRG study years from 1991 through 1992, 
confirmed only one and nine violations, respectively.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra 
note 10, at 17.  In similar fashion, Regions III, VII, IX, and X continued to confirm 
low numbers of EMTALA violations.  Id.  Regions IV, V and VI, however, continue to 
lead the regions in both number of completed investigations and confirmed 
violations of patient dumping.  See id. (noting HCFA regional enforcement of 
EMTALA remained lopsided); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 6 (finding 
that there continued to be “vast discrepancies” in the rate of incidents reported and 
violations confirmed by each of HCFA’s ten regional offices); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG 
#5, supra note 160, at 5 n.14 (reporting “vast differences” continued in the regional 
HCFA offices with respect to rate of incidents reported and violations confirmed). 
As noted in the following table, cumulative data for the first six and one-half years 
since the effective date of EMTALA (mid-1986 through 1992) also revealed persistent 
lopsided HCFA enforcement of EMTALA. 
 









I 20 1 5% 
II 46 9 20% 
III 83 18 22% 
IV 305 67 22% 
V 96 30 31% 
VI 414 112 27% 
VII 39 12 31% 
VIII 11 3 27% 
IX 149 36 24% 
X 52 11 21% 
Totals 1215 299 25% 
 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-14 fig. 1. 
 179. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 11. 
 180. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 2; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG 
#3, supra note 10, at v, 3 (explaining that, although only 742 of 5704, or thirteen 
percent, of general hospitals were for-profit, 23.5% of hospitals which violated 
EMTALA (63 of 268) were for-profit).  Furthermore, 8.5% of for-profit hospitals 
were caught dumping patients, as compared to 4.1% of not-for-profit hospitals. 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 3 (showing that for-profit hospitals were 
“greatly overrepresented” amongst patient dumping hospital offenders (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl. 179 (1993)).  
Twenty-nine percent of hospitals cited for EMTALA violations were for-profit 
hospitals while only fourteen percent of all general hospitals in the United States 
were for-profit.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 2 n.7 (citing U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl. 182, tbl. 183 (1995) 
(showing that even though for-profit hospitals represented eighteen percent of all 
hospitals in 1993, those for-profit hospitals accounted for twenty-seven percent of 
hospitals cited for patient dumping EMTALA violations); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, 
supra note 9, at 32 (concluding that for-profit hospitals were 1.7 times more likely 
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Notwithstanding discrepancies in nomenclature181 utilized by the 
various reporting organizations182 concerning the number of patient 
dumping EMTALA violations per year, the reported trend is clear:  
not only does patient dumping continue to exist throughout U.S. 
emergency departments, but there is overwhelming evidence that it is 
increasing.183  For instance, in relying upon the DHHS-OIG data, the 
number of EMTALA investigations between fiscal years 1994 and 
1998 averaged approximately 400 a year,184 and as of January 2001, 
the OIG had processed 677 dumping cases.185  When data from the 
DHHS-OIG is considered along with the PCHRG studies, a more 
comprehensive pattern regarding patient dumping is depicted:  a 
continued increase in patient dumping occurred from 1987 through 
1998.186  Figure 1 indicates that from 1987 to 1998, there had been 
approximately a 390% increase in EMTALA investigations187 and a 
683% increase in EMTALA violations.188 
 
                                                          
than not-for-profit hospitals to violate EMTALA patient dumping provisions). 
 181. For instance, differences in data between the DHHS-OIG and the PCHRG 
often can be accounted for on whether (a) an EMTALA violation is reported as 
“reported,” “confirmed,” or the hospital has been “out of compliance;” (b) whether a 
hospital is reported and categorized as “fined,” “not fined,” “violating,” or 
“penalized;” (c) whether, in accounting for an EMTALA violation, the date used is 
the date “out of compliance,” “fined,” or “settled”; (d) whether an investigation is 
started and reported or “confirmed”; (e) whether the OIG has “‘processed’ cases,” 
“settled cases,” or whether cases remain “pending” or (f) whether a fiscal year, 
calendar year, or unequal study period (which may include portions of a fiscal year, 
calendar year, or quarter) are utilized for reporting. Supra notes 69-90 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 79. 
 183. See supra Table 2 (documenting an overall trend in increasing EMTALA 
violations from 1992 through 1999). 
 184. DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 8. 
 185. Id.  The cases which have been processed include cases form fiscal year 2000 
and January 2001.  
 186. See infra Figure 1.  Data for the creation of Figure 1 was obtained from the 
following sources:  for years 1987-1992, data was taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG 
#3, supra note 10, at T-13 tbl.4; for year 1993, data was taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HRG #4, supra note 24, at 6 n.12; for years 1994-1998, data was taken from DHHS, 
OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 8 fig.3. 
 187. The actual data indicates that in 1987 there were approximately eighty-four 
investigations conducted.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-13 tbl.4.  The 
actual data indicates that in 1998 there were approximately 412 investigations 
conducted.  DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 8 fig.3.  The highest 
documented number of investigations, according to the DHHS-OIG, was in 1995, 
when 457 investigations were recorded.  Id.  The highest documented number of 
violations, according to the DHHS-OIG, was in 1996, when 191 EMTALA violations 
were recorded.  Id. 
 188. Id. 
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This increase in patient dumping can also be evidenced from 
examining the actual number of EMTALA hospital violators, number 
of violations, and specific type of major hospital EMTALA violation.189  
For instance, when examining the number of actual EMTALA 
hospital violators, a similar pattern of increased patient dumping 
activity is exhibited.190  Figure 2 illustrates from 1986 to 1999, there  
                                                          
 189. Supra Figure 1. 
 190. See infra Figure 2.  Data for the creation of Figure 2 to depict hospital 
EMTALA violators on a yearly basis was taken from the PCHRG studies as follows:  
data for years 1986-1990 was taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 
23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; data for year 1991 was taken from id. 23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3, and PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6; data for year 
1992 was taken from id. at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6; data for year 1993 was 
taken from id. at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6, and PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, 
supra note 24, at 11-13 tbl.2, 15 tbl.3; data for year 1994 was taken from id. at 11-13 
tbl.2, 15 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 8-13 tbl.1, 14 tbl.2; PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, 15-24 tbl.1, 25-27, tbl.2; data for year 1995 was 
taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 8-13 tbl.1, 14 tbl.2; PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 25-27 tbl.1, tbl.2; data for years 1996 and 1997 
was taken from id. at 25-27 tbl.1, tbl.2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-
59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-140 tbl.3; data for years 1998 and 1999 was taken from id. at 
33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-140 tbl.3.  In taking data from the various PCHRG 
studies, variations in nomenclature were taken into account, such that both hospitals 
which were fined and not-fined were considered; and, where applicable, a preference 
for inclusion into the accounting of a particular year was made for (a) an EMTALA 
violation which was “confirmed,” (b) a hospital which was reported or categorized as 
either “fined,” “not fined,” “violating,” or “penalized;” (c) the date given as “settled” 
or “confirmed,” when available, was preferred for an EMTALA violation; (d) the date 
an investigation was “confirmed,” when available, was preferred; and (e) when 
available, the date a case was “settled” was preferred. 












1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Investigations Violations
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was a 100-fold increase in the total of hospital EMTALA violators.191 
 
 
Figure 3 examines the incidence of major hospital EMTALA 
violations; again, a similar pattern of increased patient dumping 
activity is exhibited.192  There was an eighty-fold increase in major 
hospital EMTALA violations from 1986 to 1999.193 
                                                          
 191. The actual number of hospital violators for the year 1986 was two.  PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 23, tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra 
note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6.  The actual number of hospital 
violators for year 1999 was 198.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 
63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
 192. See infra Figure 3.  Data to create Figure 3, depicting the incidence of major 
EMTALA violations by hospitals, on a yearly basis, was taken from the PCHRG studies 
as follows:  data for years 1986-1992 was taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra 
note 10, 23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 
tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6; data for year 1993 was taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, 
supra note 24,  T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6; id. at 11-13 tbl.2, 15 tbl.3; data for 
year 1994 was taken from id. at 11-13 tbl.2, 15 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra 
note 160, at 8-13 tbl.1, tbl.2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 25-27 tbl.1, 
tbl.2; data for year 1995 was taken from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 
8-13 tbl.1, tbl.2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 15-24 tbl.1, 25-27 tbl.2; 
data for years 1996 and 1997 was taken from id. at 25-27 tbl.1, tbl.2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-140 tbl.3; data for years 1998 and 
1999 was taken from id. at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3.  In taking data from 
the various PCHRG studies, variations in nomenclature were taken into account, 
such that both hospitals which were fined and not-fined were considered; and, where 
applicable, a preference for inclusion into the accounting of a particular year was 
made for (a) an EMTALA violation which was “confirmed,” (b) a hospital which was 
reported or categorized as either “fined,” “not fined,” “violating,” or “penalized;” (c) 
the date given as “settled” or “confirmed,” when available, was preferred for an 
EMTALA violation; (d) the date an investigation was “confirmed,” when available, 
was preferred; and (e) when available, the date a case was “settled” was preferred.   
 193. The actual number of major EMTALA violations by hospitals for the year of 
1986 was four.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, at 23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6.  The actual 
number of major EMTALA violations by hospitals for the year of 1999 was 320.  
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
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Lastly, Figure 4 shows that, when examining the incidence of the 
specific type of major EMTALA violation by hospitals, the increased 
pattern of patient dumping activity persists.194  In fact, from 1986 to 
1999, there was a 139-fold increase in violations of the performance 
of a medical screening examination requirement,195 an approximate 
thirty-seven-fold increase in violations of the requirement of the 
provision of necessary stabilizing treatment,196 and approximately a 
                                                          
 194. See infra Table 5. The data used to create Figure 4, depicting the incidence of 
the specific type of major EMTALA violations by hospitals on a yearly basis, was taken 
from the PCHRG studies.  Specifically, data for years 1986-1992 was taken from 
PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, 23 tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, 
supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6; data for year 1993 was taken 
from id. at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 
24, at 11-13 tbl.2, 15 tbl.3; data for year 1994 was taken from id. at 11-13 tbl.2, 15 
tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 8-13 tbl.1, 14 tbl.2; PUBLIC 
CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 160, at 25-27 tbl.1, tbl.2; data for year 1995 was taken 
from PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #5, supra note 160, at 8-13 tbl.1, 14 tbl.2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
HRG #6, supra note 160, at 25-27 tbl.1, tbl.2; data for years 1996 and 1997 was taken 
from id. at 25-27 tbl.1, tbl.2; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-
71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3; data for years 1998 and 1999 was taken from id. at 33-59 tbl.1, 
63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3.  In taking data from the various PCHRG studies, variations 
in nomenclature were taken into account, such that both hospitals which were fined 
and not-fined were considered; and, where applicable, a preference for inclusion 
into the accounting of a particular year was made for (a) an EMTALA violation 
which was “confirmed,” (b) a hospital which was reported or categorized as either 
“fined,” “not fined,” “violating,” or “penalized;” (c) the date given as “settled” or 
“confirmed,” when available, was preferred for an EMTALA violation; (d) the date an 
investigation was “confirmed,” when available, was preferred; and (e) when available, 
the date a case was “settled” was preferred.  Supra note 192. 
 195. The actual number of violations of EMTALA’s mandatory medical screening 
examination provision in 1986 was zero.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, 23 
tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-
18 tbl.6.  In 1999, the actual number of EMTALA violations in respect to the 
mandatory medical screening examination provision of EMTALA was approximately 
139.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
 196. In 1986, the actual number of violations of the EMTALA provision of 
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fifty-four-fold increase in violations of the provision regulating illegal 
or inappropriate transfers.197 
 
 
Having considered the incentives for, epidemiology of, and 
persistence of patient dumping, along with the congressional 
background of EMTALA, this Article now considers the general 
statutory topography of this Act. 
II. EMTALA STATUTORY TOPOGRAPHY 
To further appreciate how EMTALA has been ineffective in 
curbing patient dumping, it is important to understand its statutory 
topography.  Two factors are critical in this understanding:  (a) the 
relation of EMTALA to state medical malpractice causes of action 
and (b) the core statutory EMTALA provisions. 
A. State vs. Federal Medical Malpractice 
Any meaningful solution to patient dumping must address the 
relationship between patient dumping and medical malpractice.  
                                                          
necessary stabilizing treatment was two.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, 23 
tbl.2, 24 tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-
18 tbl.6.  The actual number of 1999 violations of the EMTALA provision of 
necessary stabilizing treatment was seventy-four.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 
9, at 33-59 tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
 197. In 1986, the actual number of violations regarding illegal or inappropriate 
transfer provisions was two.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #2, supra note 10, 23 tbl.2, 24 
tbl.3; PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #3, supra note 10, at T-3 to T-11 tbl.3, T-17 to T-18 tbl.6.  
In 1999, the actual number of violations of illegal or inappropriate transfer 
provisions was approximately 107.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 33-59 
tbl.1, 63-71 tbl.2, 127-40 tbl.3. 
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This relationship has confused both state and federal judicial and 
legislative branches of government.198 Such confusion has hampered 
EMTALA statutory compliance and thereby permitted patient 
dumping  persistently to increase. 
To be sure, Congress did not intend EMTALA to serve as a federal 
medical malpractice statute.199  Rather, by enacting EMTALA, 
                                                          
 198. See Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303 (La. 2002) (providing an example of a 
state court misunderstanding the nature of patient dumping).  From a federal point 
of view, Congress, and the resultant federal judicial opinions in accord, further 
confuse the relationship between patient dumping and medical practice; for 
instance, while some state courts have held that patient dumping is included within 
the practice of medicine, therefore subject to a state’s medical malpractice act, 
Congress and the federal courts have indicated that EMTALA is not a federal 
malpractice statute, suggesting that patient dumping is not a subject of malpractice.  
Compare Burks v. St. John’s Hosp., 596 N.W.2d 391, 396-98 (Wis. 1999) (concluding 
that medical malpractice can include “failure to treat,” and therefore, the failure to 
provide health care services can be negligent and violate the state-imposed standard 
of care for hospitals and physicians), and Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 303 (allowing a claim 
of patient dumping to be heard under state medical malpractice law), with Summers 
v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(stating that claims of misdiagnosis fall squarely under state tort law while patient 
dumping falls solely under EMTALA), and Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 
(11th Cir. 1994) (noting that no federal malpractice claims are created under 
EMTALA and the Act is designed to address an area of law, specifically failure to 
treat, that is not covered by state medical malpractice law). 
 199. See Marshall v. E. Carroll Parish Hosp., 134 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(agreeing that EMTALA was not created to be a federal malpractice statute); 
Summers, 91 F.3d at 1136-37 (disagreeing with the notion that EMTALA creates a 
federal cause of action for malpractice); Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 
139, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that EMTALA liability analysis should not be done 
in “hindsight”); Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) (declaring 
that no cause of action for malpractice was created by the passage of EMTALA); 
Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
EMTALA was not designed as a national standard of care for screening patients); 
Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (observing that EMTALA was not intended to remedy 
negligent treatment or diagnosis); Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 
(4th Cir. 1994) (asserting that EMTALA cannot be substituted for traditional areas of 
state law, such as malpractice); Repp v. Anadarko Mun. Hosp., 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (explaining that neither malpractice nor negligence causes of action can 
be derived from EMTALA); Urban ex rel. Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 
1994) (concluding that EMTALA creates neither a malpractice nor negligence cause 
of action); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (acknowledging that new protections found under EMTALA are not 
duplications of legal protections existing under state law); Cleland v. Bronson 
Healthcare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that it is unlikely 
that EMTALA was intended by Congress to be a general malpractice statute); Lebron 
v. Ashford Presbyterian Cmty. Hosp., 995 F. Supp. 241, 243 (D.P.R. 1998) 
(announcing that EMTALA was only intended as an anti-dumping statute and was 
not intended to create federal causes of action for negligence or malpractice); 
Torres Nieves v. Hosp. Metropolitano, 998 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D.P.R. 1998) (restating 
that EMTALA does not create a cause of action for either misdiagnosis or 
malpractice); Scott v. Hutchinson Mem’l Hosp., 959 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (D. Kan. 
1997) (affirming previous holdings refusing to recognize a cause of action for 
malpractice derived from EMTALA); Tank v. Chronister, 941 F. Supp. 969, 972 (D. 
Kan. 1996) (clarifying that EMTALA was intended to create a new cause of action 
separate from malpractice and negligence); Hart v. Mazur, 903 F. Supp. 277, 280 
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Congress intended to create a new federal cause of action for “failure 
to treat” a patient, which it recognized as patient dumping.200  
EMTALA was “not intended to duplicate preexisting legal 
protections.”201  However, holding that EMTALA is not a subject of 
federal malpractice permits the inference that patient dumping is a 
subject of state medical malpractice.202  We contend that courts and 
                                                          
(D.R.I. 1995) (emphasizing that Congress did not intend for EMTALA to expose 
hospitals to new causes of action for malpractice).  But see Metropoulos, supra note 
123, at 263 (reviewing the implications of COBRA as a federal malpractice law). 
Thus, questions that related to the adequacy of a hospital’s medical standard 
screening procedure were intended to “remain the exclusive province of local 
negligence law.”  Vickers, 78 F.3d at 143 (concluding that the accuracy of diagnosis is 
a matter strictly in the province of state tort law rather than a concern under 
EMTALA); Power, 42 F.3d at 856 (reiterating that EMTALA is not a substitute for 
other medical torts); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (agreeing that malpractice and 
negligence claims remain causes of action under state law); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271-
72 (noting that EMTALA is not intended to determine what ‘adequate’ screening 
procedures would be in emergency rooms); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 
(D. Kan. 1990)(asserting that improper emergency department diagnosis and 
treatment do not fall under federal anti-dumping provisions but rather under state 
negligence law); Evitt v. Univ. Heights, 727 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D. Ind. 1989) 
(determining that claims regarding treatment and diagnosis are to remain within the 
areas regulated by state law).  Also, presumably, an EMTALA claim is not to be 
judged by the accuracy of diagnosis or the quality of treatment but rather whether 
treatment was provided equitably to all patients with similar conditions.  See Marshall, 
134 F.3d at 322 (clarifying that ‘appropriateness’ under EMTALA results when the 
hospital provides equitable screening to all patients with similar symptoms); Summers, 
91 F.3d at 1138-39 (noting that faulty screening does not fall within the realm of 
EMTALA provision); Vickers, 78 F.3d at 143-44 (disagreeing with the contention that 
EMTALA imposes a duty on hospitals requiring that screening procedures result in 
the correct diagnosis); Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192-93 (calling for regular screening 
procedures under EMTALA, violation of which results if those procedures are not 
followed in specific instances); Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258 (holding that failure to 
detect decedent’s suicidal tendency is not actionable under EMTALA but it is likely 
actionable under state malpractice law); Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (asserting that 
hospitals must apply the same screening procedure to all patients including those 
without insurance); Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 (directing that hospitals must follow 
established screening procedures with each patient that enters the emergency 
room); Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(contending that claims arising from physician or hospital personnel misdiagnosis or 
negligent treatment should be brought under state malpractice theories of recovery); 
Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (agreeing that a hospital violates EMTALA when it 
departs from its standard screening procedures, regardless of the reasons for the 
deviation); Torres Nieves, 998 F. Supp. at 132 (ruling that, in order to comply with 
EMTALA, a hospital must conduct screening of all persons who seek medical 
attention). 
 200. See H.R. REP. NO. 241, pt. 3, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 
727 (describing a “new federal cause of action”). 
 201. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (holding that EMTALA was enacted to create a 
remedy for “failure to treat” that was not previously available under state tort law as 
opposed to overlapping with preexisting legal protections); see also Thornton v. S.W 
Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that the cause of 
action created under EMTALA is not analogous to traditional state medical torts 
because it created a remedy for “failure to treat,” which state law does not address). 
 202. See Burks, 596 N.W.2d at 399 (holding that the tests used to determine if one 
of EMTALA’s regulations was violated are “effectively indistinguishable” from state 
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legislatures cloud the relationship between patient dumping and 
patient care by addressing whether EMTALA is a federal malpractice 
statute, which improperly implies patient dumping is in fact a 
medical malpractice tort. 
Confusion regarding the relationship of EMTALA to state medical 
malpractice also stems from the fact that EMTALA and state medical 
malpractice suits frequently coexist.203  Often this is because there are 
strategic advantages in filing both an EMTALA and a state medical 
malpractice cause of action.  These advantages have included:  
(1) skirting state tort reform,204 (2) multiple recovery for both state 
                                                          
malpractice laws, lending to the inference that if certain conduct by the treating 
hospitals and physicians are not covered under EMTALA it would likely be allowed as 
a cause of action under state law). 
 203. See Hamm, supra note 123, at 348 (noting that further analysis of state causes 
of action, such as personal injury and medical malpractice, substantiate the notion 
that EMTALA and malpractice damages are closely related).  The relationship 
between medical negligence and possible resultant EMTALA liability was discussed in 
one state court that not only analogized an EMTALA claim with a malpractice claim, 
but it also applied comparative fault principles.  See Clark v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. 
Ctr., 657 So. 2d 741, 746-47 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (looking at a scenario in which the 
patient was transferred into the hospital, and as a result, whether a ‘failure to treat’ 
remedy is appropriate); cf. Griffith v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., 842 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 
(D. Kan. 1994) (holding that comparative fault is not applicable because a plaintiff is 
not required to prove negligence in order to recover under EMTALA). 
 204. See Robert A. Bitterman, A Critical Analysis of the Federal COBRA Hospital 
“Antidumping Law”:  Ramifications for Hospitals, Physicians, and Effects on Access to 
Healthcare, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 125, 172-75 (1992) (noting this legislation may 
effectively “dismantle state malpractice tort reforms” that have been previously 
passed).  The skirting of state “tort reform” limitations might include state 
malpractice screening panels; unfavorable state limits, or “caps” on liability damages.  
Id.  However, whether state caps on medical malpractice damages apply to EMTALA 
cases is another area exhibiting judicial confusion, where some courts have held that 
state caps on medical malpractice damages apply to EMTALA damages.  See Reid v. 
Indianapolis Osteopathic Med. Hosp., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 852, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989) 
(deciding on a case of first impression that the $100,000 cap on malpractice damages 
applied to an EMTALA action); Lee ex rel. Wetzel v. Alleghany Reg’l Hosp. Corp., 778 
F. Supp. 900, 903-04 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding limitation on malpractice recoveries 
applies to EMTALA claims, as failing to read incorporation clause as including 
malpractice caps would render clause meaningless); Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 
972 P.2d 966, 974-76 (Cal. 1999) (holding that California’s medical injury cap of 
$250,000 for non-economic losses was applicable to an EMTALA failure to stabilize 
claim, because if the claim were brought under state law the cap would have been 
applied); Diaz v. CCHC-Golden Glades, Ltd., 696 So. 2d 1346, 1347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997) (concluding that EMTALA intended to incorporate the “vagaries of state 
medical malpractice” when determining damages). 
Not unexpectedly, some courts have held that state caps on medical malpractice 
damages do not apply to EMTALA damages.  See Power v. Arlington Hosp., 800 F. 
Supp. 1384, aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. 42 F.3d 851, 869 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(announcing that an EMTALA plaintiff may recover damages above a state 
malpractice damage cap); Cooper v. Gulf Breeze Hosp., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1538, 
1542-43 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (following Power and holding that U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(d)(2)(A) did not incorporate Florida’s medical malpractice law); Spradlin 
v. Acadia-St. Landry Med. Found., 711 So. 2d 699, 702-03 (La. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding state caps do not apply to EMTALA); see also Power, 42 F.3d at 869 (Ervin, 
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (endorsing “excellent and lucid opinion” 
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and federal claims,205 and (3) strategic leverage.206 
However, although EMTALA and state causes of action for medical 
negligence may coexist,207 they are different.208  For example, while 
traditional state malpractice cases apply a negligence standard,209 a 
strict liability standard is commonly applied under EMTALA.210  
Another difference is that EMTALA preempts all state and local laws 
that conflict with its requirements.211 
                                                          
of the district court in Power, and finding no evidence of congressional intent to limit 
EMTALA damages with state malpractice caps). 
 205. See Bitterman, supra note 204, at 170-75 (noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys may 
add COBRA violation claims to their malpractice actions to recover civil monetary 
penalties). 
 206. See id. at 164-69 (arguing that strategic leverage over a defendant hospital 
may be achieved by raising the hospital’s potential loss of its Medicare participation 
and tax exemption status, which could follow a finding of violation. 
 207. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #4, supra note 24, at 2 n.4 (finding that patient 
dumping and medical malpractice claims are usually combined involving emergency 
services); Bitterman, supra note 204, at 170-75 (noting COBRA violation are often 
coupled with state medical malpractice causes of action). 
 208. See Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (acknowledging that there may be overlap between EMTALA causes of action 
and traditional state law causes of action, but that EMTALA is intended to provide a 
separate remedy while leaving the adequacy of hospital procedure, screening, and 
diagnosis under the province of state law). 
 209. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 30, at 164-65 (articulating the necessary 
elements of a negligence cause of action:  duty, breach, causation, and damages). 
 210. See Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass’n, 950 F.2d 676, 681 
(10th Cir. 1991) (finding that the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a),(c), impose 
a strict liability standard for EMTALA violations); Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 
920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that it was the literal “mandatory 
language” of EMTALA that imposes a strict liability standard); Reid v. Indianapolis 
Osteopathic Med. Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (indicating that 
strict liability principles were the basis for EMTALA); see also discussion infra Part II.G 
(discussing preemption between EMTALA and state medical malpractice standards). 
 211. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (2000) (“The provisions of this section do not 
preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the 
requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section.”).  Although some 
believe that EMTALA creates neither a statutory duty of care nor standard of care.  
See Jack E. Karns, Hospital Screening Procedures and the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA):  Proof of “Improper Intent” Not Necessary in Failure to Stabilize 
Cases, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 355, 357 (2000) (arguing that the purpose of EMTALA is 
to give all patients comparable care and that EMTALA does not set out to create 
either a statutory duty of care or a standard of care for physicians). 
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B. Core EMTALA Provisions 
The core provisions of EMTALA include the following 
requirements:  (1) medical screening,212 (2) necessary stabilizing 
treatment,213 (3) no delay in examination or treatment,214 (4) transfer 
standards,215 (5) refusal to consent216/refusal to transfer,217 
(6) preemption,218 (7) nondiscrimination,219 and (8) civil 
enforcement.220  As noted in Table 3, some EMTALA provisions have 
pertinent subcomponents affecting both hospital and physician 
understanding and compliance, as well as government enforcement. 
                                                          
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
 213. Id. § 1395dd(b). 
 214. Id. § 1395dd(h). 
 215. Id. § 1395dd(c). 
 216. Id. § 1395dd(b)(2). 
 217. Id. § 1395dd(b)(3). 
 218. Id. § 1395dd(f). 
 219. Id. § 1395dd(g). 
 220. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2); see infra Table 3. 
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 42 USC § 1395dd(b) 
No Delay  42 USC § 1395dd(h) 
Transfer of unstable 
patients 
42 USC § 1395dd(c)(1) Transfer 
Requirement 
Appropriate transfer 42 USC § 1395dd(c)(2) 
Refusal of Treatment  42 USC § 1395dd(b)(2) 
Refusal to Transfer  42 USC § 1395dd(b)(3) 
Preemption  42 USC § 1395dd(f) 
Nondiscrimination  42 USC § 1395dd(g) 
Civil Monetary 
Penalties 
42 USC § 1395dd(d)(1) Enforcement 
Civil Enforcement 42 USC § 1395dd(d)(2) 
 
Since federal courts have viewed the language of EMTALA 
disparately, the major EMTALA components and subcomponents are 
reviewed briefly below. 
1. Medical screening examination 
A common area of confusion leading to statutory EMTALA 
violations221 and litigation, occurs in § 1395dd(a) of EMTALA, known 
as the “medical screening examination” requirement.222  The section 
contains three subcomponents:  “emergency medical condition,”223 
“comes to the emergency department,”224 and “appropriate medical 
                                                          
 221. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #1, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that 90.1% of 
violating hospitals violated the screening, stabilizing treatment or transfer provisions 
of EMTALA subcomponents). 
 222. Id. at 13 (noting that hospitals often incorrectly assume that providing a 
“Triage” exam to a patient by a nurse satisfies the EMTALA provision). 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
 224. Id. 
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screening examination.”225  Section 1395dd(a) of EMTALA 
specifically provides: 
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, 
if any individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a request is 
made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a 
medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate 
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s 
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely 
available to the emergency department, to determine whether or 
not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.226 
a. “Emergency Medical Condition” 
Healthcare providers often have difficulty understanding what 
actually constitutes an “emergency medical condition.”227  Many 
healthcare providers believe an “emergency medical condition” is, or 
should be, defined in terms of medical practice.228  However, 
EMTALA defines an “emergency medical condition” by federal 
statute and not by medical practice.229  Section 1395(e)(1)(A) 
specifically defines an emergency medical condition as: 
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of 
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result 
in:230 
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a 
pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in 
serious jeopardy;231 
(ii)  serious impairment to bodily functions;232 or serious dysfunction 
of any bodily organ or part.233 
                                                          
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. (emphasis added). 
 227. See DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 15 (noting providers’ 
difficulty understanding the “emergency medical condition” requirement of 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)).  In respect to pregnant women, the statute defines “an 
emergency medical condition to exist in a pregnant woman, who is having contractions, 
if:  (i) there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital before 
delivery, or (ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or 
the unborn child.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). 
 228. See DHHS-OIG EMTALA Survey, supra note 25, at 13-14 (noting that providers 
often find the definition of “emergency medical condition” unclear). 
 229. See id. at 6 n.2 (defining “emergency medical condition” by federal statute). 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 231. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
_ZITO1.DOC 12/12/2002  10:04 AM 
2002] THE INTENTIONAL TORT OF PATIENT DUMPING 215 
b. “Comes to the Emergency Department” 
The phrase “comes to the emergency department”234 in 
§ 1395dd(a) provides a source of confusion and litigation for health 
care providers.  The case of Arrington v. Wong235 demonstrates a 
common judicial interpretation of the meaning of the EMTALA 
phrase.236 
Arrington237 involved the diversion of an ambulance carrying a 
patient experiencing severe respiratory distress238 to the emergency 
department of one hospital to a more distant hospital.239  The patient 
                                                          
 234. Id. § 1395dd(a). 
 235. 237 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 236. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (discussing several court 
decisions in relation to the Arrington decision). 
 237. In Arrington, Harold Arrington (“Arrington”), on May 5, 1996, while working 
as a security guard, experienced difficulty breathing while driving to his job.  
Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1066.  Upon arrival to his work site, an ambulance was 
summoned, which took Arrington to the closest medical facility, Queen’s Medical 
Center (Queen’s hospital).  Id.  While in route to the Queen’s Hospital emergency 
department, the ambulance personnel contacted the hospital by radio. Id.  
Ambulance personnel informed Dr. Norbert Wong, the emergency physician on duty 
that evening, that Arrington was “in severe respiratory distress speaking 1-2 words at a 
time and . . . breathing about fifty times a minute.”  Id.  After being informed of 
Arrington’s medical condition, ambulance personnel notified Dr. Wong that the 
patient was a “Tripler [Army Medical Center] patient, being that he was in severe 
respiratory distress we thought we’d come to a close facility.”  Id. at 1070.  Dr. Wong 
responded:  “I think it would be okay to go to Tripler.”  Id.  Accordingly, ambulance 
personnel drove the patient to Tripler, which was approximately five miles further 
than Queen’s Hospital.  Id.  By the time the ambulance arrived at Tripler, 
Arrington’s condition had deteriorated.  Id.  Arrington was pronounced dead 
approximately thirty-seven minutes after his arrival at Tripler.  Id. 
In a suit against Queen’s Hospital, the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that the 
plaintiff suffered a heart attack on the way to work, and that the emergency physician 
(Dr. Norbert Wong) at the initial designated receiving hospital (Queen’s) redirected 
the ambulance to a more distant hospital (Tripler), and that as a result, Mr. 
Arrington dies soon after arrival. included four allegations.  Id. at 1068.   
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on 
the ground that in light of EMTALA, Arrington had never “come to” Queen’s 
emergency department.  Id. at 1069.  The district court concluded that EMTALA 
applied only in the case of a patient’s “physical presence” in the emergency 
department.  Id.  Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
Id.  The dispositive issue for the court of appeals concerned the legislative 
construction of “come to the emergency department.”  Id. at 1070. 
The Arrington court concluded that the patient, Arrington, was in a non-hospital-
owned ambulance en route to Queen’s hospital, and the ambulance personnel 
contacted the hospital’s emergency department on his behalf and requested 
treatment.  Id. at 1072-73.  Accordingly, the plain language of the DHHS’s rules 
required the hospital to treat Arrington unless the hospital maintained “diversionary 
status.”  Id. at 1073.  Queen’s hospital did not contend that it maintained 
“diversionary status” at the time Dr. Wong directed Arrington to the more distant 
Tripler facility.  The judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded to the 
district court.  Id. 
 238. Id. at 1069. 
 239. Id. 
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died within thirty-seven minutes of arrival at the second hospital.240  
The Arrington court found the meaning of “comes to an emergency 
room” ambiguous.241  Accordingly, the court relied on principles of 
statutory construction and interpretation,242 as well as the DHHS 
interpretive regulations for EMTALA243 as a basis for its holding. 
Recognizing the DHHS’s expansive interpretation of “comes to the 
emergency department,” the Arrington court reasoned that 
individuals in non-hospital-owned ambulances have unquestionably 
“come to the hospital” when the ambulance is on hospital property.244  
Furthermore, the court noted that, if ambulance personnel contact 
the hospital to request permission to transport the individual to the 
hospital for examination and treatment, the hospital may not deny 
                                                          
 240. Id. 
 241. See id. at 1071 (recognizing the confusion surrounding Congress’s 
requirements regarding when an emergency patient’s location, with respect to the 
hospital, triggers a hospital’s EMTALA obligation). 
 242. See id. at 1070 (noting four basic canons of statutory construction and 
interpretation relevant to the court’s holding).  First, the court noted that, 
ordinarily, courts simply apply the unambiguous terms of a statute to the case before 
them.  Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984) for the proposition that both courts and administrative agencies 
must follow the unambiguous intent of Congress regarding statutory language).  The 
court noted, where the language of the statute is clear on its face, courts are only 
permitted to examine the specific and general statutory context in which the phrase 
is used in order to discern a determinate meaning.  See id. at 1070 (citing Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 441 (1997) for the proposition that ambiguous statutory 
language is deciphered by evaluating the specific context of the language, the 
language’s everyday use and the context of the statute as a whole); see also Estate of 
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (noting that where the 
intent of Congress is expressed in unambiguous terms, the reviewing court should 
not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 
136, 139 (1991) (stating that statutory language must always be viewed in the correct 
context); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (stating that statutory context 
clarifies ambiguous language of a statute); King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 
221 (1991) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 26 (1988) for 
the proposition that the meaning of statutory language often depends on the 
situation’s context). 
 243. See Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1071 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504 (1982) for the proposition that 
administrative agency regulations interpreting a rule “will often suffice to clarify a 
standard with an otherwise uncertain scope”).  The DHHS had promulgated 
regulation 42 C.F.R. § 489.24, which interpreted EMTALA section 1395dd(a)’s 
“comes to the emergency department” language as follows: 
An individual in a non-hospital-owned ambulance off hospital property is not 
considered to have come to the hospital’s emergency department, even if a 
member of the ambulance staff contacts the hospital by telephone or 
telemetry communications and informs the hospital that they want to 
transport the individual to the hospital for examination and treatment.  In 
such situations, the hospital may deny access if it is in “diversionary status,” that 
is, it does not have the staff or facilities to accept any additional emergency 
patients. 
Special Responsibilities of Medicaid Hospitals in Emergency Cases, 42 C.F.R. 
§ 489.24(b) (2001) (emphasis added). 
 244. Arrington, 237 F.3d at 1072. 
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the individual access unless it “is in ‘diversionary status,’”245 or unless it 
has a valid treatment-related reason for denying access.246  The 
Arrington court further noted that, even if a hospital maintained 
diversionary status, if an ambulance continued to the hospital in spite 
of an instruction to take a patient elsewhere, the patient still “comes 
to” the hospital and emergency treatment must be provided.247 
c. “Appropriate Medical Screening Examination” 
The third subcomponent of the medical screening examination 
EMTALA section is the phrase “appropriate medical screening 
examination.”248  Federal courts are split widely on the meaning of 
this phrase and the standard of care which should be applied in 
order to achieve compliance.249  Such confusion, again, promotes 
EMTALA non-compliance and poor government enforcement.250  
The meaning cannot be sufficiently described without understanding 
its accompanied standard of care; the meaning of the “appropriate 
medical screening examination” is discussed below.251 
Federal courts utilize an objective,252 subjective,253 and a burden-
shifting254 standard of care to define the meaning of “appropriate 
medical screening examination.”  Some federal circuits, such as the 
Ninth Circuit, are split within their own circuit.255  For instance, as 
                                                          
 245. See id. (defining diversionary status as a hospital that “does not have the staff 
or facilities to accept any additional emergency patients” (citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24)) 
(emphasis added). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24).  The court stressed that the DHHS “clearly 
recognized” that hospitals could abuse the Act by simply diverting all persons in 
emergency straits before they arrive on hospital property.  Id.  Accordingly, under 42 
C.F.R. § 489.24, a hospital must show that it maintains diversionary status in order to 
divert emergency patients.  Id.  A hospital maintains diversionary status when it lacks 
either the staff or facilities to treat a patient.  Id. 
 248. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
 249. See infra notes 398-510 and accompanying text (discussing the contrasting 
applicable standards of care for EMTALA). 
 250. See DHHA, OIG EMTALA Survey, supra note 25, at 13 (discussing providers’ 
confusion surrounding EMTALA requirements). 
 251. See infra notes 399-495 and accompanying text (contrasting the objective with 
the subjective standard of care applied to various EMTALA provisions). 
 252. See infra notes 425-33 and accompanying text (discussing the objective 
standard of care applied to the “appropriate medical screening examination” 
component of EMTALA). 
 253. See infra notes 434-50 and accompanying text (explaining the subjective 
standard of care applied to the “appropriate medical screening examination” 
component of EMTALA). 
 254. See infra notes 451-55 and accompanying text (describing the burden-shifting 
standard of care to be applied to the appropriate medical screening examination 
component of EMTALA). 
 255. See infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (discussing the contrasting 
viewpoints of the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinions).  By no means is the Ninth Circuit 
the only federal circuit with an internal split regarding the meaning or standard of 
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discussed below,256 the Ninth Circuit, in Eberhardt v. City of Los 
Angeles,257 propounded an objective standard of care when defining 
the meaning of “appropriate medical screening examination.”258  In 
contrast, in Jackson v. East Bay Hospital,259 the Ninth Circuit adopted 
the “comparative test.”260  The court noted that a hospital satisfies 
EMTALA’s “appropriate medical screening” requirement if it 
provides a patient with an examination comparable to the one 
offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms.261  Following 
this reasoning, the Jackson court adopted an equitable or subjective 
standard.262 
                                                          
care applied to the phrase “appropriate medical screening examination.”  Compare 
Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 858 (4th Cir. 1994) (advocating a 
burden-shifting standard in respect to the “appropriate medical screening 
examination” component), with Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (advocating a subjective or equitable standard explaining that EMTALA 
requires hospitals to implement a uniform screening examination, but that it does 
not guarantee the accuracy of the emergency personnel’s diagnosis). 
 256. See infra notes 429-31 and accompanying text (discussing Eberhardt v. City of 
Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995) in detail). 
 257. 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 258. Id. at 1257. 
 259. 246 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Jackson case involved a patient with a 
history of psychiatric and psychological illnesses who was treated with numerous 
psychiatric medications.  Id. at 1252.  After being evaluated in an emergency 
department and psychiatric specialty service on several occasions over a period of a 
few days, the hospital determined that the patient lacked a diagnosed emergency 
medical condition.  Id. at 1252-53.  After ultimately being admitted to a psychiatric 
facility, the patient experienced a cardiac arrest and died.  Id. at 1253.  An autopsy 
determined that Jackson died from sudden cardiac arrhythmia, caused by acute 
psychotic delirium, initially caused by clomipramine (Anafranil) toxicity.  Id.  The 
doctors and nurses that monitored Jackson at Redbud failed to diagnose him as 
suffering from Anafranil (or other drug) toxicity.  Id.  The Jackson court held that the 
district court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed when 
Jackson received initial screening examinations that satisfied Redbud’s EMTALA 
obligations.  Id. at 1256.  Further, the Jackson court upheld the district court’s 
rejection of the argument that Jackson required different treatment from other 
patients because he exhibited psychiatric, and not just physical, symptoms as 
groundless.  Id. 
 260. See id. (citing the objective standard language of Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258).  
The Jackson court also stated that the central issue surrounding EMTALA procedures 
is whether a procedure is designed to identify acute and severe symptoms indicating 
an “emergency medical condition.”  Id. at 1255. 
 261. See id. at 1256 (stating that the court affirmatively adopted the comparative 
test used by several other circuits).  But see id. (citing Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1257, for an 
exception for examinations that are so short that they cannot identify symptoms that 
alert physicians to a patient’s immediate need for medical attention). 
 262. See id. at 1255 (citing several different circuit opinions for the proposition 
that a hospital is only required to provide a screening examination “comparable to 
that offered to other patients with similar symptoms”); see also Marshall v. E. Carroll 
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1998) (identifying that “a 
treating physician’s failure to appreciate the extent of the patient’s injury or 
illness . . . may constitute negligence or malpractice, but cannot support an EMTALA 
claim for inappropriate screening . . . .  It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that the 
Hospital treated her differently from other patients . . . .”); Summers v. Baptist Med. 
Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1139 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that 
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2. “Necessary Stabilizing Treatment” and the “Actual Knowledge” rule 
EMTALA imposes a duty of stabilization on both the hospital and 
the emergency physician.263  The duty of stabilization, unlike the duty 
to perform an appropriate medical screening examination,264 does 
not arise unless the hospital obtains “actual knowledge” of the 
patient’s unstable emergency medical condition.265  The actual 
knowledge rule has expressly served as a condition precedent to the 
stabilization requirement in at least six of the federal circuits.266 
                                                          
improper screenings of patients for discriminatory reasons, failure to screen patients 
or treating patients differently from other patients violate EMTALA provisions but 
mere negligent or faulty screenings by the hospital do not violate EMTALA); 
Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that, in order for hospitals to meet the ‘appropriate medical screening’ 
standard set up by EMTALA, the hospital must conform “its treatment of a particular 
patient to its standard screening procedures”); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care 
Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that a screening is appropriate 
within the meaning of EMTALA if a hospital treats a patient in the same manner as 
paying patients). 
 263. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)-(2) (2000).  See id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (defining “to 
stabilize” as providing medical treatment of a condition that may be necessary to 
assure, “within reasonable medical probability,” that no material deterioration of the 
condition is likely to occur during a transfer); id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B) (defining 
“stabilized” as a state where no material deterioration of a condition is likely “within 
reasonable medical probability,” to result from a transfer). 
 264. See discussion infra Part III.D (noting that an “actual knowledge” requirement 
is not associated with the medical screening examination).  A conjunctive or 
disjunctive interpretation of EMTALA, with respect to the relationship of the 
necessary stabilizing treatment provision, actual knowledge rule, and medical 
screening examination requirement, is interpreted by the federal circuits with wide 
variation resulting in significant confusion amongst healthcare providers.  Discussion 
infra Part III.D. 
 265. See Battle v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 228 F.3d 544, 558 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(noting that the duty to stabilize does not arise unless the hospital has actual 
knowledge of the patient’s unstable condition); see also Brenord v. Catholic Med. Ctr. 
of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (articulating 
that EMTALA’s stabilization transfer requirements are only triggered after a 
hospital’s determination of an emergency medical condition (citing Gatewood, 933 
F.2d at 1041)); Fuentes Ortiz v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 327, 332 
(D.P.R. 2000) (“If ‘any individual . . . comes to a hospital and the hospital determines 
that the individual has an emergency medical condition,’ the hospital must try to 
stabilize that condition, and can shift the patient to another institution only in 
accordance with EMTALA’s transfer provisions . . . . [I]f no emergency condition is 
detected, there is no duty to stabilize.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b))); Otero v. 
Hosp. Gen. Menoita, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 253, 259 (D.P.R. 2000) (explaining that 
“[t]he duty to stabilize arises with respect to any individual who comes to a hospital 
after the hospital determines that the patient has an emergency medical condition” 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) and Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173 (1st 
Cir. 1999))); Pagan v. Hosp. San Pablo, Inc., 97 F.Supp. 2d 199, 202 (D.P.R. 2000) 
(“The duty to stabilize is triggered if the patient arrives at the hospital and the 
hospital determines that the patient has an emergency medical condition.” (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)). 
 266. See Jackson, 246 F.3d at 1257 (noting that the Ninth Circuit rule requiring a 
showing of actual knowledge as a condition precedent to the stabilization 
requirement adheres to the rule in five other circuits); see, e.g., Summers, 91 F.3d at 
1140 (finding that a hospital must determine that a patient has an emergency 
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EMTALA, in fact, contains parallel yet separate definitions of the 
terms “to stabilize”267 and “stabilized.”268  The term “to stabilize” 
indicates what the hospital must do to a patient who has an 
emergency medical condition and requires necessary stabilizing 
treatment, but who is not transferred in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(c).269  “Stabilized,” on the other hand, refers to the 
condition in which the patient must be to transfer him or her, other 
than in accordance with the restrictions of § 1395dd(c).270 
If a hospital has actual knowledge of the emergency medical 
condition, it then must provide either “within the staff and facilities 
available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and 
such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, 
or for transfer of the individual to another medical facility . . . .”271  
Under EMTALA, “to stabilize” means “to provide such medical 
treatment of the emergency medical condition as may be necessary to 
assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material 
deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during 
the transfer of the individual from a facility.”272 
                                                          
medical condition before the EMTALA stabilization requirement applies (citing 
Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1996))); Gatewood, 933 
F.2d at 1041 (stating that a hospital’s diagnosis of an individual’s emergency medical 
condition triggers the stabilization and transfer provisions of EMTALA); Vickers, 78 
F.3d at 145 (observing that a hospital must have actual knowledge of an emergency 
medical condition and that EMTALA does not apply even if the hospital should have 
diagnosed such a condition).  Only one court has held that a hospital has a duty to 
stabilize an emergency medical condition even under circumstances where it had no 
knowledge of such condition.  See Carodenuto v. New York City Health & Hosp. 
Corp., 593 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (requiring stabilization of an 
emergency medical condition even if the hospital does not diagnose the condition).  
This reasoning relies, however, on the language of the transfer provisions, which, 
unlike the stabilization requirements of EMTALA, do not contain a knowledge 
requirement.  Id. 
 267. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). 
 268. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). 
 269. See id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).  This section provides that “to stabilize,” with 
respect to an emergency medical condition, means: 
to provide such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to 
assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration 
of the condition is likely to result or occur during from the transfer of the 
individual from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical 
condition, to deliver (including the placenta). 
Id. 
 270. See id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).  This section also provides that “stabilized,” with 
respect to an emergency medical condition, means: 
that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable 
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the 
individual from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical 
condition, that a woman has delivered (including placenta). 
Id. 
 271. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
 272. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
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The court in Burditt v. United States Department of Health & Human 
Services273 further clarified that such treatment consists of “treatment 
that medical experts agree would prevent the threatening and severe 
consequences of the patient’s emergency medical condition while in 
transit.274  In that regard, professional medical standards, rather than 
standards established by each hospital, determine the adequacy of a 
particular patient stabilization,275 thereby making such a legal 
determination patient-specific, contextual, and situational,276 yet 
commensurate with an objective standard of care.277 
3. No-delay requirement 
The EMTALA “no delay in examination or treatment”278 
requirement provides that “[a] participating hospital may not delay 
provision of an appropriate medical screening examination required 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a),”279 or delay necessary stabilizing 
treatment required under subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b),280 “in 
order to inquire about the individual’s method of payment or 
insurance status.”281  Frequently, emergency departments will delay a 
patient’s medical screening examination or stabilization treatment in 
order to inquire about the patient’s payment status—EMTALA 
expressly forbids this delay.282  After stabilization of the emergency 
medical condition, EMTALA no longer applies and prior 
authorization for further services is permitted.283  Some states also 
                                                          
 273. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 274. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added). 
 275. See Cherukuri v. Shalala, 175 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying a 
flexible standard to determine the sufficiency of stabilization treatments and finding 
that the standard varies based on the reasonableness of treatment under the 
immediate circumstances). 
 276. See id. at 449-50 (stating that the definition of “stabilize” requires a “fast on-
the-spot risk analysis” by the transferring physician based on the particular situation). 
 277. See notes 399-495 and accompanying text (comparing the objective versus the 
subjective standard of care with respect to physician liability). 
 278. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.; see also HCFA Interpretive Guidelines § 489.24(c)(3), available at 
http://www.hcfa.gov/pubforms/07_som/somap_v_013_to_034.htm (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter HCFA Interpretive Guidelines] (stating that all 
individuals, whether or not they are insured, must be served if they have an 
emergency medical condition).  As such, a hospital should not delay its provision of a 
medical screening examination or necessary stabilizing treatment by inquiring about 
a patient’s ability to pay for the care.  Id.  In addition, although a hospital may 
register new patients by following reasonable processes, which may include asking 
patients about insurance coverage, a hospital may not delay the screening or 
treatment of patients with emergency medical conditions in order to follow such 
registration processes.  Id. 
 282. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
 283. See id. (prohibiting delays in the provision of a medical screening 
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prohibit prior authorization calls until after the patient receives a 
medical screening examination and any necessary stabilizing 
treatment.284 
4. Transfer requirements 
EMTALA regulates patient transfers, and states that a “transfer” 
occurs when a hospital employee directs the movement, including 
discharge, of a patient outside a hospital’s facilities.285  However, 
EMTALA only governs transfers of patients who have unstabilized 
emergency medical conditions.286  Thus, if a medical screening 
examination is “appropriate” and does not reveal an emergency 
medical condition, or indicates that an emergency medical condition 
has been stabilized, EMTALA does not govern a transfer.287  
Accordingly, EMTALA provisions apply in two scenarios where 
unstable patients are commonly transferred:  (1) transfers of unstable 
                                                          
examination and any necessary stabilization treatment only). 
 284. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (West 2000) (requiring the 
provision of emergency services and care prior to inquiring about the payment 
therefore); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 395.1041(3)(h) (Harrison 1999) (providing that a 
Florida hospital may ask a patient about insurance or other financial information 
provided that the questioning does not delay emergency services or care). 
 285. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4).  This provision includes movement directed by any 
person employed by, or directly or indirectly affiliated, or associated with the 
hospital.  Id.  It does not include, however, any movement of a patient who has been 
declared dead or who leaves the hospital without a hospital employee’s permission.  
Id. 
 286. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1).  EMTALA does not restrict hospitals concerning the 
treatment or transfer of individuals with stabilized emergency conditions.  Hospital 
Responsibility for Emergency Care, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,104 (June 22, 1994) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 489). 
 287. See Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 59 Fed. Reg. at 32,104 
(stating that, under EMTALA, hospitals may transfer an individual with stabilized 
emergency medical conditions without meeting the requirements of an appropriate 
transfer); see Cherukuri v. Shalala, 175 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1999) (observing that 
EMTALA does not limit the transfer of stabilized patients); Green v. Truro Infirmary, 
992 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that the treating hospital met its 
responsibility under EMTALA, and could discharge the patient, when the hospital 
stabilized the patient’s condition); Delaney v. Cade, 756 F. Supp. 1476, 1486 (D. Kan. 
1991) (stating that a hospital does not violate the statute when it releases or transfers 
a patient whose condition is stabilized prior to the release or transfer); Clark v. Baton 
Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 657 So. 2d 741, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that 
EMTALA does not require a hospital to cure a patient’s emergency medical 
condition and that a hospital’s responsibility under EMTALA ends when it stabilizes 
such a condition); see also HCFA Interpretive Guidelines, supra note 281, at V-29 
(noting that certification of the transfer is not required if the individual no longer 
has an emergency medical condition).  Although not covered by EMTALA, transfers 
of stabilized patients may be governed by state transfer laws.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1317.2 (West 2000) (delineating the requirements for transferring a 
patient for nonmedical reasons); NEV. REV. STAT. 439B.410 (2001) (specifying the 
conditions that a hospital must satisfy prior to transferring a patient to another 
hospital); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.027 (Vernon 2001) (regulating 
patient transfers). 
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patients which are medically necessary and (2) transfers of unstable 
patients which are at the request of the patient.288 
a. Transfer of unstable patients 
A hospital may legally transfer unstable patients to another hospital 
where (1) the transfer is medically necessary, or (2) the patient 
requests the transfer.289  Medical indications for transfer of patients 
generally arise out of the necessity for a higher level of care which is 
not available at the initial treating hospital.290  These inadequacies 
                                                          
 288. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1). 
 289. Id.  Naturally, when a physician and hospital transfer a patient to obtain a 
higher level of care, but cannot stabilize the patient prior to the transfer, the transfer 
should occur only when the initial treating hospital first minimizes the risks of 
transfer to the unstabilized patient.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (defining an 
appropriate transfer as one in which the transferring hospital minimizes the risks to 
the patient’s health).  This would include, for example, control of blood pressure, 
perfusion, and ventilation.  See, e.g., Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 449, 451 (finding that 
where the physician stabilized the patient’s blood pressure, even though the 
physician did not have the resources available to immediately stabilize all the 
patient’s emergency medical conditions, the physician stabilized the patient to the 
best of his ability for transfer to another facility).  If a patient requests a medically 
unstable transfer, EMTALA provides that if the individual has an unstabilized 
emergency medical condition, the hospital may not transfer the individual unless the 
individual, “after being informed of the hospital’s obligations under [EMTALA] and 
of the risk of the transfer, in writing requests transfer to another medical facility.”   
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i).  In patient-requested unstable transfers, as well as 
medically-necessary unstable transfers, the transfer must satisfy EMTALA criterion 
for an “appropriate” transfer.  See id. § 1395dd(c)(2) (listing the requirements of an 
appropriate transfer).  Under EMTALA, an appropriate transfer is a transfer: 
(A) in which the transferring hospital provides the medical treatment 
within its capacity which minimizes the risks to the individual’s health 
and, in the case of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child; 
(B) in which the receiving facility— 
  (i) has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of the 
individual, and 
  (ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide 
appropriate medical treatment; 
(C) in which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all 
medical records . . . related to the emergency condition for which the 
individual has presented, available at the time of the transfer, 
including records related to the individual’s emergency medical 
condition, observations of signs or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, 
treatment provided, results of any tests and the informed written 
consent or legal certification . . . and the name and address of any on-
call physician . . . who has refused or failed to appear within a 
reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing treatment; 
(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and 
transportation equipment, as required including the use of necessary 
and medically appropriate life support measures during the transfer; 
and 
(E) which meets such other requirements as the Secretary [of DHHS] may 
find necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals 
transferred. 
Id. 
 290. Such a transfer may result, for example, where the initial treating hospital 
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include insufficient resources, capabilities, or expertise at the initial 
treating hospital, and may preclude the transferring hospital’s ability 
to completely stabilize a patient’s emergency medical condition.291  
Thus, where the benefits of transfer outweigh the risks of transfer, 
EMTALA specifically requires the transfer of unstable patients292 in an 
appropriate manner.293 
1) Legal certification 
When an individual at a hospital has an unstabilized emergency 
medical condition, as defined by the statute,294 the hospital may not 
transfer the individual unless a physician has signed a legal 
certification.295  The legal certification indicates that “based upon the 
information available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits 
reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical 
treatment at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to 
the individual and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child.”296 
This legal certification process implies that the transferring 
emergency physician believes that the receiving facility has the 
                                                          
does not provide orthopedics, neurosurgery, OB, neonatal, or pediatric wards.  See  
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g) (listing “burn units, shock-trauma units, [and] neonatal 
intensive care units” as examples of specialized capabilities). 
 291. See Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 449 (finding a transfer appropriate where the 
transferring hospital did not have an anesthesiologist immediately available to 
perform a medically-necessary surgery). 
 292. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B). 
 293. See infra notes 294-309 and accompanying text.  As noted earlier, EMTALA 
does not govern the transfer of stable patients.  Hospital Responsibility for 
Emergency Care, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,104 (June 22, 1994) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 489).  The court in Cherukuri v. Shalala clearly found that the act does not 
impose any requirements on hospitals with respect to the treatment or transfer of 
individuals whose emergency condition has been stabilized.  175 F.3d at 446, 449.  In 
Cherukuri, the court further noted that, where a physician believes that a transfer will 
not materially deteriorate a patient’s condition, the physician may transfer the 
patient without a certification or the consent of the receiving hospital.  Id. at 450.  
However, state statutes may govern transfers of stable patients.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 1317.2 (West 2000) (stating a hospital’s responsibilities in 
transferring a patient); NEV. REV. STAT. 439B.410 (2001) (detailing the conditions 
precedent to a patient transfer); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.027 
(Vernon 2001) (discussing the necessary steps for transferring a patient). 
 294. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B)(ii). 
 295. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Thus, only medically-necessary transfers of 
unstabilized patients require a legal certification.  See id. (prohibiting the transfer of 
patients with unstabilized medical conditions unless a physician signs a legal 
certification).  Although hospitals may have preexisting “transfer agreements” 
amongst themselves, EMTALA requires that all transfers of patients with unstabilized 
emergency medical conditions satisfy the requirements of legal certification.  See id. 
(failing to provide an exception for preexisting transfer agreements); cf. id. 
§ 1395dd(f) (noting that EMTALA preempts state laws that directly conflict with 
EMTALA requirements, thereby indicating that EMTALA will prevail over hospital 
agreements that create similar discrepancies). 
 296. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
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necessary resources, capabilities, and expertise to stabilize the 
patient’s emergency medical condition.297  The legal certification 
must weigh, not merely mention, the medical risks and benefits 
associated with the transfer of the unstable patient.298 
The standard for determining the legal sufficiency of the 
certification—that is, whether a transferring emergency physician, or 
hospital, “negligently”299 completed the certification—is the objective 
standard of reasonableness under ordinary negligence standards.300  
This same standard would apply to evaluating the conduct of either 
the hospital or the emergency physician.301  The dispositive legal issue 
is whether, under the specific patient’s circumstances, the certifying 
“physician knew or should have known that the benefits [of transfer] did 
not outweigh the risks [of transfer].”302 
2) Patient informed consent 
A patient’s informed consent is a key concept in EMTALA.  A 
hospital has fulfilled its obligations to a patient who refuses to 
consent to the treatment of an emergency medical condition when 
the hospital offers the individual further treatment and informs the 
patient of the risks and benefits of such treatment, and yet the patient 
still refuses treatment.303 
                                                          
 297. Cf. id. § 1395(c)(1) (stating that the certification must contain a summary of 
the risks and benefits underlying the certification, thereby implying that the 
physician must be aware of the benefits that the patient will receive at the other 
facility).  If a physician is not immediately available to sign the legal certification, the 
EMTALA statute provides that a “qualified medical person” (e.g., a nurse, physician 
assistant, etc.) may sign the legal certification, so long as they previously consulted 
with a physician who will later countersign the certification.  Id. § 1395(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
 298. Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1362 
(5th Cir. 1991) (finding that EMTALA requires the signer of a certification to 
deliberate and weigh the risks and benefits of a transfer prior to signing the 
certification). 
 299. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (noting that a hospital may face civil damages if it 
“negligently” violates a requirement of EMTALA). 
 300. Cherukuri v. Shalala, 175 F.3d 446, 449-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing a 
treating physician’s need to make quick determinations regarding the stabilization 
and transfer of a patient and applying an objective standard of reasonableness to 
those decisions). 
 301. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B) (applying the standard of negligence to the 
actions of both a participating hospital and a physician responsible for the 
examination, treatment, or transfer of a patient in a participating hospital). 
 302. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). If a physician signs a 
certification that the medical benefits of a transfer to another facility outweigh the 
risks that the physician “knew or should have known” otherwise, or if the physician 
misrepresents a patient’s medical condition or other information, the physician may 
face civil monetary penalties.  Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 303. Id. § 1395dd(b)(2).  A person acting on the patient’s behalf can also refuse to 
consent to recommended examination and treatment.  Id. 
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3) “Appropriate” transfer 
Under EMTALA, there are five conditions precedent to an 
“appropriate” transfer of an unstable patient.304  A transfer to a 
medical facility is “appropriate” where (1) the transferring hospital 
provides the patient medical treatment within its capabilities which 
minimizes the risks to the individual’s health, or the health of the 
unborn child for a woman in labor; (2) the receiving facility has 
space and qualified personnel to treat the individual, and agrees to 
accept and treat the individual; (3) the transferring hospital sends 
the receiving facility all relevant, available medical records; (4) the 
individual is transferred by qualified personnel and transportation 
equipment; and (5) other requirements established by the Secretary 
of DHHS, in the interest of the individual’s health and safety, are 
satisfied.305 
Where a hospital “has reason to believe” that it received a 
transferred patient in violation of EMTALA, it must report the 
transferring hospital to the Health Care Financing Administration 
(“HCFA”)306 or the state survey agency.307  A hospital has an obligation 
to report a possible EMTALA violation regardless of whether the 
receiving hospital believes the sending hospital violated the law 
intentionally or with any ill motive.308  Either physicians or hospitals 
may violate the statute, but physicians do not have a corresponding 
obligation to report a suspected EMTALA obligation.309 
                                                          
 304. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See supra note 160 (noting that although the Health Care Financing 
Administration changed its name to Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
(CMS), because this Article uses data and information obtained from previous HCFA 
publications, this Article will continue to use the reference to HCFA rather than 
CMS). 
 307. Provider Agreements and Supplier Approval, 42 C.F.R. § 489.20(m) (2001). 
 308. See Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,107 
(June 22, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 489) (observing that hospitals that 
suspect cases of dumping are “in the best position to discern when an inappropriate 
transfer has taken place in violation of the statute”). 
 309. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.20(m) (requiring a hospital to report suspected transfer 
violations by another hospital); Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 59 Fed. 
Reg. at 32,106-07 (discussing a hospital’s duty to report suspected violations).  
However, for EMTALA purposes, a physician may be considered the agent of the 
hospital such that a receiving hospital must report his actions if the receiving hospital 
suspects that the physician violated the statute.  See BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 19 
(stating that EMTALA duties attach to physicians as agents of the hospital when the 
physicians accept hospital medical staff privileges or on-call duties, making the 
hospital directly liable for physicians’ violations); Burditt v. United Staes Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1374 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[H]ospital physicians 
who treat patients in fulfillment of their contractual responsibilities are the hospital’s 
agents for purposes of such treatment.”). 
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b. Transfer of stable patients 
EMTALA does not govern the transfer of stable patients;310 
however, such transfer may be governed by state statutes.311  The 
terms “to stabilize”312 and “stabilized”313 are defined under EMTALA. 
5. Refusal to consent to treatment/refusal to consent to transfer 
EMTALA does not thwart patient autonomy or patient decision-
making.  Although hospitals and physicians must perform various 
activities and provide various services under EMTALA, a patient’s 
refusal to consent to treatment,314 or refusal to consent to transfer,315 
will not subject a hospital or physician to liability under EMTALA.316 
6. Preemption 
Congress anticipated that matters relating to the governance of 
patient dumping would concern both state and federal matters.317  
                                                          
 310. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(I)(ii) (restricting transfer of medically unstable 
patients only). 
 311. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.5 (West 2000); NEV. REV. 
STAT. 439B.410(4) (2001); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.027 (Vernon 
2001), as examples of states which have enacted patient transfer laws which do apply 
to stable transfers. 
 312. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A); see supra note 264 (defining both “to stabilize” 
and “stabilized”). 
 313. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).  The court in Cerukuri v. Shalala was clear in 
noting that “[t]he act does not impose any requirements on hospitals with respect to 
the treatment or transfer or individuals whose emergency condition has been 
stabilized.”  175 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 314. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(2) (stating that a hospital fulfills its duty to provide 
medical screening examinations and medical treatment, as may be required to 
stabilize a patient’s medical condition, if the hospital offers the individual further 
medical examinations and treatment and informs the individual of the risks and 
benefits of such examinations and treatment, but the individual refuses to consent). 
 315. Id. § 1395dd(b)(3) (providing that a hospital meets its obligations to provide 
medical screening examinations and medical treatment if the hospital offers to 
transfer the individual to another medical facility and informs the individual of the 
risks and benefits of such a transfer, but the individual refuses to consent). 
 316. Under either of these circumstances, the hospital must take all reasonable 
steps to obtain a “written informed consent to refuse” from the individual.  Id. 
§ 1395dd(b)(2)-(3).  With respect to a refusal to consent to medical examination or 
treatment, the patient’s medical records must contain a description of the refused 
examination or treatment and the written informed refusal should indicate that the 
hospital informed the person of the risks and benefits of such procedures.  Provider 
Agreements and Supplier Approval, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(2) (2001).  For a refusal to 
consent to transfer, the patient’s medical record must indicate that the hospital 
informed the patient of the risks and benefits of the transfer, state the reasons for 
the patient’s refusal, and contain a description of the refused transfer.  Id. 
§ 489.24(c)(4). 
 317. See Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Med. Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. 
Ind. 1989) (commenting on Congress’s awareness of state concerns during its 
drafting of EMTALA provisions).  Reid, a seminal case which tested the extent to 
which COBRA preempts state law, involved the allegedly inappropriate transfer of 
the victim of an automobile accident.  Id. at 853.  The patient died shortly after the 
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Accordingly, Congress provided that the provisions of EMTALA do 
not preempt the requirements of any state or local law except where 
a state or local requirement directly conflicts with EMTALA.318  Thus, 
EMTALA specifically envisions that some procedural matters are 
better left to state discretion.319  Often concerns of EMTALA 
preemption arise under (a) circumstances of private rights of action 
by the victim or survivors against the hospital or emergency physician, 
(b) issues of capping recovery awards under a state’s medical 
                                                          
transfer.  Id.  The hospital defendant attempted to invoke the protection of Indiana 
law that required review of malpractice cases by a medical review panel and limited 
damages to $100,000.  Id. at 854.  The court held that Indiana law, which states that a 
cause of action does not arise against a hospital until a state medical review panel 
renders an opinion, “directly conflicts with section 1395dd’s provision that such a 
cause of action arises whenever ‘[a]ny individual . . . suffers personal harm as a direct 
result of a requirement of [EMTALA].’”  Id. at 855.  The court did find, however, 
that the $100,000 damage cap applied to COBRA cases.  Id. at 855-56. 
 318. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).  This preemption provision relies on the familiar 
principle of unius est exclusion alterius (the mention of one thing implies the exclusion 
of the other).  See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (noting that 
where Congress includes a provision that defines a statute’s pre-emptive reach, the 
statute does not preempt any matter beyond that reach).  To determine whether 
federal law preempts a state statute, a court must ascertain Congress’s intent.  Cal. 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987); see also Burgio & 
Campofelice, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(stating that Congress’s intent controls a preemption analysis).  When Congress 
expressly defines a statute’s preemptive reach, and the statute provides “a reliable 
indicium of congressional intent” regarding the reaches of state authority, there is a 
“reasonable inference” that Congress did not intend to preempt matters beyond that 
reach.  Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995); see also Toy Mfrs. of 
Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 623 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the application 
of the rule in Cipollone).  A state statute directly conflicts with federal law when 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a “physical impossibility.”  See 
also Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (noting 
that a court does not have to examine congressional intent where compliance with 
both state and federal is a “physical impossibility”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941) (determining preemption by considering whether a state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”); Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 
1988) (listing several ways in which a federal law preempts state law). 
 319. See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 
1996) (holding EMTALA is not intended to preempt state tort law except where 
absolutely necessary).  Also, state law generally will control in respect to the issue of 
preemption and punitive damages related to EMTALA violations.  See Taylor v. Dallas 
County Hosp. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 437, 438 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (denying punitive 
damages based on Texas law which precluded punitive damages); see also Griffith v. 
Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., 826 F. Supp. 382, 385 (D. Kan. 1993) (denying punitive 
damages based on Kansas law that precludes punitive damages in wrongful death 
cases).  Similarly, state tort law controls the effect and applicability of intervening 
agency or superceding causes in respect to liability.  See Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 
48 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 1995) (denying EMTALA damages because under state law 
the plaintiff was unable to prove proximate cause in a state wrongful death claim); see 
also Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697-98 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying EMTALA 
damages because the plaintiff was unable to prove negligence under state law due to 
an intervening event). 
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malpractice regulatory scheme,320 or (c) as may relate to statutes of 
limitations321 or other state procedural formalities often related to 
medical malpractice causes of action.322 
7. Enforcement and private causes of action 
Within DHHS, EMTALA is enforced by the HCFA and the Office 
of Inspector General (“OIG”).323  The HCFA authorizes state survey 
agencies to investigate complaints of patient dumping in order to 
determine if there was a violation.324  The OIG’s Office of Counsel to 
the Inspector General levies monetary fines against violating hospitals 
and physicians and removes physicians from the Medicare program.325  
However, before the HCFA can send a case to the OIG that deals with 
the medical judgment of a hospital or physician, they must refer the 
case to a medical peer review organization (PRO).326 
EMTALA did not create a private cause of action against 
physicians,327 although such private action is permitted against a 
                                                          
 320. See Barris v. County of L.A., 972 P.2d 966, 976 (Cal. 1999) (concluding, like 
other federal courts, that damages awarded under EMTALA were subject to 
California Civil Code § 3333.2, that includes a cap of “$250,000 on the liability of a 
health care provider for noneconomic damages in an action based on professional 
negligence”). 
 321. See Draper v. Chiapuzio, 9 F.3d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
state’s one-year limitation period for filing notice of a tort claim is not preempted by 
the two-year statute of limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) because compliance 
with both the federal and state statute of limitations is not a physical impossibility 
due to the lack of direct conflict, thus allowing the plaintiff to file the required 
notice under the state statute within one year and file suit under the federal statute 
within two years); Reyes Santana v. Hosp. Ryder Mem’l Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274 
(D.P.R. 2001) (holding the two year statute of limitations under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(d)(2)(C), instead of the one year state statute of limitations, applied to the 
plaintiff’s EMTALA claim, thus denying the defendants motion for summary 
judgment); HCA Health Servs. of Ind. v. Gregory, 596 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1992) (holding EMTALA’s two year statute of limitations preempts the Indiana 
provision which requires the claimant file with the Department of Insurance for a 
medical review panel opinion); see also Vogel v. Linde, 23 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(barring the EMTALA claim because 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C) did not expressly 
provide that the claimant’s infancy and incompentency would toll the two year 
statute of limitations, thus making the plaintiffs claim time barred). 
 322. See Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 714-15 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that arbitration, as required under the Maryland Malpractice Act, was not 
necessary to bring an EMTALA claim). 
 323. See DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 1 (explaining EMTALA’s 
enforcement as bifurcated between the HCFA and the OIG). 
 324. See id. at 7-8 (stating the HCFA authorized state survey agencies to investigate 
complaints, conduct on-site inspections, discover repeated violations, and review 
EMTALA implementation plans). 
 325. See id. at 7 (describing OIG’s enforcement of the EMTALA). 
 326. See id. at 8 (stating that, without a PRO review, the OIG can enforce monetary 
penalties only if a delay may jeopardize an individual’s well being or a screening 
exam was not conducted). 
 327. See Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 394 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
EMTALA does not create a private cause of action against a physician); Baber v. 
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hospital.328  Rather, there are two arms of EMTALA enforcement:  
civil monetary penalties329 and civil enforcement.330 
a. Civil monetary penalties 
EMTALA empowers the DHHS, upon the authorization of the 
Attorney General of the United States, to initiate administrative 
proceedings for civil penalties against hospitals and physicians that 
negligently violate EMTALA.331  EMTALA specifically states that “[a] 
participating hospital that negligently violates a requirement of 
[EMTALA] is subject to a civil money penalty of not more than 
$50,000332 for each such violation.”333  The aggrieved hospital or 
physician has a right of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals.334 
                                                          
Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 876 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Gatewood v. Wash. 
Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that EMTALA does 
not create negligence or malpractice causes of action); Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 
560, 563 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that the EMTALA does not create a private cause 
of action against a physician); Lavignette v. W. Jefferson Med. Ctr., No. 89-5495, 1990 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14966, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 1990) (dismissing a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd complaint against a physician because the language and the legislative 
history of the act indicated that it was not intended to create a private cause of action 
against physicians); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 Civ. 0300, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13881, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1989) (holding the EMTALA statutory scheme does 
not include a private right of action against a physician); Richardson v. S.W. Miss. 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 794 F. Supp. 198, 201-02 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (determining from the 
language and drafter’s intent that the statute does not create a private cause of 
action against a physician). 
 328. See Delaney, 986 F.2d at 393 (stating that EMTALA creates a cause of action 
against hospitals); Barber, 977 F.2d at 877 (finding that EMTALA’s legislative history 
indicates that the statute allows for causes of action against hospitals); Gatewood, 933 
F.2d at 1040 n.1 (stating that the EMTALA provides a cause of action against 
hospitals not physicians). 
 329. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (2000). 
 330. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). 
 331. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B); see Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing how the DHHS, the 
government agency responsible for enforcing the Medicare provider agreement, 
filed an administrative claim for civil penalties against a physician for EMTALA 
violations pursuant to § 1395dd(d)(1)). 
 332. This figure is not more than $25,000 in the case of a hospital with less than 
100 beds.  Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B). 
 333. Id. § 1395(d)(1)(A); see Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1367 (referring an EMTALA 
claim against a violating physician to an administrative hearing in front of an 
administrative law judge in order to recover civil monetary penalities which are 
contingent upon weighing the aggravating or mitigating circumstances). 
 334. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (“The provisions of section 1320a-7a of this title . . . 
shall apply to a civil money penalty and exclusion under this subparagraph in the 
same manner as such provisions apply with respect to a penalty, exclusion, or 
proceeding under section 1320a-7a(a) of this title.”); see also id. § 1320a-7a(e) (“Any 
person adversely affected by a determination of the Secretary under this section may 
obtain a review of such determination in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
circuit in which the person resides, or in which the claim was presented . . . .”); 
Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1367-68 (reviewing Departmental Appeals Board decision against 
a physician pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e)). 
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Additionally, EMTALA provides that physicians who examine or 
transfer a patient and who “negligently” violate a requirement of 
EMTALA, are also subject to civil monetary penalties.335  Specifically, a 
physician who: 
signs a [legal] certification that the medical benefits reasonably to 
be expected from a transfer to another facility outweigh the risks 
associated with the transfer, if the physician knew or should have 
known that the benefits did not outweigh the risks,336 or 
(2) misrepresents a patient’s condition or other information, 
including a hospital’s obligations,337 is subject to a civil money 
penalty of not more than $50,000 for each such violation.338 
Also, if the physician’s violation is found to be “gross and flagrant, 
or is repeated,”339 the physician can be excluded from participating in 
Medicare and State healthcare programs.340 
b. Civil enforcement 
Under EMTALA civil enforcement,341 if a patient suffers harm 
because a hospital violated EMTALA requirements, that patient can 
sue the hospital for damages under the personal injury law of that 
state or seek equitable relief.342  There is no corresponding EMTALA 
civil enforcement provision under which an individual who suffers 
personal harm may directly proceed in a civil action against an 
emergency physician.343  When a medical facility344 suffers financial 
loss, relief is also available.345  Under either circumstance, whether a 
suit by a person harmed or by a medical facility, no action may be 
brought more than two years after the date of the violation.346 
                                                          
 335. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
 336. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(i). 
 337. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 338. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). 
 339. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 340. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A). 
 341. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). 
 342. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). 
 343. See id. (limiting an individual’s civil enforcement action against a 
participating hospital). 
 344. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B). 
 345. Id.  The statute states: 
Any medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct result of a 
participating hospital’s violation of an EMTALA requirement may, in a civil 
action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for 
financial loss, under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and 
such equitable relief as is appropriate. 
Id. 
 346. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). 
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8. Nondiscrimination 
EMTALA is a nondiscriminatory congressional act as evidenced by 
its attempts to preclude a receiving hospital from limiting the transfer 
of patients to its medical facility.347  EMTALA provides that, if a 
hospital has specialized capabilities, those hospitals may not refuse 
transfers of patients requiring the specialized capabilities, if the 
hospital has the capacity to treat the individual.348  The government 
defines “capacity” broadly as “the ability of [a] hospital to 
accommodate [an] individual requesting examination or treatment 
of the transferred individual.”349  Capacity, therefore, encompasses 
many factors, such as numbers and availability of qualified staff, beds 
and equipment,350 and a review of the hospital’s past practices of 
accommodating additional patients in excess of its occupancy 
limits.351 
III. EMTALA IMPERFECTIONS AND THE RESULTANT INCONSISTENCIES 
IN INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Our proposed new cause of action is based, in part, upon the 
extensive confusion, ambiguities, and inconsistencies which have 
hampered EMTALA compliance and enforcement.  This Part 
outlines some of the major EMTALA infirmities which have 
hampered effective monitoring and control of patient dumping, and 
have made government enforcement virtually impossible.  Those 
infirmities include inadequacies of understanding, compliance, and 
enforcement on the part of emergency physicians, hospital staff, and 
the federal government; conflicting standards of care regarding 
hospital conduct; confusion regarding the standard of care under 
which a physician’s conduct is judged; and conjunctive and 
disjunctive interpretations of EMTALA. 
A. EMTALA Imperfections 
Emergency physicians, hospital staff and the federal government 
have exhibited significant inadequacies with respect to EMTALA 
                                                          
 347. See id. § 1395dd(g) (describing EMTALA’s non-discrimination provisions). 
 348. See id. (stating that specialized capabilities include burn units, shock trauma 
units, neonatal intensive care units, or in rural areas, regional referral centers which 
are identified by the Secretary of DHHS). 
 349. Special Responsibilities of Medicaid Hospitals in Emergency Cases, 42 C.F.R. 
§ 489.24(b) (2001). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id.  Thus, a medical facility will not be able to evade a transfer of a potential 
patient, nor evade the spirit of EMTALA, by merely claiming that its capacity has 
been reached prior to the anticipated transfer.  Id. 
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implementation.352  The inadequacies were shown clearly in two 
recent studies conducted by the DHHS and the OIG.353 
1. Emergency department physician and staff inadequacies 
In January 2001, the OIG released a study which was conducted to 
determine whether emergency department medical directors, 
emergency physicians, and hospital emergency department staff were 
aware of the various provisions of EMTALA.354  The DHHS study 
survey revealed that emergency physicians and hospital emergency 
department staff possess an inadequate understanding of EMTALA.355 
First, the OIG study revealed that emergency department directors 
and emergency physicians are often unaware of EMTALA policy 
changes.356  Emergency department directors and physicians have 
insufficient knowledge regarding policy changes and the proper 
interpretation and application of EMTALA because they do not 
obtain their information on EMTALA directly from government 
agencies.357  This lack of information especially has caused delays in 
                                                          
 352. See Annas, supra note 1, at 74 (identifying the critical nexus between 
healthcare professionals and the government by noting that “[i]t is not just the rise 
of for-profit medicine that has challenged our traditional social commitment to 
provide emergency services to rich and poor alike, but the erosion of this social 
commitment on the part of the government itself.”) (emphasis added). 
 353. DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 1 (tracking the violations of 
hospitals and noting the increase of violations over the past decade). 
 354. See id. (stating that the purpose of the survey was “[t]o determine whether 
staff and directors of hospital emergency departments are aware of the various 
provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) and find 
out how they believe the Act affects them, their hospitals and their patients”).  At 121 
randomly selected hospitals, the OIG conducted telephone interviews with the 
directors of the emergency departments.  Id. at 9.  At the same hospitals, the OIG 
received a thirty-seven percent response to mail surveys sent to emergency 
department physicians, nurses, specialists and staff.  Id.  The OIG also reviewed 
articles and interviewed representatives from the national and California chapter of 
the American College of Emergency Physicians.  Id. at 8. 
 355. See id. at 2 (finding that the answer given by respondents was that “aspects of 
EMTALA are unclear and questionable”). 
 356. Id. at 2 (noting that emergency department personnel are familiar with 
EMTALA requirements, but many are unaware of recent policy changes). 
 357. See id. at 10 (explaining that over ninty percent of the directors obtain their 
EMTALA information from other sources such as “staff, professional associations, 
newsletters or the Internet”).  The survey suggests that a consequence of only eleven 
percent of directors receiving information directly from the HCFA is that thirty-five 
percent were unaware of the 1998 Interpretive Guidelines and sixty-three percent 
were unaware of the HCFA EMTALA Advisory Bulletin.  See id. at 10-11 (finding that 
“[o]nly 65 percent of directors are aware of HCFA’s Interpretive Guidelines, 
published in June 1998, and only twenty-seven percent knew of the proposed 
EMTALA Advisory Bulletin issued by HCFA and the OIG in November 1998.”).  
Examples of just three years of EMTALA policy changes (e.g., 1996, 1998, and 1999) 
illustrate the potential lack of knowledge emergency directors and physicians would 
face.  See id. at 9 (describing EMTALA policy developments in 1996 which addressed 
enforcement issues and defined key terms; in 1998 which expanded State surveyor 
instructions; and in 1999 which recommended best practices to assist hospital 
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issuing regulations and resolving issues relating to the impact of 
managed care and the application of the EMTALA to different 
hospital departments.358  Second, the OIG study confirmed that 
emergency department staff training remains a problem.359  High-
volume emergency department staff are less likely to receive 
EMTALA training than their counterparts in lower-volume 
emergency departments.360  Further, only seventy-five percent of 
emergency department on-call specialists are trained on EMTALA 
guidelines.361 
Third, surveyed hospital emergency departments continue to 
express concerns about EMTALA compliance.362  Although, under 
EMTALA, a medical screening examination cannot be delayed in 
order to inquire about an individual’s method of payment,363 up to 
thirty percent of emergency department staff continue to inquire 
about health insurance information before providing a medical 
screening examination.364  Sadly, fifteen percent of staff in those 
hospitals that seek authorization for medical screening exams, and 
ten percent in those that seek insurance authorization for [necessary] 
stabilizing treatment, believed that screening or treatment is not 
provided when authorization is denied.365  Furthermore, “five percent 
of respondents believed an inappropriate transfer from their hospital 
has taken place in the past year,”366 whereas eight percent [of all 
hospitals], including almost eighteen percent of hospitals with a large 
proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries, believed that decisions 
regarding medical screening are influenced by a patient’s ability to 
                                                          
compliance). 
 358. See id. at 9 (explaining that the evolution of the implementation of the 
EMTALA resulted from “delay[s] before final regulations were issued[;] . . . concerns 
about the impact of managed care on access to emergency department services[;] . . . 
[and] issues . . . over the application of EMTALA to different hospitals departments 
and operations”). 
 359. See id. (finding that the staff that is less likely to receive EMTALA training are 
those working in high-volume emergency departments). 
 360. Id. at 11. 
 361. Id. at 2. 
 362. See id. at 2 (explainingt that participants in the survey reported that, 
generally, hospitals comply with EMTALA but there are still overall concerns 
regarding compliance). 
 363. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) (2000) (disallowing hospitals to delay a medical 
screening examination to ask about the patient’s insurance status or payment 
method). 
 364. See DHHS, OIG EMTALA SURVEY, supra note 25, at 12 (stating that seventy 
percent of registration staff report that payment information is collected only after a 
patient has undergone a screening exam). 
 365. Id. at 13. Twenty-five percent of registration staff said that authorization is 
sought for necessary stabilizing treatment.  Id. at 19. 
 366. Id. 
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pay.367 
Fourth, OIG survey respondents found aspects of EMTALA 
“unclear” or “questionable.”368  Over forty percent of emergency 
physicians369 and over sixty percent of emergency department 
directors370 believe parts of EMTALA are unclear.371 Also, many 
respondents believed that interpretations of EMTALA exceed 
legislative intent.372 
Fifth, survey respondents believed that EMTALA effects both 
quality of patient care and a hospital’s administrative and financial 
condition.373  Directors at forty-four percent of emergency 
departments believed the patient protection provided in EMTALA 
increased the standard of care,374 whereas twenty-five percent of 
directors believed EMTALA has had a negative impact upon hospital 
finances and administration.375 
Sixth, the OIG survey revealed that “managed care” causes  
particular problems for hospital emergency departments when the 
hospitals comply with EMTALA.376  Although EMTALA 
implementation guidelines warn hospitals against obtaining 
insurance authorization prior to patient screening, emergency 
departments argue that without previous authorization, private 
managed care plans will not refund emergency services.377  The 
hospitals are left with the Hobson’s choice of either:  contacting the 
health plan before the required medical screening examination to 
                                                          
 367. Id. Also, the survey suggested that, if a hospital had a high percentage of 
Medicaid patients, then staff was more likely to seek authorization for stabilizing 
treatments.  Id. 
 368. Id. at 2, 13. 
 369. Id. at 13. 
 370. Id. 
 371. See id. (stating that emergency department staff believed terms such as 
“emergency medical condition,” “medical screening exam” and “stable for discharge” 
require clarification). 
 372. See id. at 14 (explaining EMTALA interpretation problems and concerns with 
legislative intent when a patient admitted through another department develops an 
emergency medical condition). 
 373. See id. at 3 (stating that some respondents believed that EMTALA creates 
administrative complications and financial problems by requiring that hospitals treat 
patients without providing funding). 
 374. Id. at 15. 
 375. Id.  Respondents specifically believed that EMTALA creates layers of 
unnecessary bureaucracy; complicates routine procedures; contributes to financial 
problems; and promotes over utilization of the emergency department (especially by 
managed care patients who do not or cannot obtain an office visit with their primary 
care physician).  Id.  The problems created included:  (1) EMTALA mandating 
medical screening and stabilization of emergency conditions without providing a 
source of funding for such services; and (2) having to provide screening exams for 
non-emergeny patients who lack insurance or whose insurance will not pay.  Id. 
 376. Id. at 3. 
 377. Id. at 16. 
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secure payment, and therefore, suffering an EMTALA violation; or 
risking that the health plans will deny payment if they obtain 
authorization after the medical screening examination is provided, 
and thereby, remaining in compliance with EMTALA.378 
2. Federal government inadequacies 
The OIG also conducted a study to evaluate government 
enforcement processes relating to EMTALA.379  The OIG study 
revealed four significant governmental inadequacies regarding 
EMTALA enforcement.380  First, respondents noted the “long delays 
and inadequate feedback” in the EMTALA enforcement process.381  
Not only was timely processing of EMTALA cases found to be a 
longstanding problem,382 but HCFA regional offices often failed to 
communicate their decisions to state survey agencies, hospitals, and 
the Peer Review Organizations regarding specific EMTALA violations 
thereby resulting in inadequate feedback.383 
                                                          
 378. See id. (explaining that hospitals are left with this choice because the HCFA 
and OIG could not resolve the issue as EMTALA did not give them the authority to 
amend non-Medicare and non-Medicaid managed care plans). 
 379. See id. at 11 (explaining the diverse methodology for the DHHS enforcement 
study).  Interviews were conducted at four HCFA regional offices that have 
jurisdiction over a majority of the nation’s hospitals and many EMTALA cases, eight 
state survey agencies, five PROs and emergency department nurses, physicians and 
healthcare providers.  Id.  The OIG also reviewed HCFA manuals, guidelines and logs 
of EMTALA complaints and law journals.  Id.  Previous studies conducted by the OIG 
revealed prior inadequacies in governmental EMTALA oversight.  See id. at 10 
(discussing the conclusions of a 1998 study which found coordination among 
components of the investigation process needed improvements and a 1995 study 
which found inconsistencies in the enforcement of EMTALA). 
 380. See id. at 2 (finding inadequacies in the enforcement process; EMTALA 
investigations; EMTALA case tracking; and the peer review process). 
 381. Id. 
 382. The HCFA requires state survey agencies to complete investigations within 
five working days of authorization and submit their reports ten to fifteen working 
days after the investigation is complete.  Id. at 12.  Although strict time frames apply 
to state survey agencies that investigate complaints of patient dumping, HCFA itself is 
not subject to any.  Id.  The logs that we obtained for purposes of the Enforcement 
Survey from the HCFA central office confirmed long delays in processing EMTALA 
claims.  Id.  For instance, between 1994 and 1998, regional offices took an average of 
sixty-five days after the state’s investigation to determine if an EMTALA violation 
occurred.  Seven of the ten HCFA regional offices sometimes took as long as one 
year or more to decide whether a hospital violated EMTALA.  Id.  Staff in one state 
informed the survey investigators that in some cases two years or more elapsed before 
the hospital was made aware of status.  Id.  In one case, a hospital was not cited until 
four years after the EMTALA investigation occurred.  Id. 
 383. See id. at 13 (stating state survey agencies and PROs are not informed by the 
HCFA of the results of their investigations). 
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Second, the number of EMTALA investigations384 and their 
ultimate disposition was found to vary widely by HCFA region and 
year.385  Although nationally the study identified one EMTALA 
investigation for every fifteen hospitals between 1994 and 1998, 
because of the widespread inconsistency of EMTALA investigations 
and dispositions, some hospitals may have a higher or lower chance 
of being investigated, depending in large part on their geographic 
location and assignment to a particular regional HCFA office.386  The 
percentage of investigations that confirm a patient dumping 
EMTALA violation also was found to vary greatly by region 
throughout the United States.387  For instance, although nationally 
forty percent of EMTALA investigations substantiated a violation 
between 1994 and 1998,388 one HCFA region found violations in 
twenty-two percent of its investigations, whereas another region 
found violations in sixty-eight percent of its investigations.389 
Third, poor tracking of EMTALA cases impeded HCFA oversight.390  
The government’s data collection for EMTALA cases historically has 
been inconsistent and incomplete.391  Upon examination, HCFA’s 
                                                          
 384. Id. at 13.  The Enforcement Study noted:   
In 1994, for example, one of the largest HCFA regions [which the study did 
not name] handled 119 EMTALA cases, the second highest total nationally.  
[However, t]he workload has since dropped precipitously, and in 1998 the 
same region handled only three [3] EMTALA cases.  Another region [also 
unnamed] logged 42 cases in 1996 and only 7 in 1998.  Conversely, 7 of the 
10 regional offices have seen a rise in their EMTALA caseloads since 1994.  
One region’s caseload climbed from eighteen cases in 1994 to seventy-four 
cases in 1998.  Another region’s caseload jumped from thirteen cases in 1994 
to 48 in 1998. 
Id. 
 385. Id. at 2, 13. 
 386. Id. at 13. In one region, however, the study found that there was one 
EMTALA investigation for every eight hospitals in that region during the same 
period; in another region, there was an average of one investigation for every forty 
hospitals.  Id. 
 387. Id. at 14 (noting that variance between states could be due to multiple 
reasons including inconsistency in data collection methods and also the number and 
size of the agency’s staff). 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id.  Substantial inconsistencies regarding EMTALA investigations have also 
been found in state agencies that investigate patient dumping.  Id. at 15.  In 1997, the 
Enforcement Process and Procedures Subgroup of the EMTALA Work Group found 
“substantial inconsistencies” between state agencies and regions both in 
understanding and application of EMTALA guidelines.  Id. 
 390. Id. at 2. 
 391. Id. at 15.  Inconsistencies in data collection formats between regions and the 
central HCFA office were found by the Enforcement Study.  Id.  Offices used 
different software applications to track cases.  Id.  Regional office staff reported that 
they had lost EMTALA files.  Id.  Another region developed its own spreadsheet, and 
noted that they had received no guidance from central office about tracking cases.  
Id. 
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own investigation logs were found to contain numerous errors and to 
have omitted key information about patient dumping complaints and 
EMTALA investigations.392  The historical absence of an accurate, 
complete, central database was believed to have limited HCFA’s 
ability to oversee regional offices and effectively monitor patient 
dumping.393 
Fourth, peer review was not always obtained before HCFA 
considered terminating a hospital for medical reasons.394  Although 
the HCFA instructs states to obtain professional medical review 
during an EMTALA investigation, such a medical review does not 
always occur.395 
EMTALA imperfections—due to emergency physician, hospital 
staff, and federal government inadequacies—have been fostered by 
conflicting standards imposed on hospitals or emergency 
physicians.396  Not only may the standards of care be different as 
applied to either the hospital or emergency physician, but judicial 
interpretations of EMTALA have resulted in different standards of 
care being applied to the same EMTALA provision by different 
federal circuits.397 
                                                          
 392. Id. at 2.  For instance, although HCFA’s central office implemented a 
particular software for tracking EMTALA cases, some regional offices continued to 
use their own methods for data collection which were distinct from the methods of 
the  HCFA central office.  Id.  The Enforcement Study requested EMTALA 
investigation logs from HCFA’s central office, and found the logs contained 
numerous errors and omissions.  Id. at 15. 
Key information was absent.  Details were missing concerning the complaints 
that did not result in an investigation, the dates investigations were 
authorized, and the nature of the violations, which can range from technical  
violations involving a failure to complete necessary paperwork to more 
serious infractions such as failure to perform a medical screening exam.  
Common errors in the 1998 logs include illogical dates (e.g., dates of 
investigation precede dates of complaint) and incorrect provider numbers. 
Id. at 16. 
 393. Id. at 15.  The HCFA central office cannot track regional workloads and 
address longstanding problems because the regional offices continue to use their 
own methods for data collection.  Id. 
 394. Id. at 2. 
 395. Id.  After state investigations occur, the regional offices have discretion to ask 
the local PRO to perform another review, lasting five days, in order to obtain 
evidence from additional medical experts.  Id. at 16.  The PRO review becomes 
mandatory if the OIG assesses civil penalties.  Id.  In this review, the PRO determines 
if the patient “had an emergency medical condition that was not stabilized.”  Id.  
After this review, the PRO is required to discuss the incident with the physicians and 
hospitals involved where they have an opportunity to submit additional information.  
Id. 
 396. See Michael J. Frank, Tailoring EMTALA to Better Protect the Indigent:  The 
Supreme Court Precludes One Method of Salvaging a Statute Gone Awry, 3 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 195, 206-09 (2000) (describing the different Federal Circuit 
opinions regarding a standard of care under EMTALA). 
 397. Id. 
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B. Hospital Conduct:  Conflicting Standards of Care 
The three duties imposed by EMTALA (appropriate medical 
screening examination,398 necessary stabilizing treatment,399 and 
appropriate transfer400) carry with them separate, and often 
conflicting, standards of care.401  That is, although each duty requires 
medical compliance, whether such compliance has been satisfied 
turns on a legal, not a medical, determination.402  The legal 
determination of compliance will consider whether the standard of 
care for each duty has been legally satisfied.403  Because the federal 
circuit courts are frequently divided as to what standard of care 
should be used to determine legal compliance, compliance with 
EMTALA suffers and patient dumping continues.404 
 
                                                          
 398. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). 
 399. Id. § 1395dd(b). 
 400. Id. § 1395dd(a). 
 401. See infra Table 4 (listing the differences in standards of care among the 
federal circuits). 
 402. See Frank, supra note 396, at 195-205 (providing a general overview of the 
EMTALA statute). 
 403. Id. 
 404. See infra Table 4 (describing that the standards of care used by courts when 
evaluating whether the transfer or screening procedure performed by the hospital 
constituted a violation of EMTALA). 
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TABLE 4405 
Federal  




















































































Traditionally, the standard of care with which most physicians are 
familiar with is the standard of care used in state medical malpractice 
or professional negligence actions.406  State medical negligence 
actions are litigated under, and are based upon, the objective, 
reasonable prudent person standard.407  According to this standard, a 
practicing physician is held to a level of care exercised by a same or 
similarly practicing reasonable physician, under same or similar 
                                                          
 405.   See Frank, supra note 396, at 205-12 (describing the split in the standards of 
care promulgated by the different federal circuits for the EMTALA screening exam 
requirement). 
 406. See generally id. at 232-41 (discussing malpractice standards as they apply to 
hospitals and to individual physicians in an analysis of a Sixth Circuit EMTALA case). 
 407. Id. 
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conditions.408  Under most state medical malpractice laws, expert 
medical testimony is necessary to show what the standard of care is 
and precisely how it was violated.409 
In the realm of EMTALA-patient dumping liability, however, the 
emergency physician’s conduct is subject to multiple standards of 
care, and hospital EMTALA liability and physician negligence liability 
constitute different prongs of liability analysis.410  First, in considering 
a hospital’s EMTALA liability, the emergency physician’s conduct will 
be imputed to the hospital in such a way that a determination may be 
made as to whether there was sufficient hospital compliance with 
EMTALA.411  Here, the emergency physician’s conduct, although it 
may fall below the negligence standard of care, may be satisfactory to 
satisfy some, but not all, of a hospital’s EMTALA-imposed duties.412  It 
should be noted, however, that this same conduct may not satisfy 
other aspects of liability exposure.413 
Second, notwithstanding any imputation of physician conduct to a 
hospital, the emergency physician’s conduct also may be evaluated 
from a “negligence” perspective to determine physician EMTALA 
liability, under an objective standard of care.414  For instance, 
although an emergency physician’s conduct may satisfy a subjective 
standard of care for the satisfaction of a hospital’s “appropriate 
medical screening examination,” that same conduct may not be 
viewed as immune from physician EMTALA liability, or physician 
state negligence liability, which adhere to an objective standard of 
care.415 
There have been instances in which the emergency physician’s 
conduct is sufficient to satisfy some of the hospital EMTALA 
obligations, yet below the objective standard of care reasonably 
                                                          
 408. Id.  In contrast, the subjective standard is where an actor’s conduct is judged 
according to his own conduct, and not as against a similarly situated acted in same or 
similar circumstances.  Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. See supra Table 4 (illustrating that courts will consider different standards of 
care depending on whether the court is evaluating hospital or physician actions). 
 411. See BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 19 (stating that, legally, physicians are viewed 
as agents of the hospital and that hospitals are directly liable for all its physician’s 
actions under EMTALA). 
 412. See generally Frank, supra note 396, at 232-41 (discussing the range of 
malpractice standards as they apply to both physicians and hospitals, and how the 
same action in different states could result in different findings of liability). 
 413. Id. 
 414. See BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 19 (noting the practical implications of the 
principle/agent relationship between hospitals and physicians when determining 
liability under EMTALA). 
 415. See id. (explaining how the different standards between state and federal laws 
can impose different liabilities on the physician, even when a court evaluates the 
same action). 
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expected of physicians, therefore subjecting physicians to personal 
civil liability.  Thus, the federal circuits’ approach to such standards 
of care will now be considered.416 
1.   Medical screening examination:  multiple standards of care 
Many of the violations and much of the litigation involving 
EMTALA concern the appropriate medical screening examination 
provision.417  This provision sends a mixed signal:  it requires 
“appropriate”418 (suggestive of an objective standard) screening, but 
one which is “within the capability of the . . . emergency department” 
(suggestive of a subjective standard).419  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals commented on this statutory ambiguity and noted that 
“‘[a]ppropriate’ is one of the most wonderful weasel words in the 
dictionary.”420  The First Circuit, quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
noted that “appropriateness,” like nature, is a “mutable cloud which 
is always and never the same.”421 
Thus, difficulties for healthcare providers who wish to comply with 
EMTALA consist, in part, of a lack of consensus by both the medical 
and legal community, with respect to the various EMTALA 
obligations—such as what constitutes “appropriate” medical 
screening.422  Indeed, the federal circuits have employed varied 
standards of care, sending physicians and hospitals mixed messages 
regarding their responsibilities, and  thereby complicating and 
threatening EMTALA compliance and government enforcement.423  
There are three separate applicable standards of care with respect to 
the “appropriate medical screening examination” EMTALA duty:  
(1) the objectively reasonable standard; (2) the subjective standard; 
and (3) the burden-shifting standard.424  These standards will be 
discussed briefly to illustrate the varied foci and resultant confusion 
                                                          
 416. See generally supra Table 4 (illustrating the differences of standards of care 
regarding EMTALA violations between federal circuit courts). 
 417. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Cleland v. Bronson Healthcare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
 421. See Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing 
EMTALA’s requirement for an appropriate medical screening but the lack of 
definition for what constitutes one). 
 422. Frank, supra note 396, at 205-06 (explaining that some federal courts find 
liability if no examination is given, while other circuits are only concerned that the 
screening examination is uniform for all patients). 
 423. See id. at 232 (noting that the ambiguity in EMTALA’s language creates 
dilemmas for both hospitals and the intended beneficiaries of the act). 
 424. See supra Table 4 (identifying these three standards and explaining how the 
standards are applied differently to hospitals and physicians). 
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of the federal courts. 
a. The objectively reasonable standard 
The federal courts within the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have reached beyond EMTALA’s plain textual meaning and have 
developed an objective standard for determining compliance with 
EMTALA’s appropriate medical screening examination duty.425  
Although in the minority, these jurisdictions import greater 
obligations to this ambiguous “appropriate” duty.426 
For instance, in Correa v. Hospital San Francisco,427 the First Circuit 
held that a hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patients in its 
emergency department “if it provides screening examination 
reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions that may be 
affecting symptomatic patients and provides that level of screening 
uniformly to all those who present substantially similar complaints.”428  
The Ninth Circuit, in Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles,429 held that if a 
                                                          
 425. See Caroline J. Stalker, Comment, How Far Is Too Far?:  EMTALA Moves From 
the Emergency Room to Off-Campus Entities, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 830-34 (2001) 
(comparing the standard used by various federal circuits in interpreting the meaning 
of “appropriate medical screening examination”); see also Frank, supra note 396, at 
206 (noting the similar approach taken by the First and Ninth Circuits in 
determining what is meant by an “appropriate medical screening” under EMTALA). 
 426. See Stalker, supra note 425, at 830-34 (contrasting the First, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits’ standard for determining what is an appropriate medical 
screening with the standard of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits). 
 427. 69 F.3d 1184 (1st Cir. 1995).  In Correa, a sixty-five year-old female, Ms. 
Gonzalez, complained of “feeling real bad,” experiencing “chills, cold sweat, 
dizziness, [and] chest pains.”  Id. at 1188.  Ms. Gonzalez had her son take her to 
Hospital San Francisco at approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 6, 1991.  Id.  After 
the hospital staff  “continued blithely to ignore her” for approximately two hours, 
Ms. Gonzalez left the hospital and went to the offices of a local physician.  Id. at 1188-
89.  By the time she arrived at the doctor’s office her blood pressure was 90/60.  Id. 
at 1189.  Ms. Gonzalez began vomiting, did not respond to fluid resuscitation, and 
expired from hypovolemic shock.  Id.  The defendant hospital in Correa did not 
follow its own hospital policies and  procedures during the treatment of Ms. 
Gonzalez.  Id. at 1193.  Specifically, the hospital neither recorded her vitals signs nor 
referred Ms. Gonzalez immediately to a physician, as would have been consistent with 
the hospital’s own policy regarding the evaluation of a patient with chest pain.  Id.  
The court in Correa held the defendant’s failure to provide appropriate screening to 
the decedent and the act of merely assigning her a number upon being told she was 
experiencing chest pain was so egregious and lacking in justification that it 
amounted to an effective denial of the screening examination required by EMTALA.  
Id.  Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the $700,000.00 verdict.  Id. at 1188. 
 428. Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).  Reference to the “reasonable” provision in 
identifying critical medical conditions is an objective approach to the determination 
of a standard of care for the duty of medical screening examinations. 
 429. 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995).  In Eberhardt, Allan Eberhardt was taken to a 
hospital emergency department because of a heroin overdose.  Id. at 1254.  The 
emergency physician gave Eberhardt two two-milligram doses of Narcan and 
discharged the patient.  Id. at 1255.  The emergency physician testified that 
Eberhardt told him right before he walked out of the hospital that he was 
experiencing a feeling of “impending doom” and that he “was upset because we 
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medical screening examination is “designed to identify acute and 
severe symptoms that alert the physician of the need for immediate 
medical attention to prevent serious bodily injury,”430 then the 
examination is “appropriate.”431  The Eleventh Circuit, in Gardner v. 
Elmore Community Hospital,432 stressed that a hospital fulfills its statutory 
duty to screen patients in its emergency department if it provides for 
a screening examination “reasonably calculated to identify critical 
medical conditions that may be afflicting symptomatic patients . . . .”433 
b. The subjective standard 
The subjective standard of care for the medical screening 
examination is followed primarily by the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and 
D.C. Circuits.434  These circuits utilize a plain-text statutory analysis 
and consider the legislative purpose of EMTALA435 in attempting to 
determine what is meant by “appropriate medical screening 
examination.”  This type of textual analysis generally employs five 
legal axioms:  (1) EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute and it 
                                                          
saved his life.”  Id.  Thirty hours after discharge from the emergency department, 
Eberhardt was found with a machete, breaking the windows of a private residence.  
Id.  When the police arrived, Eberhardt charged at them shouting “kill me” and “put 
me out of my misery.”  Id.  The police shot and killed Eberhardt, after which 
Eberhardt’s survivors brought suit against the hospital, claiming the hospital 
negligently failed to detect Eberhardt’s suicidal tendency.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit 
held that because Eberhardt’s symptoms were not acute or severe, the hospital did 
not bear any EMTALA liability.  See id. at 1258 (holding that absent a proffer of any 
evidence showing manifestation of “acute” or “severe” symptoms, the hospital 
fulfilled its responsibility to provide an appropriate medical screening examination 
comparable to that offered other patients with similar symptoms). 
 430. Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). 
 431. See id. at 1257-58.  The Ninth Circuit did not focus on the capabilities of an 
emergency department nor whether a particular medical screening examination was 
applied equitably, but rather relied upon an objective interpretation of the statutory 
language.  Id. 
 432. 64 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (M.D. Ala. 1999).  In Gardner, plaintiffs filed a cause of 
action under EMTALA alleging, in part, violation of the medical screening 
provisions.  Id. at 1198-1200.  Plaintiffs were victims of motor vehicle accidents who 
were initially evaluated at Elmore Community Hospital (“Elmore”), and later 
evaluated at Baptist Medical Center.  Id.  Plaintiffs alleged that Elmore violated 
EMTALA’s medical screening examination by not detecting various facial and rib 
fractures which were in fact diagnosed at Baptist.  Id. at 1200.  The Gardner court, 
considering both the purpose and rationale behind EMTALA, noted that the “First 
Circuit has defined the ‘appropriate medical screening requirement’ more 
thoroughly” than its own circuit.  Id. at 1201.  The court held that the plaintiffs failed 
to meet their burden of production regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss and 
thereby granted the defendant’s motion.  Id. at 1202. 
 433. Id. at 1202. 
 434. Frank, supra note 396, at 206-07.  Although Frank includes the Eleventh 
Circuit in the subjective interpretation category, I include the Eleventh Circuit under 
the objective category for reasons stated above. 
 435. Id. 
_ZITO1.DOC 12/12/2002  10:04 AM 
2002] THE INTENTIONAL TORT OF PATIENT DUMPING 245 
does not set a national emergency health care standard;436 
(2) “appropriate medical screening examination” is not judged by its 
proficiency in accurate diagnosis; rather what is dispositive is whether 
the examination was performed equitably in comparison to other 
patients with similar symptoms;437 (3) a misdiagnosis, failure to 
properly diagnose, or failure to order additional diagnostic tests does 
not bring liability under EMTALA for inappropriate medical 
screening, but rather may constitute negligence or malpractice under 
a state tort action;438 (4) a key issue is whether a hospital’s procedures 
                                                          
 436. Marshall v. E. Carroll Parish Hosp., 134 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(agreeing with other circuits which have held that EMTALA “was not intended to be 
used as a federal malpractice statute” but rather was passed to prevent patient dumping) 
(emphasis added); Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 
(8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute, 
does not establish a national emergency health care screening standard, and claims 
of misdiagnosis or inadequate treatment should be the province of state malpractice 
law); Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating clearly that EMTALA 
“is neither a malpractice nor a negligence statute”); see Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., 
Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that other circuits universally agree 
with the idea that EMTALA should be distinguished from standard claims of 
negligence and misdiagnosis); Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the language of EMTALA declines to impose a national 
standard of care upon hospitals’ screening of patients); Repp v. Anadarko Mun. 
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that § 1395dd(a) specifically 
precludes the establishment of a federal standard for malpractice); Holcomb v. 
Manahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that § 1395dd(a) does not 
create a basis for federal malpractice claims resulting from misdiagnosis); Baber v. 
Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the language 
of EMTALA clearly indicates that it was not intended to establish a national standard 
for screening emergency room patients); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 
F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that EMTALA does not create a sweeping 
federal cause of action for medical malpractice claims which are traditionally covered 
by state law); see also Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding 
that EMTALA does not create a federal cause of action for medical malpractice). 
 437. Marshall, 134 F.3d at 322 (stating an appropriate medical screening is one 
performed equitably among all patients with similar symptoms); see Vickers, 78 F.3d at 
144 (contending EMTALA is only violated when patients perceived to have the same 
symptoms receive disparate screening, not when patients who in fact have the same 
symptoms receive disparate treatment); Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138 (noting that 
inappropriate treatment occurs when patients with similar symptoms receive 
different treatment within the hospitals capabilities; EMTALA does not create a rule 
that patients are entitled to non-negligent or correct treatment, but rather they are 
entitled to be treated as other similarly situated patients); Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192-93 
(holding that faulty or negligent screening does not contravene EMTALA, but rather 
EMTALA is violated by disparate screening and the refusal to follow established 
procedures); Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (stating that a hospital is in compliance with 
EMTALA as long as it screens paying and indigent patients in the same manner); 
Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 (noting that the required standard of “appropriate medical 
screening” varies with each hospital and a hospital, therefore, violates § 1395dd(a) 
when it does not follow its own established practices and procedures for screening 
emergency room patients). 
 438. See Marshall, 134 F.3d at 322 (noting that while a misdiagnosis may constitute 
malpractice or negligence, it can not support a claim of inappropriate screening 
under EMTALA); Vickers, 78 F.3d at 143 (stating EMTALA does not establish a duty 
of care for hospitals requiring a correct diagnosis during emergency room screening, 
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were uniformly followed, or would have been offered to any other 
patient in a similar condition with similar symptoms;439 and (5) an 
inappropriate medical screening examination concerns disparate 
treatment or impact upon a patient which then will constitute an 
EMTALA violation.440 
Individual circuits, however, have focused on different aspects of 
these principles to formulate their subjective standard.  In Gatewood v. 
                                                          
but rather, that is a matter of state malpractice law); Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258 
(maintaining that state law, not EMTALA, would be the appropriate authority to 
settle whether the hospital was liable for failure to identify suicidal tendencies of a 
patient); Baber, 977 F.2d at 880 (declaring that issues of misdiagnosis and negligent 
treatment are best resolved under state malpractice theories of recovery); Gatewood, 
933 F.2d at 1039 (affirming the district court’s ruling that as long as the hospital in 
question did not deviate from its own established procedures in screening patients, 
issues relating to diagnosis remain within the exclusive domain of state malpractice 
law); see also Summers, 91 F.3d at 1139  (agreeing with the district court that faulty 
screening alone is not a cause of action under EMTALA). 
 439. Marshall, 134 F.3d at 323 (affirming that an “appropriate medical screening 
examination” is an examination that a “hospital would have offered to any other 
patient in a similar condition with similar symptoms”); see Summers, 91 F.3d at 1137 
(holding that EMTALA requires patients to be treated as other similarly situated 
patients, but EMTALA does not require correct or non-negligent treatment); 
Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258 (stating that the test for an EMTALA violation is “whether 
the challenged procedure was identical to that provided similarly situated patients as 
opposed to whether the procedure was adequate as judged by the medical 
profession”); Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192 (noting that the “essence” of the medical 
screening requirement is that there be some screening procedure that is 
administered even-handedly); Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (holding that EMTALA “only 
requires a hospital to provide indigent patients with a medical screening similar to 
one which they would provide any other patient”); Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 (stating that 
§ 1395dd(a) requires a hospital to provide a medical screening “that is appropriate 
within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department”; this requirement is, 
therefore, hospital-specific, “varying with the specific circumstances of each 
provider”); Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 (holding the plain language of EMTALA requires a 
screening procedure that is applied “uniformly to all patients with similar 
complaints”); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (maintaining EMTALA is intended to 
ensure each patient is accorded the same level of treatment as other patients in 
similar circumstances, not to ensure a proper diagnosis); Cleland v. Bronson 
Healthcare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990) (interpreting the phrase 
“appropriate medical screening” to mean an examination that would have been 
offered to any paying patient); see also Vickers, 78 F.3d at 143 (stating that the 
“appropriate medical screening” provision is aimed at disparate treatment) (citing 
Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp., 996 F.2d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 440. See Vickers, 78 F.3d at 144 (maintaining a claim under EMTALA exists only 
when patients who are perceived to have the same conditions receive disparate 
treatment, not when patients who in fact have the same conditions receive disparate 
treatment); Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138 (stating that an emergency room screening that 
has a disparate impact on the plaintiff should be considered inappropriate for 
EMTALA purposes); Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 (holding that a hospital violates 
§ 1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own established screening procedures); see 
also Marshall, 134 F.3d at 323-24 (observing that the plaintiff bears the burden of 
showing that the hospital treated the plaintiff differently from other patients; the 
burden is not on the hospital to show that it had a uniform screening); Williams v. 
Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing plaintiffs must prove the 
hospital treated one patient “differently from other patients” to have a claim under 
EMTALA). 
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Washington Healthcare Corp.,441 for instance, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals reasoned that what constitutes an “appropriate” screening is 
properly determined not by reference to particular outcomes, but 
instead by reference to a hospital’s own standard screening 
procedures.442  The Sixth Circuit, in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care 
Group, Inc.,443 and the Tenth Circuit, in Repp v. Anadarko Municipal 
                                                          
 441. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  In Gatewood, the victim, Mr. Gatewood died 
of a heart attack after being discharged from the emergency department of 
Washington Hospital Center (“WHC”) with a diagnosis of suffering from 
“musculoskeletal pain.” Id. at 1038.  Mr. Gatewood complained of pain radiating 
down his left arm and into his chest.  Id. at 1039.  Mr. Gatewood was evaluated by Dr. 
Mehlman, a resident, who examined him and performed blood tests, a chest x-ray 
and an EKG.  Id.  Dr. Laygo, the attending physician, also examined Mr. Gatewood.  
Id.  Mr. Gatewood was discharged from the hospital with instructions to use a heating 
pad and over-the-counter analgesics for his pain. Id. Mr. Gatewood died the next 
morning from a heart attack. Id.  Mrs. Gatewood filed a suit alleging EMTALA 
violations and a state malpractice action.  Id. at 1038.  The district court held that 
EMTALA was intended to prohibit “dumping” of patients for economic reasons, and 
that it provided no cause of action for fully insured patients presenting typical claims 
of “failure to properly diagnose.” Id. at 1039 (summarizing the district court’s May 
23, 1990 ruling).  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that whether a patient 
carries health insurance is not critical to a claim under EMTALA, which by its own 
terms covers “any individual” who presents at an emergency department. Id.  
However, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Id.  Similarly, the court noted, any 
departure from standard screening procedures constitutes inappropriate screening 
in violation of EMTALA.  Id. at 1041.  The court made clear that the motive for such 
departure is not important to this analysis, which applies whenever and for whatever 
reason a patient is denied the same level of care provided others and guaranteed him 
or her by § 1395dd(a).  Id. at 1041.  “Absent some allegation of differential 
treatment,” then, no claim can be stated under § 1395dd(a).  Id.  The D.C. Circuit 
found that the appellant failed to state a cognizable claim under the federal statute 
and absent a viable federal cause of action the district court’s dismissal of the case 
was affirmed for lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 1041-42. 
 442. Id. at 1042.  The Gatewood court also relied on the plain text meaning of the 
federal statute to hold that it “unambiguously extends” protections to “any 
individual” who seeks emergency department assistance.  Id. at 1040.  Here, the D.C. 
Circuit relied on the canons of statutory interpretation, citing courts are bound by 
statutory language when it is so clear that where, as here, “it is not manifestly 
inconsistent with legislative intent.”  Id. (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 671 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 
1976)).  The court noted its history makes clear that EMTALA is intended not to 
ensure each emergency department patient a correct diagnosis, but rather to ensure 
each patient “is accorded the same level of treatment regularly provided to patients 
in similar medical circumstances.”  Id. at 1041. 
 443. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).  The Clelands took their fifteen-year-old son to 
the Bronson Methodist Hospital emergency department (“Bronson”) complaining of 
lower abdominal cramps and vomiting.  Id. at 268.  The child was diagnosed as 
having influenza and was discharged four hours later.  Id.  However, the child was 
actually suffering from intestinal intussusception, a condition where a part of the 
intestine telescopes within itself.  Id.  Less than twenty-four hours after his discharge 
from Bronson, the child suffered a cardiac arrest and died.  Id.  The parents of 
Cleland filed a cause of action under EMTALA, alleging, in part, that defendants 
failed to provide for an appropriate medical screening.  Id.  The district court 
dismissed the Clelands’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action, based on its 
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Hospital,444 also focused on the peculiarities of a particular hospital.  
The Cleland court referred to an appropriate medical screening 
examination by a hospital as being “within its capabilities,”445 whereas 
the Repp court interpreted EMTALA’s requirement as being 
“hospital-specific, varying with the specific circumstances of each 
provider.”446  The Eighth Circuit, in Summers v. Baptist Medical Center 
Arkadelphia,447 reasoned that “something more than, or different 
                                                          
interpretation that EMTALA applied only to indigent and uninsured patients.  Id.  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.  Id.  Because 
there was no allegation that the screening was in any way different than would have 
been offered to any other patient, or was deficient in any way peculiar to the 
patient’s characteristics, the judgment of the district court dismissing the case was 
affirmed.  Id. at 272. 
 444. 43 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994).  In Repp, Mr. Repp sought emergency care from 
the Anadarko Municipal Hospital (“Anadarko”) for pain throughout his left arm.  Id. 
at 521.  Mr. Repp informed the nurses he had previously undergone cardiac bypass 
surgery.  Id.  While in the emergency department, Mr. Repp’s doctor was contacted, 
who prescribed two different injections of medications.  Id.  After receiving the 
injections, Mr. Repp returned home, where he died in his sleep from a cardiac 
arrest. Id. Plaintiffs, who were Mr. Repp’s survivors, brought suit under EMTALA 
alleging that defendants (Anadarko, Dr. Jay Belt, Anadarko Medical Clinic, P.C., and 
C. Bilyeu, L.P.N.) violated their own policies and did not provide Mr. Repp with a 
proper medical screening examination.  Id.  Plaintiffs additionally brought a state 
malpractice action against all defendants.  Id. at 521 n.2.  The district court granted 
summary judgment for all defendants and plaintiffs appealed.  Id. at 521.  Although 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found “appropriate medical screening” to be an 
ambiguous phrase, the court believed the language of § 1395dd(a) precluded the 
adoption of a standard tantamount to a federal malpractice statute.  See id. at 522 
(emphasizing that Congress did not intend EMTALA to serve as a medical 
malpractice statute).  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a hospital violates 
§ 1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard procedures.  Id.  Accordingly, 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 
defendants.  Id. at 523. 
 445. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272.  The Cleland court stated that to resort to a 
malpractice or other objective standard of care for the meaning of the term 
“appropriate” was precluded by the terms of the statute.  Id.  Rather, “appropriate,” 
the court believed, “must more correctly be interpreted to refer to the motives with 
which the hospital acts”—thereby establishing a subjective standard.  Id.  Motives the 
court considered, without limitation, included race, sex, politics, occupation, 
education, personal prejudice, and drunkenness.  Id.  Although the “motive” aspect 
of Cleland was overturned by Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253 (1999), 
motive is the essence of subjectivity.  The Cleland court believed if a hospital acts in 
the same manner as it would have for the usual paying patient, then the screening 
provided is “appropriate” within the meaning of the statute.  Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272. 
 446. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.  The Repp court reasoned that EMTALA does not 
require a hospital to provide a medical screening in the abstract, but one that is 
appropriate “within the capability” or within the “particular conditions of each 
individual emergency room,” including ancillary services routinely available to the 
emergency department.  Id. 
 447. 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc).  In Summers, Harold Summers fell 
out of a tree stand while deer hunting after which he was taken by ambulance to 
Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphia (“Baptist”).  Id. at 1135.  The emergency 
physician ordered four x-rays of the patient’s spine as well as other routine tests.  Id.  
Although Baptist conceded that Summers complained of chest pain, the emergency 
doctor testified that Summers did not complain of pain in the front part of his chest.  
Id.  No x-rays of the chest were taken.  Id.  The emergency physician at Baptist 
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from,”448 ordinary negligence in the emergency department screening 
process must be shown to make out a federal claim under 
EMTALA.449  The court held that the “something” required was a 
“lack of uniform treatment.”450 
c. The burden-shifting standard 
The Fourth Circuit, in Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass’n,451 
                                                          
believed the spinal x-rays showed only an old break at the eighth thoracic vertebra.  
Id.  Summers was told he was suffering from mucourte spasms.  Id.  Although 
Summers requested to be admitted to the hospital, he was given pain injections and 
discharged.  Id.  The next day Summers went by ambulance to St. Bernard’s Regional 
Medical Center in Jonesboro, Arkansas, where he underwent a chest x-ray and 
computerized tomography.  Id.  Multiple fractures to the rib, vertebra, and sternum 
were revealed from the scan.  Id. at 1135-36.  Summers was subsequently hospitalized 
at Jonesboro for fourteen days, some of that time in intensive care.  Id. at 1136.  
Summers filed an EMTALA claim alleging Baptist had “failed to provide for an 
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of [its]. . . 
emergency department . . . .”  Id.  The lower court granted Baptist’s motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.  Id. at 1135.  Summers sought 
review in the appeals court.  Id.  The court concluded: 
instances of “dumping,” or improper screening of patients for a 
discriminatory reason, or failure to screen at all, or screening a patient 
differently from other patients perceived to have the same condition, all are 
actionable under EMTALA.  But instances of negligence in the screening or 
diagnostic process, or of mere faulty screening, are not. 
Id. at 1139. 
 448. Id. at 1138. 
 449. Id.  Thus, a medical screening examination is deemed inappropriate if it has 
any type of “disparate impact on the patient.”  Id.  The court held that patients are 
entitled to be treated as “other similarly situated patients are treated, within the 
hospital’s capabilities.”  Id.  The court noted further that once a hospital determines 
on its own what its screening procedures will be, it must apply them uniformly to all 
patients.  Id. (citing Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 
1996); Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (1st Cir. 1995); Repp, 43 F.3d at 
522; Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 450. Id.  The court also held, with respect to determining the appropriateness of a 
medical screening examination, that an emergency physician is only required by 
EMTALA to screen and treat a patient for those conditions the physician “perceives 
the patient to have.”  Id.  at 1139. 
 451. 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).  In Power, Susan Power was evaluated at the 
Arlington Hospital (“Arlington”) emergency department for pain in her left hip, 
lower abdomen, and back running down her leg; inability to walk; shaking; and 
severe chills.  Id. at 853.  She was evaluated by two physicians and was given a 
prescription for pain medication, the name of an orthopedist, and was discharged.  
Id.  The following day, Power again appeared at the Arlington emergency 
department in an unstable condition and with barely existent blood pressure.  Id.  
Upon diagnosing her with septic shock, Arlington admitted Power without delay to 
the intensive care unit (“ICU”).  Id.  During her four month stay in the ICU, Power 
was maintained on life support, suffered the amputation of both legs below the knee, 
became blind in one eye, and was stricken with severe and permanent lung damage.  
Id.  After five months of hospitalization she was eventually transferred from Arlington 
to another hospital in her hometown of London, England.  Id. 
Power sued Arlington under EMTALA, alleging that it failed to give her an 
“appropriate medical screening” during her first visit to the emergency department.  
Id. at 853-54.  Power also argued that Arlington violated EMTALA by moving her to 
the hospital in London while her condition was unstable.  Id. at 854.  The district 
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formulated yet a different standard which consisted of a three-step, 
burden-shifting process to determine the correct standard of care to 
be utilized in the determination of whether the EMTALA 
“appropriate medical screening examination” obligation was 
satisfied.452  First, the plaintiff has the burden of making a threshold 
showing of differential treatment (subjective standard).453  Second, 
the hospital is permitted to offer rebuttal evidence indicating either 
that the patient was provided the same degree of care afforded to all 
patients, or that a test or procedure was bypassed because the treating 
physician determined that the individual circumstances of the patient 
                                                          
court denied Arlington’s motion for summary judgment on Power’s EMTALA claim, 
finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.  Id.  The district court ruled 
that Power’s EMTALA causes of action were not controlled by the Virginia cap on 
medical malpractice damages, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1992), or the 
Virginia liability limits for tax-exempt hospitals, id. § 8.01-38.  Power, 42 F.3d at 854.  A 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Power on the screening claim and awarded actual 
damages of five million dollars.  Id.  The jury found in favor of Arlington on the 
EMTALA transfer claim.  Id. 
On appeal, Arlington’s main issue concerned the appropriate legal standard for 
recovery in an EMTALA claim.  Id. at 854.  Other issues on appeal included:  
EMTALA’s interrelationship with the two Virginia statutes, medical malpractice suit 
caps, and the limits on liability for tax-exempt hospitals.  Id.  The court noted that 
Power had plainly provided sufficient evidence to meet the threshold requirement of 
an EMTALA claim from which a jury could conclude that she was evaluated 
differently from other patients treated at the Arlington emergency department, and 
that Arlington did not uniformly apply its standard screening procedure.  Id. at 856.  
Arlington had the chance to present evidence that the emergency department 
treated Power no differently than other patients, or that any deviation from standard 
procedures was based on the determination of the treating physician as to what was 
medically required.  Id. at 859.  In response, Power submitted evidence from 
qualified medical experts who testified that, for a patient with Power’s symptoms, a 
blood test was an essential part of a medical screening examination at Arlington’s 
emergency department.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict in favor of 
Powers and her claim under EMTALA.  Id. at 869.  However, the court reversed the 
holding that Virginia’s medical malpractice damages cap and limit on liability for tax-
exempt hospitals were inapplicable to EMTALA claims.  Id.  The court stated that the 
state’s limitation on damages was applicable, and recovery should have been limited 
to one million dollars under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15.  Power, 42 F.3d at 861.  In 
addition, the liability limit for the tax-exempt hospital should have applied, under 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38, because the action was one for negligence or other tort.  
Power, 42 F.3d at 864-65. 
 452. Power, 42 F.3d at 856.  The Fourth Circuit noted it previously held that “[t]he 
plain language of [EMTALA] requires a hospital to develop a screening procedure 
designed to identify such critical conditions that exist in symptomatic patients and to 
apply that screening procedure uniformly to all patients with similar complaints.”  Id.  
The court relied on Barber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 879 (4th Cir. 
1992), which stressed that EMTALA requires more than simply having a screening 
procedure in place.  Power, 42 F.3d at 859 (citing Barber, 977 F.2d at 879).  Rather, 
adherence to EMTALA requires hospitals to uniformly apply screening procedures.  
Id.  In Power, two emergency room physicinas testified that Arlington lacked written 
guidelines detailing appropriate medical screening procedures for emergency 
department doctors to follow when evaluating patients.  Id. at 855. 
 453. Id. at 858.  This initial burden of the plaintiff is more akin to the objective 
standard of care. 
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(objective standard) did not necessitate the test or procedure.454  
Third, if a hospital submits such rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff is 
then given the opportunity to use the his own medical testimony 
(subjective standard) to challenge the physicians’ medical opinions.455 
2. Stabilization:  objective standard of care 
Although multiple standards of care may be imposed in evaluating 
an appropriate medical screening examination, the duty of 
stabilization employs an objective standard.  Stabilization involves two 
considerations:  actual patient stabilization and stabilization during 
transfer.456  To be sure, according to the plain text of EMTALA, 
stabilization has occurred when such treatment has been provided as 
may be necessary to assure “within reasonable medical probability”457 that 
“no material deterioration of the condition is likely.”458  Thus, a 
professional (objective) standard, rather than the standard of a 
particular hospital, is used.459 
Some flexibility, however, is provided for within the objective 
standard of care of EMTALA’s duty of stabilization, as shown in 
                                                          
 454. Id.  This rebuttal evidence of the hospital is more akin to the subjective 
standard of care. 
 455. Id.  The court stressed that this is particularly true in a case like Power where a 
hospital has denied that it maintains any standard emergency protocols or 
procedures, noting that there, the Fourth Circuit ruled that EMTALA’s plain 
language dictates that hospitals must create screening procedures and apply them 
consistently.  Id. (citing Barber, 977 F.2d at 879). 
 456. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A)-(B) (2000) (explaining that the difference 
between “to stabilize” and “stabilized” is that “to stabilize” a patient involves the 
provision of the medical treatment required for a patient to be considered 
“stabilized” such that the likelihood of “material deterioration” during transfer to 
another medical facility is practically non-existent). 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id.; accord Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1259 n.3 (9th Cir. 
1995) (asserting that the stabilization mandate requires hospitals to provide care 
tailored to meet the needs of each patient’s emergency medical condition—not to 
dispense “uniform stabilizing treatment”); In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 
1994) (stating that rather than providing merely “uniform treatment,” the hospital 
must provide the requisite treatment to avoid material deterioration of the individual 
patient’s emergency medical condition); Thornton v. S.W. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that, once the hospital becomes aware that a 
patient is suffering from an emergency medical condition, it must stabilize the 
specific condition detected before the patient can be transferred or discharged).  In 
cases of maternal labor, the stabilization process involves the time at which the 
mother has delivered the child and the placenta.  42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(ii)(B) 
(1998). 
 459. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 546 (1995); accord  Delaney v. Cade, 986 
F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993); Green v. Touro Infirmary, 992 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 
1991); see also Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that the hospital’s responsibility under EMTALA ends when it has 
stabilized a patient’s emergency medical condition). 
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Cherukuri v. Shalala.460  The court in Cherukuri reasoned that 
                                                          
 460. 175 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 1999).  The main issue in Cherukuri was whether Dr. 
Cherukuri, an emergency department on-call surgeon, violated the “stabilization” 
requirement of EMTALA because he transferred two critically ill patients with head 
injuries to a regional trauma center before operating on their abdominal injuries to 
stop suspected internal bleeding.  Id. at 448.  In response to this violation, the 
Inspector General initiated an enforcement action seeking suspension of the 
doctor’s license and $100,000 maximum “civil penalty.”  Id.  An administrative law 
judge working for the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
ruled that the surgeon was guilty and imposed the maximum fine.  Id. 
The complex facts of Cerukuri are quite interesting.  At about 3:30 a.m. on 
September 15, 1991, five severely injured auto accident victims were brought to 
Williamson Hospital (“Williamson”), a small rural hospital in the Appalachian 
Mountains of Kentucky.  Id. at 451.  The Williamson emergency department staff 
consisted of an emergency physician and a registered nurse.  Id.  Upon arrival of the 
five trauma victims to Williamson, Dr. Cherukuri was immediately summoned to the 
emergency department.  Id.  Two of the five patients, Crum and Mills, had severe 
head injuries, internal abdominal injuries and evidence of internal bleeding.  Id.  
Williamson had no trauma center and no equipment for monitoring the effect of 
anesthesia on the brain during surgery, and maintained a longstanding policy of 
refraining from performing neurosurgery on brain injuries.  Id. at 448.  Rather, as on 
the evening of the events in question, its protocol was to transfer such patients to 
other larger and better equipped hospitals.  Id. 
Dr. Cherukuri’s evaluation of Crum revealed extensive brain injury and severely 
low blood pressure which he believed to be indicative of near-brain death.  Id. at 451.  
When  a small incision in Crum’s stomach revealed internal bleeding, Dr. Cherukuri 
tentatively concluded that Crum might not survive.  Id.  However, Crum would need 
immediate blood and other liquid transfusions to stabilize his blood pressure.  Id.  
After implementing initial resuscitative treatment, Dr. Cherukuri concluded that he 
would have to operate on Crum’s abdomen to locate and stop the bleeding before 
transferring him to another hospital for brain surgery.  Id. at 451-52.  Dr. Cherukuri 
found patient Mills to be responsive but unconscious with an acute head injury and 
low blood pressure.  Id. at 451.  A small incision in his stomach indicated that Mills 
was also bleeding internally.  Id. 
Dr. Cherukuri attempted to arrange for anesthesia in order to operate on Crum 
and Mills.  Id.  The anesthesiologist on call advised strongly against operating on the 
patients with cranial injury and refused to provide anesthesia for any such 
anticipated surgery on the accident victims.  Id. at 452.  The anesthesiologist 
repeatedly advised that administering anesthesia for the abdominal surgery was too 
dangerous because Williamson lacked the equipment to monitor the anesthesia’s 
effect on brain pressure.  Id.  No other anesthesiologists were available to Dr. 
Cherukuri.  Id. 
Because Dr. Cherukuri could not find an anesthesiologist to provide anesthesia 
that would allow him to perform intraabdominal surgery on the two patients with 
head injuries, both patients were transferred to St. Mary’s Hospital (“St. Mary’s”) in 
Huntington, West Virginia.  Id. at 451.  Upon learning that the two patients were 
transferred, St. Mary’s staff became irate and reported their suspicions that Dr. 
Cherukuri had violated EMTALA by transferring unstable patients without the 
receiving hospital’s consent.  Id. at 454.  Based on St. Mary’s report of a suspected 
incident of improper transfer, the U.S. government undertook an investigation and 
prosecution of Dr. Cherukuri.  Id. 
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held that in cases of internal bleeding, 
“stabilization” “necessarily require[s]” the surgeon to perform abdominal surgery 
prior to transfer.  Id. at 449.  Although the ALJ acknowledged that the on-call 
anesthesiologist had asserted very plainly that he did not intend to administer 
anesthesia to the patients because of the high risk that it would result in their deaths, 
the ALJ nevertheless held that EMTALA “required” the surgeon “to force” the 
anesthesiologist to administer anesthesia by “expressly ordering him to do so.”  Id. at 
452.  According to the ALJ, EMTALA “necessarily required” Dr. Cherukuri to force 
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EMTALA’s statutory definitions regarding stabilization are “not given 
a fixed or intrinsic meaning.”461  Rather, the meaning of stabilization 
“is purely contextual or situational.”462  Thus Cherukuri held that “to 
stabilize” requires a “flexible standard of reasonableness” that 
depends on the circumstances.463 
3. Transfer:  objective standard of care 
EMTALA is silent as to the applicable standard of care to be used 
to determine statutory compliance with the patient transfer 
provision.464  Because patient dumping litigation resulting from 
EMTALA transfer violations involves the interrelationship465 of 
                                                          
the anesthesiologist “against his will” to administer anesthesia.  Id. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to enforce the order of the ALJ, and 
set aside the administrative decision.  Id. at 449.  The Sixth Circuit noted that 
EMTALA in no way mandated such a “confrontation” as proposed by the ALJ.  The 
Sixth Circuit found the ALJ’s conclusions erroneous.  Id. at 452. 
 461. Id. at 449.  In this regard, the capabilities of a particular hospital, as well as a 
patient’s specific circumstances, remain pertinent issues of law and medicine.  See also 
In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 (emphasizing that meeting the standard of dispensing 
reasonable treatment under the circumstances may require the provision of 
stabilizing treatment, even when it might be against the manifest ethical principle of 
a hospital or its standard practices); Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1369 (explaining that 
EMTALA requires treatment that would prevent material deterioration of the 
patient’s emergency medical condition during transfer); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. 
Ass’n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting that the term “to stabilize” 
involves a factual question about whether the medical care was reasonable in light of 
the circumstances). 
 462. Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 449.  The Cherukuri court explained that in 
determining stabilization, factors that ought to be balanced include the relative 
weights of:  (1) what the emergency physician can do for the patient at the receiving 
hospital; (2) what services would be available to the patient at the receiving hospital; 
(3) the patient’s current condition; and (4) the risk that the patient’s condition will 
deteriorate during the transfer.  Id. at 450.  Here, the Cherukuri court cited Bryan v. 
Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1996), noting 
that the Fourth Circuit also held that in terms of transfer, “stabilize” is a relative 
concept that varies with the circumstances.  Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 450. 
 463. Cherukuri, 175 F.3d at 454.  Also, the Cherukuri court affirmatively cited the 
position set forth in the brief filed by the Solicitor General of the United States in 
Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999), in which the Solicitor General, 
on behalf of the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services (the 
“Secretary”), explained that the definition of “stabilization” establishes an “objective” 
standard of “reasonableness,” based on the specific circumstances at hand and 
“requires merely that a hospital stabilize patients within the staff and facilities at the 
hospital.”  Cherukui, 175 F.3d at 450.  The court also cited the Solicitor General’s 
reference to a statement of Senator Bob Dole, a co-sponsor of EMTALA, who had 
stated that “a hospital is charged only with the responsibility of providing an adequate 
first response to a medical crisis” which “means the patient must be evaluated and, at 
a minimum, provided with whatever medical support services and/or transfer 
arrangements that are consistent with the capability of the institution and the well-
being of the patient.”  Id. at 451 (citing 131 CONG. REC. 28,569 (1985)). 
 464. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (2000) (detailing the medical treatment that 
hospitals are required to provide to emergency room patients in terms of transfer, 
but containing nothing about the necessary standard of care). 
 465. Litigation concerning patient transfer generally involves three questions.  
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medical and legal principles of patient stabilization and transfer, the 
U.S. Solicitor General’s position in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.,466 
                                                          
First, courts consider issues which relate back to sufficiency determinations of 
whether necessary stabilizing treatment of an emergency medical condition was in 
fact adequate for stabilization.  See, e.g., Roberts, 525 U.S. at 252.  Although the main 
issue in Roberts focuses on whether improper motive is a required element to 
establish an EMTALA violation, the fact pattern and subsequent discussion of patient 
transfer is a prime example of the interrelationship between the issue of transfer 
raising the sufficiency consideration of prior necessary stabilizing treatment of the 
patient’s emergency medical condition.  Id. 
Second, courts determine whether the transfer involved an unstable medical 
condition where the physician completes a legal certification indicating that the 
“medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical 
treatment at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual.”  
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii).  See Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1371-72 (concluding that 
the physician’s testimony as to his weighing the benefits and risks of transfer was 
incredible because he made an “immediate and unwavering decision” to transfer the 
patient when he learned of her condition over the phone); Owens v. Nacogdoches 
County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (noting the physician’s 
testimony that he weighed the benefits and risks of transfer was incredible, where he 
risked sending a sixteen year old pregnant girl with labor pains to a hospital four 
hours away without providing transportation, rather than risk stunting the growth of 
the baby). 
Third, courts must decide whether the transfer was “appropriate” under EMTALA.  
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2).  See Owens, 741 F. Supp. at 1276 (asserting that the 
patient’s private automobile did not satisfy EMTALA’s requirements for adequate 
transportation where a physician’s direction for the patient to go to another hospital 
qualified as a transfer); Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1372-73 (describing the transfer of a high 
risk hypertensive labor patient to a hospital three hours away, where neither the 
medical personnel nor the equipment in the ambulance were considered satisfactory 
under EMTALA); Wey v. Evangelical Cmty. Hosp., 833 F. Supp. 453, 466 (M.D. Pa. 
1993) (finding in favor of the hospital ordering a transfer, where no expert medical 
testimony was offered to indicate that a private automobile transfer of a patient who 
was not able to comply with directions to keep the injured limb elevated and 
continued to suffer from pain, was medically inappropriate and violative of 
EMTALA). 
 466. 525 U.S. 249 (1999).  Accordingly, a review of the facts in Roberts is helpful.  
In Roberts, Wanda Y. Johnson sustained injuries when she was struck by a vehicle in 
May 1992.  Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 5, Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 
525 U.S. 249 (1999) (No. 97-53) [hereinafter Solicitor General Brief].  Her injuries 
were life-threatening, and she was taken to the Galen of Virginia hospital (“Galen”) 
(formerly DBA Humana Hospital, University of Louisville) in Louisville, Kentucky, 
where she was treated for two months.  Id. at 5.  She suffered multiple infections and 
complications.  Id. (citing Pet. App. at A27).  In July 1992, Galen transferred 
Johnson, who lacked medical insurance, to Crestview Health Care Facility, a licensed 
nursing facility in Indiana.  Id. (citing Pet. App. at A27).  At the time of transfer, 
Johnson was being treated for an active infection.  Id. at 5 (citing Pet. App. at A27).  
The day after Johnson’s transfer to the nursing facility, Johnson’s condition 
worsened and she was transferred to Midwest Medical Center, a nearby Indianapolis 
hospital, where she was treated for several months.  Id. (citing Pet. App. at A27).  
Petitioner, Johnson’s guardian, filed a federal suit on August 30, 1993, singularly 
alleging that Galen had violated EMTALA 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) by transferring 
Johnson to the nursing facility before stabilizing her condition.  Id. at 5 (citing Pet. 
App. at A27). 
The district court initially denied Galen’s motion for summary judgment on the 
EMTALA claim because it concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to whether Johnson was stabilized at the time of transfer.  Id. at 6.  The district court 
also held, citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 
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with respect to the analysis of the standard of care applicable to 
necessary stabilizing treatment, again is informative.  In Roberts, the 
Solicitor General comprehensively dissected all provisions of 
EMTALA which pertain to an objective standard of care.467  Notably, 
the government identified four key loci within EMTALA that pointed 
strongly to an objective standard. 
First, the government inter-related the standard of care of 42 
U.S.C. § 13295dd subsection (a) with (b).468  In Roberts, the 
government relied upon the statutory definition of the term 
“emergency medical condition,”469 indicating that a “reasonableness 
                                                          
Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (1990), that “the presence of an improper motive [is] an 
essential element in a claim for relief under § 1395dd,” and that there was also a 
disputed issue of material fact as to whether the hospital transferred Johnson with an 
improper motive.  Solicitor General Brief, supra, at 7.  The court’s ruling on 
improper motive was based on evidence that a hospital social worker was pressured 
to discharge Johnson because the hospital was not receiving payment for her 
treatment.  Id.  (citing Pet. App. at A37-38).  On a motion for reconsideration, 
although the district court did not alter its earlier conclusion, it granted summary 
judgment to Galen because “the plaintiff presented no evidence that either the 
medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was 
caused by an improper motive[].”  Id. at 6-7 (citing Pet. App. at A50-51). 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment, 
declaring that the district court “properly interpreted the Cleland holding as 
requiring that a plaintiff prove a hospital acted with an improper motive in order to 
recover under the EMTALA.”  Id. at 7 (citing Pet. App. at A10).  The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that proof of an improper motive is necessary for distinguishing between 
an EMTALA claim and a state law claim for malpractice.  Id. at 7-8 (citing Pet. App. 
at All).  The Sixth Circuit did acknowledge, however, that the issue in Cleland was 
whether the hospital had complied with 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) by providing the 
patient with an “appropriate medical screening,” whereas the issue in Roberts was 
whether the hospital violated § 1395dd(b) by neglecting to stabilize a patient with an 
emergency medical condition.  Id. at 8.  As such, the court of appeals concluded that 
Cleland’s improper motive requirement also pertains to cases, such as the one at 
hand, arising under § 1395dd(b).  Id.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
award of summary judgment for Galen, holding that the district court correctly 
concluded that petitioner had not met the burden of proving an improper motive 
served as the impetus for discharging Johnson.  Id.  However, on certiorari, the 
United States Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit holding, thereby 
establishing that proof of an improper motive is neither a necessary nor required 
factor for finding an EMTALA violation.  Roberts, 525 U.S. at 250. 
 467. The government’s strategy was to identify as many instances as possible within 
the EMTALA statute which relied upon, or either directly or indirectly imposed, an 
objective standard, thereby showing that the opposition’s contention of EMTALA 
involving a subjective standard was inconsisitent with the statute. 
 468. See Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 2-3 (explaining that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(a) requires hospitals to provide patients with a proper medical 
examination to evaluate whether they are suffering from an emergency medical 
condition and, if such a condition is found to exist, § 1395dd(b) obligates the 
hospital to stabilize the patient within the means available at the hospital or to 
transfer the patient in compliance with § 1395dd(c), whereby transfer can be 
performed at a patient’s or legal representative’s written request). 
 469. See id. at 14-15.  “Emergency medical condition” was defined as: 
a condition ‘manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity 
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical 
attention could reasonably be expected to result in:  (i) placing the health of 
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standard”470 is yet again integrated into EMTALA.471  That is, the 
government asserted that according to the statutory language of 
EMTALA, a failure to provide an adequate medical examination to a 
patient who had an emergency medical condition “could reasonably 
be expected”472 to result in danger to the health or damage to bodily 
function in that patient.473  Here, referring to the use of the 
“familiar”474 “reasonableness standard,”475 the government indicated 
that this definition reinforces and makes apparent that, at a 
minimum, hospitals are required to stabilize the conditions of those 
patients whose health could “reasonably be expected” to be in peril 
without such care, as with the transfer of a patient.476 
In conjunction with this analysis, the government noted that the 
statutory definition of “to stabilize”477 includes two requirements:  
(1) the hospital must guarantee “within reasonable medical 
probability”478 that deterioration of the patient’s condition during 
transfer is unlikely; and (2) the term “emergency medical condition” 
refers to a condition that could “reasonably be expected” to put a 
patient’s health in significant danger.479  As a result, the government 
concluded that “[b]oth of those ‘reasonableness’ standards support 
the conclusion that EMTALA imposes an ‘objective standard of 
care.’”480 
                                                          
the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the 
woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to 
bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part). 
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)) (emphasis added). 
 470. Id. at 15. 
 471. See id. at 15-16 (insisting that the use of a reasonableness standard not be 
misconstrued as meaning that a hospital “will be liable only if it intends to treat a 
patient improperly or . . . with an improper motive”). 
 472. Id. at 15. 
 473. Id. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13295dd(e)(1)(A), (3)(A) (2000)). 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id.  The Solicitor General also noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (requiring a 
hospital to provide “an appropriate medical screening examination within the 
capability of the hospital’s emergency department, including ancillary services 
routinely available to the emergency department . . . .”) has a standard of care similar  
to that required under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b), i.e., a reasonableness—but not purely 
objective—standard, as a hospital, therefore, cannot be held liable under 
§ 1395dd(b)(1)(A) on the ground that it “‘negligently’ failed to have more 
specialized staff or facilities at the hospital.”  Id. at 14 n.4 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(b)(1)(A)). 
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Second, the government also considered “mental state”481 in its 
analysis of EMTALA’s standard of care.482  Specifically, the 
government noted that the definition of “to stabilize”483 elucidates the 
“mental state”484 required of the hospital in making transfer decisions:  
it must make certain, “within reasonable medical probability”485 that 
the odds of the patient’s condition worsening are low.486  
Consequently, the hospital is not strictly liable for a patient’s 
condition when it makes a transfer through such an objective 
standard of care analysis.487 
Third, the government relied on legislative history488 in arguing 
that Congress dealt with “patient dumping”489 by imposing a 
“substantive standard of medical care.”490  This position was 
substantiated by noting that all pertinent congressional committee 
reports and floor debate statements491 express the hospital’s EMTALA 
duties in “objective terms.”492 
                                                          
 481. Id. at 13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)). 
 482. See id. (clarifying that the term “mental state” referred to that of the 
individual committing the EMTALA violation). 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. at 14. 
 486. Id. 
 487. See id. (stating that if the hospital acts “within reasonable medical probability” 
(i.e., an objective standard) to ensure that any “material deterioration” of the 
patient’s condition is unlikely, the hospital has fulfilled its duties under such an 
objective standard). 
 488. Id. at 10. 
 489. Id.  Here the government defined patient dumping as “refusing treatment to 
or transferring patients who could not pay for care.”  Id. 
 490. See id. (stating that the substantive standard was chosen over a proscription 
against “acting with an improper (non-medical) [subjective] motive”).  The 
Conference Report on EMTALA made clear that it was adopting the House proposal 
that “all participating hospitals must . . . provide further examination and treatment 
within their competence to stabilize the medical condition or provide treatment for 
the labor.”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-453, at 473 (1985).  Although the House bill 
required provision of “medical treatment . . . to assure that no material deterioration 
of the [emergency medical] condition is likely to result from the transfer of the 
individual,” id. at 477, the Senate bill added that the treatment must only provide 
such assurance “within reasonable medical probability.”  Id.  The Conference 
Committee adopted the House provision, but modified it with the Senate’s “within 
reasonable medical probability” standard.  Id.  Thus, the adopted compromise 
indicates that Congress focused on the precise standard of care to be embodied in 
EMTALA, and concluded that a medical reasonableness standard would provide 
sufficient protection against patient dumping.  Id. at 478. 
 491. Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 10. 
 492. Id.  Senate floor debate and commentary concerning EMTALA support the 
notion that Congress chose to address the problem of emergency treatment and 
stabilization by imposing a medical standard of care.  See 131 CONG. REC. 29,829, 
29,835 (1985) (announcing that hospital emergency rooms are required to provide a 
medical evaluation and stabilize any patient presenting for care).  For instance, 
Senator Durenberger, the bill’s floor manager, stated that the bill would “make it 
clear that the Medicare Program will not do business with any institution which 
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Lastly, the government relied on sanction provisions to bolster its 
identification of an objective standard.493  Here, the government 
noted that a participating hospital that “negligently”494 violates a 
requirement of EMTALA is subject to a civil money penalty for each 
such violation.495 
C. Physician Conduct:  Objective Standard of Care 
Much confusion exists in both the legal and medical professions 
concerning the standard of care that should be applied to emergency 
physicians’ conduct with respect to EMTALA obligations.496  Such 
confusion threatens EMTALA compliance and fosters patient 
dumping.  For instance, physicians are placed in a difficult position 
when they are expected to follow a particular standard of care 
regarding one EMTALA provision on behalf of the hospital, but their 
own conduct with respect to that same provision may be judged 
against an altogether different standard.497  Because such a divergent 
set of standards may exist for the same EMTALA obligation, we 
briefly explore the basis for physician liability under EMTALA. 
1. Strict liability vs. negligence 
Although traditional state medical malpractice causes of action are 
governed by a negligence standard, and it is commonly misperceived 
that EMTALA is governed by a strict liability standard,498 judicial 
                                                          
willfully and knowingly, or through negligence, turns its back on an emergency 
medical situation.”  Id. at 28,568.  Senator Kennedy, a co-sponsor, similarly stated 
that “every patient who has a bona fide emergency must receive stabilizing care.” Id.  
at 28,569.  Senator Dole, another co-sponsor, referred to the problem of patient 
dumping, and added that “a hospital is charged only with the responsibility of 
providing an adequate first response to a medical crisis,” which “means that a patient 
must be evaluated and, at a minimum, provided with whatever medical support 
services and/or transfer arrangements that are consistent with the capability of the 
institution and the well-being of the patient.”  Id. 
 493. See Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 16 (indicating that “[i]f, as the 
Sixth Circuit held, violations of EMTALA require proof of improper motive, there 
could be no possibility of a ‘negligent’ violation of the Act . . .  .”).  
 494. See id. at 4 (stating the use of the term “negligence” in the sanction provisions 
allows sanctioning a hospital that is at fault regardless of whether an improper 
motive can be proven). 
 495. See id. (explaining a physician may also be excluded from Medicare 
participation and federally funded state health care programs for “gross and flagrant 
or repeated” violations) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2000)). 
 496. See Frank, supra note 396, at 205-10 (noting schism existing between the 
interpretations of the circuits regarding the standard of care required by EMTALA). 
 497. See id. at 204, 213-14 (noting that “hospitals but not physicians are subject to 
private suits” for EMTALA violations, yet “knowledge of a medical condition is 
imputed to the hospital through its physicians” and thus physicians become 
responsible for two divergent sets of standards). 
 498. See Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass’n, 950 F.2d 676, 681 
(10th Cir. 1991) (finding that the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) and (c) 
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decisions have been notably unclear as to which standard should be 
used to judge a physician’s conduct.  For instance, in Abercrombie v. 
Osteopathic Hospital Founders Ass’n,499 the court specifically found that it 
was significant that the word “negligently” was used with respect to a 
physician’s violation of EMTALA, but that the term was absent from 
the section regarding civil enforcement.500  Noting further that 
neither the appropriate medical screening requirement, nor the 
requirement of only transferring stable patients incorporates a 
negligence standard, the court concluded that a strict liability 
standard applied under EMTALA.501 
However, it is misleading to denominate EMTALA as a strict 
liability statute, especially when considering the standard against 
                                                          
impose a strict liability standard for EMTALA violations); Stevison ex rel. Collins v. 
Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that EMTALA 
contains “mandatory language” thus imposing a strict liability standard, subject to the 
defenses provided by the statute); Reid, Inc. v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Med. Hosp., 
709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (indicating EMTALA “was based on a strict 
liability standard”); Fell, supra note 24, at 631 (noting that EMTALA generally carries 
a strict liability standard while state malpractice claims employ a negligence 
standard). 
 499. 950 F.2d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 1991).  In Abercrombie, a patient who presented to 
an emergency department with chest pain was treated and sent home.  Id. at 677-78.  
Later, on the same day of discharge, the patient was seen by her family physician who 
diagnosed her as having a myocardial infarction.  Id.  The patient returned to the 
hospital where she suffered a massive infarction and died.  Id. at 678. 
 500. Id. at 681 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)). 
 501. Id.  Even more bizarre, the Abercrombie court also found that jury instructions 
that included reference to a negligent violation of EMTALA, rather than imposing 
strict liability, were impermissible, yet merely constituted harmless error.  Id. at 680-
81.  Some cases have held that EMTALA does not impose a strict liability standard.  
See, e.g., Barris v. City of Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966, 972 (Cal. 1999) (stating EMTALA 
requires “actual knowledge by the hospital” and is, therefore, not a strict liability 
statute); Stevison v. Enid Health Syst., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(construing EMTALA as imposing a strict liability standard.  Most of what is 
published regarding the relationship of strict liability to EMTALA is directed at 
hospitals, rather than physicians.  See Terry J. Wechsler, Tenth Circuit Survey:  Health 
Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 767 (1996) (stating that EMTALA imposes strict liability on 
hospitals, and further, that the hospital carries the burden of proof in refuting an 
alleged EMTALA violation).  Some authors have noted that the strict liability 
standard has been inappropriately applied as an “exceedingly strict liability” 
standard, and has only been applied to certain provisions of EMTALA.  See Frank, 
supra note 396, at 212-13 (asserting that, in order to most faithfully preserve the 
meaning of the text, courts should refrain from interpreting the stabilization 
provision in isolation, and accordingly, should employ a conjunctive reading of the 
various provisions); Caroline J. Stalker, How Far  is Too Far?: EMTALA Moves From the 
Emergency Room to Off-Campus Entities, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 824 (positing that 
judicial interpretations of EMTALA substantially expanded liability under the 
statute).  Additionally, with respect to the actual knowledge rule, see supra Part II.B, 
most courts have ruled that EMTALA’s stabilization requirement does not impose 
strict liability on the hospital.  See Frank, supra note 396, at 213 (commending courts 
for holding that EMTALA’s duty to stabilize does not arise unless the hospital is 
aware of a patient’s emergency medical condition). 
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which physician conduct is to be judged.502  That is, whereas strict 
liability automatically imposes responsibility for acts regardless of the 
care utilized during the act, EMTALA requires hospitals to adhere to 
a certain level of care.503  Similarly, EMTALA itself contains numerous 
indications that an objective standard of care is to be used in 
evaluating physician conduct.504  In fact, much of the language of 
EMTALA is based on the common negligence, or objective, standard 
which would evaluate whether a reasonable physician, under the 
same or similar circumstances, would have acted in the same manner 
as the physician in question acted.505 
2. Basis for physician EMTALA liability 
To appreciate the standard against which physician conduct must 
be judged, it is important to understand how physicians are liable 
under EMTALA.  This is an area of additional confusion, because 
EMTALA is believed by many to be primarily a hospital-oriented 
statute506 which “imposes no responsibilities directly on physicians; it 
unambiguously requires hospitals to examine and stabilize, treat or 
appropriately transfer all who arrive requesting treatment.”507  This is 
a misconceived paradox.508  Physician EMTALA duties are imposed on 
the basis of two separate underpinnings.  First, physician duties are 
imposed through the historical persistence of the notion of a 
“responsible physician,”509 and second, through “voluntariness.”510 
                                                          
 502. See Alicia K. Dowdy et al., The Anatomy of EMTALA:  A Litigator’s Guide, 27 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 463, 489 (1996) (arguing that it is incorrect to refer to EMTALA as a 
strict liability statute, even though courts sometimes do so); see also Joan M. Stieber et 
al., EMTALA In The 90’s–Enforcement Challenges, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 57, 67 n.39 (1998) 
(arguing that the imposition of strict liability under EMTALA is “inappropriate in the 
inexact realm of emergency medical care”). 
 503. Stieber, supra note 502, at 67 n.39. 
 504. See id. (identifying the use of statutory language such as “reasonable medical 
probability” and “reasonable physician” as probative of an intended objective test). 
 505. Id. 
 506. Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1376 
(5th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging EMTALA imposes no responsibilities directly on 
physicians). 
 507. Id. 
 508. See BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 84 (noting it is paradoxical that “the law does 
not directly create any physician duties or liabilities.”).  
 509. Historically, a “responsible physician,” as originally defined by EMTALA, 
included:  “one who (A) is employed by, or under contract with, the participating 
hospital, and (B) acting as such an employee or under such contract, has 
professional responsibility for the provision of examinations or treatment for the 
individual, or transfers of the individual, with respect to which the violation 
occurred.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1987), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1395dd(d)(1)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1991).   
 510. See BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 19 (noting that duties attach to on-call, 
admitting, and consulting physicians by virtue of their voluntarily accepting medical 
staff privileges or accepting on-call duties). 
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The language of EMTALA is unambiguous with respect to 
physician liability:  any “responsible physician” who negligently 
violates an EMTALA requirement is subject to civil monetary 
penalties.511  A “responsible physician” is one who is “responsible for 
the examination, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a 
participating hospital who has sought emergency medical care.”512 
“Voluntariness” also provides for physician EMTALA duties.  First, 
EMTALA, as a federal law, was written as one of the Conditions of 
Participation in the Medicare program.513  Thus, to participate in 
Medicare, a hospital must require its medical staff, in toto, to comply 
with the Medicare Conditions of Participation, which include all the 
provisions of EMTALA.514  Therefore, all physicians who treat patients 
in a Medicare-participating hospital, especially emergency physicians, 
are subject to the legal duties of EMTALA.515  It is the mere 
attainment of clinical hospital privileges, at a Medicare-participating 
hospital, which subjects a physician to the obligations, 
responsibilities, and duties of EMTALA.516 
3. Physician EMTALA liability:  objective-negligence standard of care 
The U.S. government has taken the clear position that EMTALA is 
governed by an objective-negligence standard, and not a strict liability 
standard of care.517  The evidence supporting the government’s 
                                                          
 511. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (2000). 
 512. Id. 
 513. Burditt v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1366 
(5th Cir. 1991) (“Hospitals that execute Medicare provider agreements with the 
federal government pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc must treat all human beings who 
enter their emergency departments in accordance with the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.”); BITTERMAN, 
supra note 18, at 15. 
 514. BITTERMAN, supra note 18, at 84. 
 515. Id. at 19. 
 516. Id. at 84.  Thus, all members of a hospital’s medical staff become liable under 
the EMTALA definition of a “responsible physician.”  Id.; Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1371 
n.10 (stating that physicians “may not obligate themselves to hospitals receiving 
federal funds without accepting EMTALA’s obligations”). 
 517. See Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466.  The government’s position and 
understanding of the applicable standard of care in respect to EMTALA duties is best 
reflected in the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Solicitor General of the United States, on 
behalf of the Secretary, in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999).  The 
interpretation of an EMTALA objective standard of care is also consistent with the 
rulings of various federal circuits citing an objective standard for the interpretation 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)’s “appropriate medical screening examination” 
requirement imposing a substantive minimum standard of care.  See Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 
69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) (screening must be “reasonably calculated to 
identify critical medical conditions”); Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 
1258 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The touchstone is whether . . . the [screening] procedure is 
designed to identify an ‘emergency medical condition,’ that is manifested by ‘acute’ 
and ‘severe’ symptoms.”). 
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position is overwhelming and includes at least five specific loci.518 
First, the statutory language that subjects a physician to liability is 
clear in providing that a physician who “negligently”519 violates a 
requirement of EMTALA is subject to enforcement proceedings.520  
The use of “negligently” in forming the basis of physician liability 
clearly imports an objective standard of care based in negligence, 
rather than in strict liability.521  This negligence standard finds 
support in additional, specific statutory language also based on an 
objective framework.522  For instance, “reasonableness standards”523 
are enunciated within statutory definitions of “emergency medical 
condition,”524 “to stabilize,”525 and “stabilized,”526 and are augmented 
                                                          
 518. Because hospital EMTALA duties and obligations are essentially the duties of 
an emergency physician, the provisions outlining EMTALA hospital duties are, by 
definition, imputed upon the physicians on staff at participating hospitals.  
Accordingly, arguments in favor of an objective standard of care for hospitals, as 
outlined in the section on Transfer Standard of Care, supra Part II.B.4, are equally 
supportive of an objective standard of care for physicians and will not be repeated in 
this section concerning physician EMTALA liability. 
 519. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (2000). 
 520. Id. (providing that “any physician who is responsible for the examination, 
treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating hospital, including a 
physician on-call for the care of such an individual, and who negligently violates a 
requirement of this section” will be liable for civil monetary penalties).  The 
government also has noted that if an EMTALA violation is “gross and flagrant or is 
repeated,” then the physician is also subject to exclusion from participation in 
Medicare and federally funded state health care programs.  Solicitor General Brief, 
supra note 466, at 4; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b)(2) (stating the Secretary may 
refuse to enter into an agreement with the provider).  The Secretary may also impose 
civil money penalties and exclusions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a, as 
incorporated into 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A)-(B).  Solicitor General Brief, supra 
note 466, at 4. 
 521. Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 15 (asserting that the inclusion of 
the word “negligent” indicates that the statutory duty turns on objective factors 
rather than strict liability). 
 522. Id. 
 523. The government, in Roberts, strongly advocated the position that “both of 
th[e] ‘reasonableness standards’ [referring to the standards used in the definition of 
“emergency medical condition” and “to stabilize”] support the conclusion that 
EMTALA imposes an ‘objective standard of care.’”  Solicitor General Brief, supra 
note 466, at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A), (3)(A)). 
 524. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) defines an “emergency medical condition” as 
follows: 
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient 
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical 
attention could reasonably be expected to result in—(i) placing the health of the 
individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman 
or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily 
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part . . .  
(emphasis added). 
 525. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) defines the term “to stabilize” as follows: 
[T]o provide such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to 
assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of 
the condition is likely to result or occur during from the transfer of the 
individual from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition 
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by similar statutory use of the phrases “could reasonably be 
expected”527 and “within reasonable medical probability”528 within 
certain definitions.529 
A second factor supporting the notion that an objective standard of 
care should be used with respect to physician conduct is found in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (“OBRA 1990”),530 in 
which Congress provided that, when considering allegations of 
violations of EMTALA, the Secretary shall “request the appropriate 
utilization and quality control peer review organization (“PRO”).”531  
The role of the PRO is to address “quality of care,”532 which relates to 
a medical standard of care, whereby the PRO is to provide an “expert 
medical opinion.”533  Congress’s provision for the use of a PRO 
further affirms that physician EMTALA liability is based on 
“adherence to a medical standard of care.”534 
Third, the use of an alternative to the stabilization requirement 
also indicates that the physician EMTALA duty turns on objective 
factors.535  Specifically, under the appropriate transfer provisions of 
EMTALA,536 a hospital may transfer a patient whose condition has not 
                                                          
described in paragraph (1)(B), to deliver (including the placenta) 
(emphasis added). 
 526. 42 U.S.C § 13295dd(e)(3)(B) defines the term “stabilized” as follows: 
[T]hat no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable 
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the 
individual from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition 
described in paragraph (1)(B), that the woman has delivered (including the 
placenta) (emphasis added). 
 527. See Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 15 (arguing that the use of such 
statutory language confers an objective duty upon physicians). 
 528. Id. at 9 (citing use of objective language as precluding a strict liability 
interpretation of EMTALA) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A)). 
 529. Id. 
 530. Pub. L. No. 101-508, Tit. IV, § 4027(a)(1)(A), 104 Stat. 1388-117 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3) (1994)).  
 531. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3). 
 532. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(g)(2)(v) (2001) (identifying quality of care as one 
factor to be considered in evaluating the EMTALA liability of physicians and 
hospitals). 
 533. A medical expert opinion is generally provided regarding (a) whether an 
individual had an emergency medical condition, (b) whether an individual’s 
emergency medical condition was stabilized, (c) whether an individual was 
transferred appropriately, and (d) whether there were any medical utilization or 
quality of care issues involved in the case.  Id. 
 534. The objective standard is further substantiated by the fact that Medicare 
providers generally have an obligation to provide services of “a quality which meets 
professionally recognized standards of health care.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)(2) (emphasis 
added). 
 535. Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 16 n.6 (articulating exception to 
the no-transfer rule when medical benefits “reasonably expected” from treatment at 
another facility outweigh increased risk to the individual) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii)). 
 536. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1). 
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been stabilized537 if a physician “has signed a certification that[,] 
based upon the information available at the time of transfer, the 
medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate 
medical treatment at another facility outweigh the increased risks to 
the individual . . . from effecting the transfer.”538 
Fourth, the government has relied, in part, upon 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(i), which imposes liability on a physician who 
signed such a legal certification “if the physician knew or should have 
known” that the benefits did not outweigh the risks.539  The “should 
have known” standard suggests that the physician’s duty is “not 
merely” to refrain from acting on subjective grounds, but rather 
invokes obligations based upon objective standards.540 
Lastly, subsequent congressional amendments to OBRA 1990541 
concerning the imposition of civil penalty provisions also support an 
EMTALA objective standard.542  Under EMTALA, as originally 
enacted, the Secretary could impose civil monetary penalties on 
physicians who “knowingly violate[d] a requirement of 
[EMTALA].”543  In OBRA 1990, Congress substituted the term 
“negligently” for the term “knowingly,”544 which is compatible with an 
objective standard of care. 
D. Conjunctive versus Disjunctive Interpretations of EMTALA 
Another area in which hospital and physician conduct may conflict, 
and thereby lead to poor EMTALA compliance, is in the 
determination of whether the medical screening examination, 
stabilization, and transfer provisions of EMTALA are interdependent 
or independent of each other.  Here, again, the federal courts are 
split in their conjunctive and disjunctive interpretations of EMTALA.  
                                                          
 537. Id. 
 538. Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 16 n.6 (noting that the EMTALA 
statutory duty is, therefore, based on an analysis of what is “reasonably expected,” which 
is compatible with an objective standard) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii)) 
(emphasis added). 
 539. Solicitor General Brief, supra note 466, at 16 n.6. 
 540. Id. 
 541. Pub. L. No. 101-508, Tit. IV, § 4008(b)(3)(A) and (B), 104 Stat. 1388-44 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994)).  
 542. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1), (b)(2) (employing “reasonableness” standard in 
enumerating grounds for termination and non-renewal of agreements). 
 543. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). 
 544. OBRA 1990 § 4008(b)(1), 104 Stat. at 1388-44; see also Solicitor General Brief, 
supra note 466, at 18 (“[C]anon[s] of statutory construction requir[e] a change in 
language to be read, if possible, to have some effect.”) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 263 (1992)). 
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1. Conjunctive interpretations 
A conjunctive interpretation of EMTALA limits the scope of 
EMTALA to patients evaluated in the emergency department only, 
and thereby precludes its application to inpatients.545  Under such an 
interpretation, the liability exposure for physicians is more limited. 
Naturally, the conjoining of subsections (b) and (c) of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd finds explicit support in the plain text of § 1395dd(b)(1), 
which “ties the need for stabilization of discerned emergency medical 
conditions to the transfer restrictions imposed by subsection (c).”546  
Therefore, § 1395dd(c) can be interpreted to impose liability only 
upon a prior § 1395dd(b) determination that a transferee patient 
suffers from an emergency medical condition.547  Further, because 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B) provides that if a hospital determines that 
an emergency medical condition exists, it either must stabilize the 
individual or transfer him “in accordance with subsection (c),” there 
is “sound reason, embedded in the statute’s text, to read subsection 
(c)’s qualified prohibition on unstabilized transfers in tandem with 
subsection (b)’s requirement that the hospital actually detect the 
emergency medical condition.”548  The conjunctive interpretation of 
EMTALA is followed by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. 
The Fourth Circuit endorsed the conjunctive interpretation of 
EMTALA through two separate methodologies.  In Bryan v. Rectors & 
Visitors of the University of Virginia Medical Center,549 the Fourth Circuit 
assessed the temporal duration of EMTALA obligations; whereas in 
                                                          
 545. See Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 176-77 (1st Cir. 1999) (favoring a 
disjunctive reading of EMTALA so as not to limit liability to the emergency room 
only). 
 546. Id. at 175 (finding that such a linkage of subsections (b) and (c) therefore 
makes “linguistic and structural sense”) (emphasis added).  Such a proposition finds 
support in case law through linkage of the actual knowledge of the hospital in 
respect to the presence of an emergency medical condition with the stabilization of 
such a condition.  See Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1994) (joining three 
other federal circuit courts in requiring proof of actual knowledge on the part of the 
hospital in a § 1395dd(c) claim regarding patient transfer); Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of 
Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting a hospital determination that the 
patient suffers from an emergency medical condition is a prerequisite for application 
of EMTALA’s transfer requirements); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 
1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (stabilization) 
and § 1395dd(c) (transfer) provisions “are triggered only after the hospital 
determines that [an] individual has an emergency medical condition.”) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 1399dd(b)(1), (c)); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 
271 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[i]f the emergency nature of the condition is not 
detected, the hospital can not be charged with failure to stabilize a known emergency 
condition”).  
 547. Lopez-Soto, 175 F.3d at 175; accord Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 
139, 145 (4th Cir. 1996); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041. 
 548. Lopez-Soto, 175 F.3d at 175. 
 549. 95 F.3d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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Hussain v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.,550 
the Fourth Circuit considered the ability of EMTALA to reach into a 
patient’s hospital room.  Under either methodology, hospital and 
emergency physician EMTALA obligations are quite diverse.  In 
Bryan,551 the court identified a hospital’s obligation under EMTALA 
as pertaining to “immediate, emergency stabilizing treatment,”552 
rather than having to provide treatment indefinitely.553  Thus, the 
court narrowly interpreted the scope of the temporal duration of the 
EMTALA obligation by declaring that “the stabilization requirement 
was intended to regulate the hospital’s care of the patient only in the 
immediate aftermath of the act of admitting a patient for emergency 
treatment.”554  In Hussain,555 the Eastern District of Virginia, relying on 
                                                          
 550. 914 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
 551. In Bryan, Cindy Bryan, as administratrix of the estate of Shirley Robertson, 
brought a cause of action under EMTALA against the University of Virginia Medical 
Center (“UVA”).  Bryan, 95 F.3d at 349.  The complaint alleged that UVA failed to 
provide Mrs. Robertson with the stabilizing treatment that EMTALA required and 
she died as a result.  Id. at 350.  The district court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Id.  Mrs. Robertson was transferred to UVA because of severe respiratory 
distress.  Id.  UVA was given clear instructions to take all necessary measures to keep 
her alive.  Id.  After twelve days of treating Mrs. Robertson, UVA entered a “do not 
resuscitate” (“DNR”) order against the family’s wishes.  Id.  Eight days after the DNR 
order, Mrs. Robertson suffered a heart attack and was allowed to die.  Id. at 351.  The 
Bryan court affirmed the dismissal of the administratix’s action for failure to state a 
claim under which relief could be granted, as no recoverable cause of action arising 
under EMTALA could be identified.  Id. at 353. 
 552. Id. at 351. 
 553. Id.  The Bryan court specifically noted that “once EMTALA has met that 
purpose of ensuring that a hospital undertakes stabilizing treatment for a patient 
who arrives with an emergency condition, the patient’s care becomes the legal 
responsibility of the hospital and the treating physicians.”  Id.  The court identified 
the limited purpose of EMTALA by requiring that the hospital provide limited 
stabilizing treatment to or an appropriate transfer of “any patient that arrives” with 
an emergency condition.  Id. at 352. 
 554. Id. 
 555. 914 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Va. 1996).  In Hussain, Uzma Hussain, presented to 
Fairfax Hospital emergency department for evaluation Id. at 1332.  After being 
diagnosed and treated  for acute recurrent pancreatitis, Ms. Hussain was admitted to 
the hospital. Id.  In the early morning on the date following her admission to the 
hospital, the nursing staff requested a medical examination for Ms. Hussain for 
unspecified reasons.  Id.  The physician staff did not comply with this request and Ms. 
Hussain died shortly thereafter.  Id.  The plaintiff filed a cause of action under 
EMTALA, alleging that Fairfax failed to provide an appropriate medical screening 
examination and that Fairfax violated 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) by failing to 
stabilize Ms. Hussain’s medical condition.  Id.  Evidence indicated that Ms. Hussain’s 
complications of acute pancreatitis were not diagnosed and her life threatening 
condition was not stabilized.  Id.  Fairfax filed a motion for summary judgment and 
asserted that it had in fact treated and admitted Ms. Hussain for her emergency 
medical condition upon presentment to the emergency department.  Id. at 1335.  
The district court indicated that the plaintiff’s proof did not establish or permit an 
inference that Fairfax failed to stabilize the original emergency medical condition of 
acute recurrent pancreatitis to such a point that it would not materially deteriorate 
during, or as a result of, transfer to another hospital.  Id.  As such, the court granted 
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42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A), explained that the statutory language 
clearly refers back to the emergency medical condition “observed 
upon the patient’s initial appearance at the hospital’s emergency 
department.”556  Accordingly, the court noted that “neither in its text 
nor its avowed purpose does EMTALA reach into the hospital room 
of a patient admitted for several hours to redress the failure of 
hospitals to follow standard medical procedures in connection with 
in-patient hospital treatment.”557 
In James v. Sunrise Hospital,558 the Ninth Circuit utilized a three-way 
conjunctive statutory construction for the interpretation of EMTALA.  
The Ninth Circuit interpreted subsections (a), (b), and (c) of 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd as if each subsection related to a single course of 
events.  Thus, the James court reasoned that careful examination of 
the plain statutory text supports the proposition that § 1395dd(c) 
regulates transfers made pursuant to §§ 1395dd(a) and (b) and did 
not create an alternative basis for hospital liability.559  Specifically, the 
court reasoned that because Congress did not use “and” or “or” to 
connect § 1395dd subsections (a), (b), and (c),560 the transfer duty in 
§ 1395dd(c) was interpreted to deal with people who have emergency 
                                                          
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Id. 
 556. Id. at 1334. 
 557. Id. at 1335. 
 558. 86 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1996).  Ms. James challenged the dismissal of her 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Id. at 886.  
Her complaint alleged that she developed an emergency medical condition while 
hospitalized in Sunrise Hospital (“Sunrise”) and was subsequently discharged in 
violation of EMTALA.  Id.  Ms. James was admitted to Sunrise with acute renal 
failure.  Id.  While an inpatient, she underwent insertion of a synthetic graft into her 
arm.  Id.  The procedure was followed by numerous complications, including pain, 
numbness of her forearm, wrist, and hand, coolness of her hand, bluish discoloration 
of her hand, and weakening of her pulse.  Id.  Nevertheless, Sunrise discharged Ms. 
James without any evaluation of the condition of her vasculature.  Id.  Ms. James 
alleged that the condition she developed post-operatively was not stabilized prior to 
her discharge, which ultimately caused her hand to be amputated.  Id.  Ms. James 
asserted that Sunrise violated 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) of EMTALA.  Id. at 887.  Sunrise 
asserted that there was no such thing as a claim under § 1395dd(c) not implicating 
§ 1395dd(b).  Id. at 888.  Its theory was that, unless and until the hospital 
“determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition” under 
§ 1395dd(b), the transfer restrictions of § 1395dd(c) do not operate.  Id.  The court 
noted its prior holding in Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995), 
that screening at less than an appropriate level will not satisfy EMTALA, and that the 
hospital’s duty to stabilize the patient under § 1395dd(b) does not arise until the 
hospital detects the emergency condition.  James, 86 F.3d at 889.  The court 
concluded that the transfer restrictions of § 1395dd(c) only apply when an individual 
comes to the emergency room, and when the hospital determines that the individual 
has an emergency medical condition after an appropriate medical screening 
examination.  Id.  As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment that dismissed 
Ms. James’s complaint, concluding that EMTALA only applied to treatment decisions 
made in the emergency department.  Id. 
 559. James, 86 F.3d at 888, 889. 
 560. Id. at 888. 
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medical conditions under § 1395dd(b),561 and that because 
§ 1395dd(b) states that the transfer must be “in accordance with 
subsection (c),”562 § 1395dd(c) regulates the transfers made in 
accordance with § 1395dd(b).563 
2. Disjunctive interpretations 
The First,564 Sixth,565 Seventh,566 and Tenth567 Circuits, as well as the 
                                                          
 561. Id. 
 562. Id. 
 563. Id.  The court failed to understand why Congress would indicate that in 
§ 1395dd(b), the transfer has to be in accordance with § 1395dd(c), unless it meant 
for § 1395dd(c) to regulate the transfers made in accordance with § 1395dd(b).  Id.  
Therefore, the court held that § 1395dd(c) was designed to deal with people who are 
found to have emergency medical conditions under § 1395dd(b).  Id.  In support of 
its logic, the court noted the absence of inter-circuit conflict among four circuits 
utilizing such a conjunctive analysis to hold that there is no liability under 
§ 1395dd(c) unless there has been a determination under § 1395dd(b).  Id. (citing 
Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 525-27 (10th Cir. 1994); Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 
977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 
1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 
271 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
 564. Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1999); see infra note 575 
(describing the facts of Lopez-Soto). 
 565. In Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990), the 
Sixth Circuit relied on rules of statutory construction and legislative history as a basis 
for its disjunctive interpretation of EMTALA.  The court considered the appeal of a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant Southwest Detroit Hospital 
(“Southwest Detroit”) under a claim of EMTALA violation.  Id. at 1132.  The issue in 
Thornton was whether the initial treating hospital violated EMTALA by releasing Ms. 
Thornton before her condition “stabilized.”  Id.  After suffering a stroke, Elease 
Thornton spent a protracted course at a hospital but her recovery necessitated being 
transferred to the Detroit Rehabilitation Institute (“DRI”) for post-stroke 
rehabilitation therapy.  Id.  However, the DRI refused to accept Ms. Thornton 
because she lacked health insurance coverage.  Id.  Consequently, Ms. Thornton was 
discharged from the hospital and sent to her sister’s home for basic nursing care.  Id.  
After discharge from Southwest Detroit, Ms. Thornton’s condition deteriorated until 
she finally gained admission to the DRI.  Id.  Ms. Thornton brought suit under 
EMTALA, alleging that she suffered from an “emergency medical condition” when 
she entered Southwest Detroit and that Southwest Detroit failed to stabilize her 
condition before discharging her as required by EMTALA.  Id. 
The district court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether, after a three week stay in Southwest Detroit, Ms. Thornton’s condition had 
stabilized sufficiently for release.  Id. at 1134.  The district court had stated that 
EMTALA was not intended to require hospitals to bring patients to complete 
recovery, but to require hospitals to give emergency department treatment.  Id.  The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, concluding that the district court 
correctly found that Ms. Thornton’s condition had stabilized at the time of her 
release and that no genuine issue of material fact existed.  Id. at 1135. 
The Thornton court’s analysis centered on changes in construction between 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) [medical screening examination] and 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) 
[stabilization], noting that changes in wording support varied interpretations as well 
as changes in meaning. The court reasoned that, because of the change in wording 
between the screening requirement for patients that come to a “hospital emergency 
room” in § 1395dd(a), and the stabilization requirement in § 1395dd(b) that applies 
to the “hospital,” a disjunctive interpretation was thereby warranted.  Id. at 1135.  
The court noted that EMTALA’s legislative history supports a literal [and therefore 
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Supreme Court of Virginia,568 favor a disjunctive interpretation of the 
                                                          
disjunctive] interpretation, and that such history is clear that Congress intended to 
prevent hospitals from dumping patients who suffered from an emergency medical 
condition because they lacked insurance to pay the medical bills.  Id. at 1134.  The 
Thornton court reasoned that notwithstanding the repeated use of the phrase, 
“emergency room,” in comments of the congressional Judiciary Committee (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 241(III) (1986),  reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726-27) and The Ways 
and Means Committee (citing H.R. REP. NO. 241(I) (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 605), Congress sought to ensure that patients with medical 
emergencies would receive emergency care.  Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1134-35.  Noting 
that, although “emergency care often occurs, and almost invariably begins, in an 
emergency room,” the court reasoned that emergency care does not always stop 
when a patient is transported from the emergency department into other areas of 
the hospital.  Id. at 1135. 
 566. At least one district court in the Seventh Circuit has applied a disjunctive 
interpretative analysis to EMTALA.  In Loss v. Song, No. 89C 6952, 1990 WL 159612, 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990), Tracy Loss presented to defendant St. Joseph Hospital 
(“St. Joseph”) in active labor.  On the day of her admission, Tracy gave birth to a son, 
Brent Loss.  Id. at *1.  From the time of his birth, Brent suffered from severe 
congenital cardiac disease.  Id.  On the day after his birth, St. Joseph discharged both 
mother and infant.  Id.  In her complaint against her doctor for violations of the 
discharge provision of EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (2000), Tracy alleged 
that, prior to and at the time of his discharge, her child exhibited blue discoloration 
from his waist and thighs to his toes, ate poorly, and was lethargic.  Loss, 1990 WL 
159612, at *1.  Tracy alleged that these symptoms indicated an emergency medical 
condition, and that Brent was not stabilized at the time of his discharge.  Id. 
The defendants argued that a child born at a hospital with an emergency medical 
condition was precluded from bringing an EMTALA action because the child could 
not plead that he was admitted to or through the emergency department.  Id.  
However, the court in Loss noted that the complaint met all elements of an 
anticipated EMTALA claim, except for the fact that the infant did not “go to an 
emergency room.”  Id. at *3.  In so doing, the court relied on Deberry v. Sherman 
Hospital Ass’n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ill. 1990), which provided guidance to 
the court regarding the elements of an EMTALA claim.  Loss, 1990 WL 159612, at *3. 
The Loss court noted that the claim was not brought as a typical case of emergency 
department presentment, but rather was with respect to an infant who “came into legal 
existence after admittance.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Relying upon the type of disjunctive 
interpretation employed by Thornton, as well as congressional intent and plain 
statutory language, the court held that the plaintiff’s allegations that her child 
suffered from a severe congenital cardiac disease at birth were sufficient to state a 
claim under COBRA.  Id.  That is, the fact that the claim substantiated an emergency 
medical condition which required immediate treatment, irrespective of the manner 
or locus in which the patient arrived at the hospital where the treatment was 
provided, was sufficient to state a valid claim under EMTALA.  Id. 
 567. The Tenth Circuit also endorses the disjunctive interpretation of EMTALA as 
noted in both Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994), and Robbins v. Osteopathic 
Hospital Founders Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Okla. 2000).  Although Urban 
primarily involves the “actual knowledge” component of § 1395dd(c), and Robbins 
concerns the “informed consent” of a patient by a hospital in respect to its 
recommended transfer in satisfaction of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i), both cases 
implement and support the disjunctive interpretation of EMTALA. 
 568. The Supreme Court of Virginia relied upon the plain language and 
unambiguous words of Congress to form its disjunctive interpretation of EMTALA in 
Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hospital, 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va. 1992).  Smith involved a 
woman who, at thirty-three weeks gestation, had premature rupture of the uterine 
membranes.  Id. at 690.  During the subsequent four days of her stay at Richmond 
Memorial Hospital (“Richmond”), the plaintiff experienced abdominal cramping, 
greenish vaginal leakage, and progressive abdominal discomfort.  Id.  The plaintiff 
subsequently experienced cold chills and her body temperature dropped to 95.3 
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interrelationship of EMTALA provisions.  Under the disjunctive 
approach, courts treat the three duties of EMTALA as if they are 
independent of each other.  In other words, the duty to provide an 
appropriate medical screening examination,569 the duty to stabilize,570 
and the duty to appropriately transfer571 are not viewed as 
interdependent, but rather, they represent separate and distinct 
duties and causes of action.572  Such a disjunctive interpretation of the 
EMTALA provisions mandates that EMTALA is triggered wherever an 
individual located within a hospital develops an emergency medical 
condition, giving rise to the duty to medically screen, stabilize, 
and/or transfer. 
Cases which raise the conjunctive and disjunctive interpretation 
issue commonly involve instances in which those who have suffered 
harm “come into legal existence after admittance.”573  In Lopez-Soto v. 
Hawayek,574 the First Circuit addresssed a newborn’s entrance to the 
hospital via the operating room.575  The court’s analysis relied heavily 
                                                          
degrees Fahrenheit.  Id.  At one point, Richmond called a physician, who was not Ms. 
Smith’s regular attending physician.  Without ever examining her, the physician 
ordered that Ms. Smith be transferred to the Medical College of Virginia Hospital 
(“MCV”).  Id.  Several hours after arriving at MCV, Ms. Smith underwent emergency 
Cesarean section.  Id.  At first, two ambulances refused to transport Ms. Smith to 
MCV.  Id.  Ms. Smith sued Richmond claiming violation of COBRA [EMTALA], 
which caused her child to experience severe injuries.  Id.  The trial court held that 
COBRA did not cover “emergency conditions arising from medical neglect during a 
stay in a hospital.”  Id.  Smith appealed. 
In propounding the disjunctive interpretation, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
reasoned in Smith that the language used in each subsection of EMTALA describes 
distinct patient circumstances requiring different treatment protocols.  Id. at 692.  
Specifically, the court held that if an individual “comes to the emergency department” and 
requests examination or treatment, the hospital must provide an appropriate 
medical screening examination; whereas, if an individual “comes to a hospital” and the 
hospital determines that an emergency medical condition or active labor exists, the 
hospital must either stabilize the condition or transfer the person.  Id.  If the “patient 
[is] at a hospital,” the hospital may transfer that patient only under certain 
conditions.  The court noted that there was “nothing in the language of the Act 
which limits application of these subsections solely to a patient who initially arrives at 
the emergency room and who has not been stabilized . . . .”  Id. 
 569. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
 570. Id. § 1395dd(b). 
 571. Id. § 1395dd(c). 
 572. See, e.g., Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 692 (using the disjunctive interpretation in 
holding that nothing in the language of EMTALA limits application of each 
subsection to a patient who initially arrives at an emergency room and who has not 
been stabilized). 
 573. See Loss v. Song, No. 89C 6952, 1990 WL 159612, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990) 
(involving a child whose birth was delayed and who was alleged to have been injured 
as a result); see also Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 689 (involving birth of a child which was born 
with cardiac problems at time of birth); Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (involving the birth of a child in an operating room). 
 574. 175 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 575. Id.  Mayda Lopez-Soto, experiencing labor pains, was admitted at Auxilio 
Mutuo Hospital (“Auxilio”) for the delivery of her child.  Id. at 171.  When Dr. Jose 
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on the plain text of the statutory language.576 
The Lopez-Soto court held that EMTALA “unambiguously 
imposes”577 certain duties in the emergency care of an individual 
“regardless of how that person enters the institution or where within 
the walls he may be when the hospital identifies the problem.”578  
Further, the court explained that nothing in the provisions of 
EMTALA suggests a “necessary relationship”579 between a hospital’s 
obligations and the identity of the department within the hospital to 
which the afflicted individual presents himself.580  The First Circuit 
                                                          
Hawayek, an obstetrician, induced her water to break and immediately discovered 
the presence of thick “pea soup” meconium in the amniotic fluid, he ordered a 
Cesarean section.  Id.  Roughly fifteen minutes after the operation commenced, 
Lopez-Soto gave birth to a baby boy who suffered from severe respiratory distress due 
to meconium aspiration, constituting a medical emergency.  Id.  A pediatrician 
determined that the baby suffered not only from meconium aspiration, but also had 
a collapsed lung in the form of a pulmonary pneumothorax and that the baby 
required specialized neonatal intensive care unit.  Id.  The pediatrician elected to 
send the infant to the receiving hospital without first attempting to stabilize the 
patient or to treat the exigent condition of pneumothorax.  Id.  The baby was 
transferred to the San Juan Pediatric Hospital where he died the next day.  Id. 
Plaintiff, Lopez-Soto, filed a cause of action against the physicians and Auxilio, 
alleging violations of EMTALA.  Id.  Lopez-Soto asserted that Auxilio violated 
EMTALA because her baby was born “with a severe pulmonary condition that 
required emergency and immediate medical care and treatment,” but Auxilio 
nonetheless transferred him to another institution without stabilizing this condition.  
Id. at 172.  The defendants denied the allegations, contested jurisdiction, and 
asserted that EMTALA did not apply.  Id. 
The district court had adopted a conjunctive interpretation of all three subsections 
of EMTALA and precluded the independent reading of the provisions, fearing that 
applying EMTALA outside the emergency department would extend the statute 
beyond its scope and beyond Congressional intent.  Id.  The district court dismissed 
plaintiff’s EMTALA claim.  Id.  The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order, 
ordered the reinstatement of the pendent EMTALA claims, and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.  Id. at 177. 
 576. Id. at 172.  The First Circuit began by considering  “the meaning of the words 
that Congress wrote with an appraisal of the statutory text and structure . . .  mindful 
that if the plain language of the statute points unerringly in a single direction, an 
inquiring court ordinarily should look no further.”  Id. 
 577. Id. at 173. 
 578. Id. (citing Helton v. Phelps County Reg’l Med. Ctr., 794 F. Supp. 332, 333 
(E.D. Mo. 1992); Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 692). 
 579. Id.  The court further explained that “a disjunctive approach draws strength 
from the fact that subsection (b) mentions neither an emergency department locus 
nor a medical screening as a precursor to a hospital’s stabilization obligations.  
Rather, those obligations attach as long as an individual enters any part of the 
hospital and the hospital determines that an emergency medical condition exists.”  
Id. at 174.  The court believed that Congress “structurally [chose] to disconnect the 
three subsections [of EMTALA], closing them off from each other by periods, 
without any conjunctive links.”  Id.  The court reasoned that Congress’s use of 
punctuation  supported its disjunctive interpretation of EMTALA. Id. 
 580. Id. at 173.  By relying on the tenet that “all words and provisions of statutes 
are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should 
be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant, 
or superfluous,” the court rejected the district court’s attempt to meld the duties of 
§ 1395dd subsections (a), (b) and (c).  Id. (citing United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 
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held that a plain language approach was also good public policy.581  
That is, interpreting § 1395dd(b) to obligate hospitals to stabilize 
individuals when emergency medical conditions arise, regardless of 
their location in the hospital, is key to ensuring the health of those 
already admitted to the hospital who develop an emergency medical 
condition.582 
                                                          
F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st Cir. 1985)).  The court also relied on canons of statutory 
construction concerning the selection of language, noting that the fact that Congress 
used the “comes to an emergency department” language in § 1395dd(a), while 
employing different phraseology (“comes to a hospital”) in § 1395dd(b), serves to 
emphasize the “separateness of the statutory commands.”  Id. at 173.  The court 
reasoned that Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally and purposely when 
it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.  Id. 
(citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994)).  Otherwise, under a 
conjunctive approach, the implementation of the § 1395dd(b) phrase “comes to a 
hospital” would be meaningless in respect to the § 1395dd(a) phrase “comes to the 
emergency department.”  Id. 
 581. Id. at 176.  The First Circuit was quite critical of the conjunctive reasoning 
used by the district court.  Id.  The court noted that the district court unduly 
“fretted” over legislative purpose and was erroneous in its belief that allowing 
EMTALA’s stabilization and transfer obligations to apply outside the context of an 
emergency department (i.e., via a disjunctive interpretation) would extend the 
statute’s reach beyond Congress’s perceived limited goal of patient dumping.  Id.  
The First Circuit cited three reasons why the district court’s reasoning was faulty and 
cramped.  Id. 
First, the Lopez-Soto court held that courts should interpret statutes primarily 
through detailed analysis of concrete statutory language, not by reference to abstract 
notions of generalized legislative intent.  Id. (reiterating “that courts must presume 
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there”) (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, (1992)).  The 
First Circuit explained that while an examination of legislative purpose can shed 
light upon congressional intent, it cannot serve as the baseline for statutory 
construction.  Id. 
Second, the First Circuit emphasized that the narrow conjunctive interpretation of 
the district court did not account for the fact that statute explicitly embraces women 
in labor who typically go to maternity wards, not emergency departments, when they 
are ready to give birth.  Id. at 176-77. 
Third, the court noted that a disjunctive interpretation, not a conjunctive 
interpretation, best serves Congress’s preoccupation with patient dumping.  Id.  
Here, the court pointed out that patient dumping is not a practice that is limited to 
an emergency department, and that where a hospital determines that a patient on a 
ward has developed an emergency medical condition, it may fear that the costs of 
treatment will outstrip the patient’s resources, and seek to move the patient 
elsewhere.  Id. at 177.  The court opined that this form of patient dumping is 
“equally as pernicious” as the dumping that occurs in emergency departments, and 
the court was not prepared to say that Congress did not seek to curb it.  Id.  Although 
the district court was concerned that EMTALA might be converted into a federal 
medical malpractice statute without an emergency department arrival limitation 
commensurate with a conjunctive interpretation, the First Circuit found this concern 
to be overblown.  Id. 
 582. Id. at 175. 
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IV. THE FAILED ATTEMPT AT CREATING A NEW TORT OF PATIENT 
DUMPING:  COLEMAN V. DENO583 
Having considered the shortcomings of EMTALA and how they 
preclude effective healthcare provider compliance and government 
enforcement, a new approach to patient dumping will be 
considered—a state cause of action in the form of an intentional tort 
of patient dumping.  One failed attempt to sustain such a cause of 
action opens the door for consideration of this new remedy. 
A. Case Facts 
Coleman concerned a medical malpractice and patient dumping 
general tort cause of action involving the loss of the plaintiff’s arm.584  
On June 7, 1988, the plaintiff went to the emergency department of 
JoEllen Smith Hospital (“JESH”), where he complained of chest wall 
pain as a result of lifting.585  The plaintiff had a fever of 100.3 degrees 
Fahrenheit.586  He was examined by the attending emergency 
physician and discharged.587 
The following day, swelling and aching588 in the plaintiff’s left arm 
caused him to return to the emergency department.589  At that time 
the plaintiff had a heart rate of 120 beats per minute and a fever of 
102.8 degrees Fahrenheit.590  An attending nurse noted that the 
plaintiff’s left arm was “swollen and warm with bullae in the left 
antecubital space.”591  On this visit, the plaintiff was examined by Dr. 
Richard Deno,592 who ordered a white blood cell count on the 
plaintiff that returned a reading of 27,100.593  Dr. Deno diagnosed the 
plaintiff with left arm cellulitis and found that the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
 583. 787 So. 2d 446 (La. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d in part, modified in part, and remanded 
by 813 So. 2d 303 (La. 2002). 
 584. Id. at 454. 
 585. Id.  Mr. Coleman arrived at the emergency department at 1:44 a.m., also 
complaining of chest pain during deep breathing.  Id. 
 586. Id.  Normal body temperature is 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 587. Id.  Dr. Ivan Sherman, the attending emergency physician, found chest wall 
tenderness.  Id.  Dr. Sherman diagnosed plaintiff with chest pain and costochondritis 
and prescribed various anti-inflammatory medications.  Id.  The plaintiff was 
discharged at 3:45 a.m.  Id.  Coleman was instructed to “apply heat to his chest and to 
see his personal physician for a follow up examination.”  Id.  After filling his 
prescription, the plaintiff returned home.  Id. 
 588. Id. 
 589. Id.  Mr. Coleman returned to the JoEllen Smith Hospital on June 8, 1988, at 
8:10 p.m.  Id. 
 590. Id.  Normal heart rate range is 60-80 beats per second. 
 591. Id. 
 592. Id. at 455.  Dr. Deno noticed track marks consistent with intravenous drug 
use on the swollen left arm of the plaintiff.  Id. 
 593. Id. at 454.  Normal range for a white blood cell count is approximately 6-
10,000. 
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condition necessitated inpatient intravenous antibiotics.594 
Dr. Deno felt that transferring the patient was feasible and would 
be advantageous for the patient.595  The Charity Hospital of New 
Orleans (“Charity”) possessed superior and immediately available 
laboratory facilities necessary to treat the patient.596  Dr. Deno 
arranged for the plaintiff to be transferred to Charity,597 but 
determined that the plaintiff was stable and could transport himself 
to Charity.598  Dr. Deno did not administer antibiotics to the 
plaintiff.599 
The plaintiff arrived at Charity over two and one-half hours after 
his discharge from the JESH emergency department.600  Examination 
at Charity revealed that the plaintiff had a swollen left upper 
extremity which was extremely painful.601  His arm was swollen and 
warm from the mid arm to lower forearm.602  Since the transfer to 
Charity, the patient’s white blood cell count had risen to 29,900.603  
Left arm x-rays revealed significant soft tissue swelling.604 
Antibiotics were not started until seven hours after the plaintiff 
arrived at Charity.605  A surgical consultation on June 11 revealed that 
the plaintiff had crepitus, “indicating gas in the tissues of his left 
arm.”606  Subsequent left arm X-rays confirmed “air” within the soft 
tissues of plaintiff’s left arm.607  The plaintiff was then taken to the 
operating room,608 where the skin, fat, and bulk of the mucourtes of 
his left arm were found dead.609  An open left shoulder disarticulation 
                                                          
 594. Id. 
 595. Id. 
 596. Id. at 455. 
 597. Id.  Dr. Deno contacted the emergency resident at Charity, whereupon the 
resident accepted the plaintiff for immediate admission to the emergency 
department.  Id. 
 598. Id. at 456.  The plaintiff alleged in his original petition that Dr. Deno gave 
him express permission to go first to his home to pick up certain belongings before 
going to Charity.  Id. at 461. 
 599. Id. at 455. 
 600. Id.  The plaintiff arrived at 12:21 a.m. on June 9, 1988.  Id. 
 601. Id. 
 602. Id. at 456. 
 603. Id. 
 604. Id. 
 605. Id.  The physician determined that the plaintiff should be admitted for 
“intravenous antibiotics (Nafcillin, 2 grams every four hours), tetanus toxoid 
administration, elevation of warm compresses to the left arm, and additional blood 
studies.”  Id.  The patient was admitted to the Hospital’s LSU Medicine Service at 
6:00 p.m., June 9, 1988.  Id. 
 606. Id. at 457.  “Crepitus” is a crackling sensation which is felt by an examiner 
when palpating soft tissue. 
 607. Id. 
 608. Id. 
 609. Id.  Tissue death was believed to be due to compartment syndrome, a 
condition whereby infection-swelling become so great in magnitude that the blood 
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and amputation of the plaintiff’s left arm at the level of the left 
shoulder was preformed.610  Tissue cultures were positive for the gas-
forming organism, peptostreptococcus, and on June 28, 1988, the 
plaintiff was discharged from Charity.611 
B. Trial Court and Procedural History 
The plaintiff filed a request for a medical panel review pursuant to 
Louisiana law,612 wherein he alleged that both emergency physicians 
who evaluated him at JESH were negligent, that JESH and Charity 
hospitals were negligent, and that their negligence caused the loss of 
his left arm.613  The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to 
properly diagnose or treat his left arm condition.614  The medical 
malpractice panel concluded that there was “no breach of the 
applicable medical standard of care” by either JESH emergency 
physician.615  The plaintiff subsequently filed suit in civil district 
court,616 alleging both negligence and violation of COBRA’s anti-
dumping provision617 against the defendants. 
A jury trial618 was held, during which Dr. Deno filed various motions 
attempting to preclude any reference to COBRA/EMTALA’s anti-
dumping provision, or to the race or socioeconomic status of the 
plaintiff.619  The trial court granted Dr. Deno’s exception of no cause 
                                                          
supply of the arm is completely compromised and, as a result of a lack of blood flow 
to the tissues, the tissues die.  Id. 
 610. Id. at 456. 
 611. Id. 
 612. Id.  This review was made pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41 and 
§ 40:1299.39 (West 2001); Coleman, 787 So. 2d at 456.  The plaintiff filed individually 
and as the father of Louis Frank Coleman.  Id. 
 613. Id. 
 614. Id.  With respect to Jo Ellen Smith Hospital, Coleman alleged negligence 
during the June 7 and June 8, 1988, emergency department visits.  Id.  With respect 
to Charity, Coleman alleged negligence during the Charity hospital stay between 
June 9 and June 12, 1988.  Id. 
 615. Id. 
 616. The suit was filed on July 27, 1990, against Dr. Sherman, Dr. Deno, and Jo 
Ellen Smith Hospital.  Id.  The Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund 
(“Compensation Fund” or “Fund”) was an intervenor in the suit.  Id. 
 617. The COBRA violation was filed as a supplemental petition on March 27, 
1991.  Id. at 456-57. 
 618. The jury trial was conducted on March 1-5, March 8-12 and March 15, 1999.  
Id. at 457.  Plaintiff settled his claim against JoEllen Smith Hospital for $10,000, and 
the hospital was dismissed from the action on October 10, 1991.  Id. at 458.  Plaintiff 
settled his separately filed claim against Charity in March, 1993, for $25,000, and 
Charity was dismissed from the action.  Id. 
 619. Dr. Deno filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and/or 
prescription on plaintiff’s COBRA/EMTALA anti-patient-dumping claim and a 
motion in limine for an order precluding any reference to COBRA/EMTALA.  Id. at 
457. 
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of action.620  After hearing multiple medical expert witnesses for the 
plaintiff and the defense, the jury found both of the JESH emergency 
physicians were negligent and that their negligence contributed to 
the loss of plaintiff’s left arm.621  The jury awarded $4,400,000 to the 
plaintiff,622  but the court subsequently issued multiple annotated 
judgments623 significantly reducing the plaintiff’s award.624  The trial 
                                                          
 620. Id. 
 621. Id.  The jury apportioned twenty percent of fault to Dr. Sherman and eighty 
percent to Dr. Deno.  Id.  The jury found that Charity and plaintiff were not 
negligent.  Id. 
 622. Id.  This included “lost wages, diminished earning capacity and the cost of 
replacing personal services.”  Id.  The jury found that the amount for future medical 
care and related benefits was $500,000.  Id.  The damages sustained by plaintiff’s son, 
Louis Frank Coleman, for loss of society and services was $1 million.  Id.  The March 
18, 1999 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against Dr. Ivan 
Sherman and Dr. Richard Deno, in solido.  Id.  The judgment awards were restricted 
for each defendant to $100,000 plus interest based on statutory limits.  LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(2); Coleman, 787 So. 2d at 457. 
 623. On March 18, 1999, the court issued an annotated judgment that maintained 
the award rendered against defendants, Dr. Ivan Sherman and Dr.Richard Deno, in 
solido:  Louis Coleman, individually, $4,900,000.00; Louis Coleman, as natural tutor 
of his minor son, Louis Frank Coleman, $1,000,000.00.  Coleman, 787 So. 2d at 457.  
This judgment, as previously mentioned, was limited to $100,000 plus interest for 
both plaintiffs.  Id. at 457.  Further, judgment was rendered against the Louisiana 
Patients’ Compensation Fund Over-Sight Board (“LPCF”) in the sum of $300,000.00 
for both plaintiffs.  Id.  The annotated judgment awarded legal interest from the date 
the claim was filed with the LPCF.  Id.  The award for expert fees remained the same.  
Id. 
Accordingly, the trial court found that Louis Coleman would recover judgment 
against each defendant doctor in the sum of $79,591.84 plus interest.  Id.  The LPCF 
owed the balance of $238,775.51 plus interest.  Id.  The trial court held that Louis 
Coleman on behalf of his minor son, Louis Frank Coleman, would recover from each 
defendant doctor the sum of $20,408.16 plus interest.  Id.  The LPCF owed the 
balance of $61,224.49 plus interest.  Id. 
On June 24, 1999, after hearing post-trial motions, the trial court rendered a final 
amended judgment which provided that the parties stipulated that Louis Coleman 
settled with Charity for $25,000, and settled with JoEllen Smith Hospital for $10,000.  
Id. at 458.  The court granted the defendant Dr. Ivan Sherman’s motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”).  Id.  The court granted remittitur 
regarding the claim of Louis Coleman as natural tutor of his minor son, Louis Frank 
Coleman, to $10,000.00.  Id.  Although the trial court noted that the jury found Louis 
Coleman in need of future medical care and related benefits in the amount of 
$500,000.00, the trial court did not enter a judgment on this sum.  Id.  The trial court 
denied the post-trial motions except as follows:  the trial court reiterated that it 
granted Dr. Ivan Sherman’s motion for JNOV, dismissing all claims against Dr. 
Sherman by Louis Coleman, individually and on behalf of his minor son, Louis Frank 
Coleman, with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs.  Id. at 459.  Sole fault 
was assigned to Dr. Richard Deno.  Id.  In the amended judgment, the trial court 
held that the award to Louis Coleman on behalf of his minor son, Louis Frank 
Coleman, was remitted from $1,000,000 to $10,000.  Id.  The trial court found that 
the award to Louis Coleman does not pre-empt the claim of the minor son.  Id. 
The trial court ordered that the award to the minor son, Louis Frank 
Coleman, against Dr. Richard Deno was $1,018.30 and interest from April 1, 
1991, with the LPCF paying all other interest thereon [$10.000.00 divided by 
$4.910,000.000 = .0020366%, which means that the minor son, Louis Frank 
Coleman’s award on a total limitation of $500,000.00 is $1,018.30 ($500,000 
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court’s judgment was appealed625 by the plaintiff, defendant Dr. 
Deno, and the Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund (LPCF) as an 
intervenor.626 
C. Louisiana Appellate Court Opinion 
The main issues the plaintiff alleged on appeal included:  (1) the 
trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to diclose to the jury that 
Dr. Deno directed plaintiff to Charity because plaintiff lacked 
finances or hospitalization insurance;627 and (2) Dr. Deno’s fault in 
directing plaintiff to Charity because of the lack of finances or 
insurance is beyond the scope of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice 
Act (LMMA), and (3) because Dr. Deno’s conduct was beyond the 
scope of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA), application 
of the LMMA’s limit on damages was impermissible.628  On appeal, 
defendant Dr. Deno claimed that the jury was prejudiced by 
plaintiff’s witnesses’ references to race and socio-economic status.629 
                                                          
x .0020366% = $1,018.00).]. 
Id.  The trial court decreed that the judgment in favor of plaintiff, Louis Coleman, 
against Dr. Richard Deno was $98,971.70 with interest from April 1, 1991, with the 
LPCF paying all other interest.  Id. at 458.  The trial court ordered that the LPCF 
should receive credit of $100,000 for the judgment rendered against Dr. Richard 
Deno, and awarded $400,000 plus interest in favor of the plaintiff Louis Coleman 
against the LPCF.  Id. 
 624. Id. at 458-59. 
 625. Id. 
 626. The intervenor, the Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund, argued on 
appeal that: 
(1) the trial court erred in denying Dr. Deno and the Fund’s motions for 
new trial as well as JNOV, and the jury erred in finding that Dr. Deno was 
negligent; (2) there was no expert evidence to prove that Dr. Deno was 
negligent or caused or contributed to plaintiff’s loss of his left arm; (3) the 
jury erred in failing to apportion fault to Charity; (4) the jury award was 
excessive; (5) the jury erred in awarding $500,000 in special damages for lost 
wages or diminished earning capacity; (6) the trial court and jury erred in 
rendering an award to the minor son, Louis Frank Coleman, for loss of 
consortium; (7) the trial court erred in permitting plaintiff’s witnesses to 
testify regarding the cost of plaintiff’s future medical care and including 
$500,000 for future medical care and related expenses in a lump sum; and 
(8) the trial court erred in failing to give the Patients’ Compensation Fund a 
credit of $110,000 for plaintiff pretrial settlements with JoEllen Smith and 
Charity Hospitals. 
Id. 
 627. Id. at 459. 
 628. Id. 
 629. Dr. Deno also argued on appeal that: 
(1) the jury charges were erroneous and confusing; (2) the verdict was 
contrary to the law and evidence; (3) the trial court erred in failing to 
apportion any fault to Charity; (4) the trial court verdict was manifestly 
erroneous because there was no credible evidence that the plaintiff was in 
need of future medical care; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing testimony concerning the cost of a prosthesis device where there 
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Chief Appellate Justice, William H. Byrnes, III, delivered the 
opinion for the court.630  Justice Byrnes held that Dr. Deno’s fault in 
directing plaintiff’s transfer to Charity for lack of finances or 
insurance created a timely action beyond the scope of the LMMA, 
thereby entitling plaintiff to the full amount of the jury award.631  
Justice Byrnes noted that the Supreme Court of Louisiana had 
previously held that provisions of the LMMA apply only to 
“malpractice” as defined in the LMMA, and any other liability faced 
by health care providers is governed by general tort law.632  The court 
noted that the federal anti-dumping statute fails to provide a civil 
remedy against physicians,633 and that Louisiana state law imposes 
upon hospitals the obligation to render emergency services to all 
persons regardless of insurance or economic status, but does not 
expressly impose or decline to impose the same obligation on 
physicians.634 
Justice Byrnes stressed that as public policy the LMMA must be 
strictly construed against limiting the tort claimant’s rights against 
the wrongdoer.635  The court noted that, were the health care 
provider to commit an intentional tort against a patient or 
negligently injure that patient in a manner unrelated to medical 
treatment, the LMMA’s limitation of liability would not be available.636 
                                                          
was no expert testimony establishing that the device was medically necessary; 
(6) the jury verdict was manifestly erroneous because there was no evidence 
to support an award to the son, Louis Frank Coleman, for loss of consortium; 
and (7) the damage award to the minor son, Louis Frank Coleman, was 
extinguished by the award to his father, Louis I. Coleman. 
Id. 
 630. Id. at 454. 
 631. Id. at 459. 
 632. Id.  Justice Byrnes stated that this included those provisions of the LMMA that 
limited liability of qualified health care providers by providing a “maximum amount 
of damages, a mandatory pre-suit review by a medical review panel, and special 
prescriptive and preemptive periods.”  Id. 
 633. Id. (citing McDougal v. Blanch, 672 So. 2d 398, 400 n.3 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 674 So. 2d 973 (La. 1996)). 
 634. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2113.4 (West 2001)).  The appellate court 
also emphasized Dr. Deno’s express granting of permission to the plaintiff to first go 
home, and then go to Charity hospital, noting: 
Although he actually recognized, or should have recognized, the severe 
nature and seriousness of the plaintiff’s arm infection, Dr. Deno nevertheless 
failed to hospitalize the plaintiff for immediate care and attention at JoEllen 
Smith Hospital, and instead instructed plaintiff to go to Charity Hospital, 
while at the same time giving him express permission to go first to his home 
to pick up certain belongings before going to Charity. 
Coleman v. Deno, 787 So. 2d 446, 460 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 635. Id. at 461 (citing Johns v. Agrawal, 748 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1999), writ 
denied, 754 So. 2d 944 (La. 2000); Clark v. Baird, 714 So. 2d 840 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 726 So. 2d 31 (La. 1998)). 
 636. Coleman, 787 So. 2d at 462 (citing Descant v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 
639 So. 2d 246 (La. 1994)). 
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Justice Byrnes specifically noted that intentional tort allegations do 
not fall within the province of the LMMA.637  The court noted that the 
LMMA, as with medical malpractice acts of most states, governs only 
unintentional acts of negligence and contractual issues.638  The court 
also noted that even JESH’s policy provided that “every emergency 
room patient must receive appropriate treatment before discharge or 
transfer, regardless of financial status.”639  Justice Byrnes made clear 
that the “patient dumping” cause of action was not prohibited under 
the LMMA because of its status as an intentional tort, even though 
Dr. Deno’s decision to transfer the plaintiff to Charity for lack of 
finances or insurance violated JESH’s written policy.640 
The appellate court concluded there was “no express state law that 
excludes recovery under [Louisiana Civil Code article 2315], general 
tort law [Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:2113.4 to 40:2113.6], 
or against physicians for the intentional tort of patient dumping.”641  
Justice Byrnes held that “[p]laintiff’s reference to anti-dumping states 
a cause of action against the physician under Louisiana law.”642  
Further, Justice Byrnes concluded that the nature of patient dumping 
precluded application of the LMMA, and that the plaintiff’s amended 
petition stated a cause of action against defendant Dr. Deno, beyond 
the scope of the LMMA, thereby entitling the plaintiff to the jury 
award which would not be subject to the damage cap.643 
Accordingly, Justice Byrnes, in recognizing the intentional tort of 
patient dumping, reinstated the jury’s verdict against Dr. Deno and in 
favor of plaintiff.644  The cause of action of patient dumping was 
permitted to exist even where EMTALA provisions were satisfied.645 
D. Supreme Court of Louisiana Opinion—Majority Opinion 
After an extensive rendition of the facts in Coleman, the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana’s opinion consisted of three parts.  The first part 
of the opinion addressed the nature of the plaintiff’s patient 
dumping claim.646  The second part addressed the standards for 
defining a medical malpractice, claim which consisted of an analysis 
                                                          
 637. Id. at 462 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41A(8); Richardson v. 
Advanced  Cardiovascular Sys. Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. La. 1994)). 
 638. Id. 
 639. Id. 
 640. Id. 
 641. Id. 
 642. Id. 
 643. Id.  The LMMA has a $500,000 damage cap. Id. 
 644. Id. 
 645. Id. 
 646. See infra notes 649-68 and accompanying text. 
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of six factors.647  The third part of the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s 
opinion addressed both plaintiff’s and defendant’s arguments with 
respect to the medical malpractice claim.648 
The court characterized the plaintiff’s patient dumping claim, as 
the intentional tort of improper transfer.649  The court held that the 
nature of the claim of improper transfer (patient dumping) in this 
case was “really a claim of failure to properly diagnose, failure to 
stabilize, or both.”650  The court noted that “the court of appeal, with 
little analysis and citing no authority, characterized such a claim as 
outside the scope of ‘malpractice’ under the LMMA and thus justified 
the entire $4,900,000 jury award.”651  The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
held that the appellate court erred both procedurally and 
substantively in this regard.652 
The Louisiana Supreme Court recited the court of appeal’s 
reasoning that “the ‘patient dumping’ cause of action refers to an 
intentional tort where Dr. Deno directed plaintiff’s transfer to 
Charity for lack of finances or insurance although it conflicted with 
JoEllen Smith Hospital’s written policy.”653  The supreme court 
utilized a two-prong approach to determine whether the patient’s 
claim of patient dumping was outside the scope of “malpractice” 
under the LMMA and hence correct.654  First, the supreme court 
distinguished the Coleman case from its prior two decisions, Spradlin v. 
Acadia-St. Landry Medical Foundation655 and Fleming v. HCA Health 
                                                          
 647. See infra notes 670-94 and accompanying text. 
 648. See infra notes 695-703 and accompanying text. 
 649. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 313 (La. 2002). 
 650. Id. 
 651. Id. 
 652. Id.  Procedurally, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that neither 
Coleman’s original nor amended petition alleged an intentional tort, and that the 
court of appeal thus crafted an intentional tort that “was not plead [sic], not prayed 
for in relief, not argued, not tried, and not submitted to the jury.”  Id.  The court 
specifically noted that the plaintiff’s original petition alleged only medical 
malpractice; the amended petition alleged only negligence per se based on EMTALA; 
and the pleadings were not expanded at trial, as provided for in LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 1154 (West 1997), to include such an alleged intentional tort.  Coleman, 813 So. 
2d at 313.  The Supreme Court of Louisiana significantly noted that the court of 
appeal did not overrule the trial court’s grant of Dr. Deno’s exception of no cause of 
action as to the EMTALA claim and that Coleman did not contest that ruling.  Id. at 
313 n.13. 
 653. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 313 (citing the lower court’s opinion at 787 So. 2d 446, 
463 (La. Ct. App. (2001)).  The court also held that, because the JESH’s policy was 
never introduced into evidence and was not even implemented until several months 
after Coleman presented there, the hospital policy was not relevant.  Id. at 313 n.12. 
 654. See id. at 314 (noting that the court of appeal found that plaintiff’s reference 
to anti-patient-dumping statutes in his amended petition sufficed to state a cause of 
action under Louisiana tort law). 
 655. 758 So. 2d 116 (La. 2000). 
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Services of Louisiana, Inc.,656 in which it addressed patient dumping 
claims under the EMTALA and the Louisiana statutory counterpart.657  
Second, it added sui generis three factors to the previous list of three 
factors it had created in Sewell v. Doctors Hospital,658 which may be used 
by courts in determining whether certain conduct by a qualified 
health care provider constitutes “malpractice” as defined by the 
LMMA.659 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana distinguished Coleman from the 
two prior decisions by noting that the defendant in the case at bar 
was an emergency room physician as opposed to a hospital.660  The 
court outlined two reasons for which it believed such a distinction was 
of importance.  First, the court noted that  the “statutory duties 
imposed by EMTALA . . . apply only to participating hospitals, not 
physicians . . . .”661  Second, “hospitals are distinct legal entities that 
do not, in the traditional sense of the term, ‘practice’ medicine; 
whereas, physicians do ‘practice’ their profession, and their 
negligence in providing such professional services is termed 
‘malpractice.’”662  The court explained that attempts to imply a private 
cause of action against a physician have been rejected as inconsistent 
with both EMTALA’s congressional history663 and with the Louisiana 
anti-dumping statutory scheme.664  In addition, the LMMA applies 
                                                          
 656. 691 So. 2d 1216 (La. 1997). 
 657. See id. at 414 n.15 (distinguishing Spradlin from the case at bar, where the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana defined the term “patient dumping” as “the refusal to 
treat patients with emergency medical conditions who are uninsured and cannot pay 
for medical treatment or the transfer of such patients to a public hospital”). 
 658. 600 So. 2d 577, 579 n.3 (La. 1992); see also infra text accompanying note 670. 
 659. See Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315-16 (citing Holly P. Rockwell, Annotation, What 
Patient Claims Against Doctor, Hospital, or Similar Health Care Provider Are Not Subject to 
Statutes Specifically Governing Actions and Damages for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R.4TH 
887 (1991)). 
 660. See id. at 314. 
 661. Id. (recognizing that the same reasoning applies to the Louisiana statutory 
counterpart to EMTALA). 
 662. Id. at 314-15 (explaining that the significance of the term “malpractice” is 
that it is used to “differentiate professionals from nonprofessionals for purposes of 
applying certain statutory limitations of tort liability” which was at issue in Coleman 
under the LMMA) (citing FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA 
TORT LAW § 21-2 (1996)). 
 663. See id. at 314 n.15 (citing Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 664. Id. (maintaining that the statutory scheme was designed to overcome 
common law, which failed to allocate a duty to hospitals to give emergency treatment 
to all persons) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2113.4 to :2113.6 (West 2001)).  
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted that in Coleman, it declined for 
the third time to decide whether the Louisiana statutory scheme, which includes its 
own penalty provisions, can form the basis for a private cause of action under general 
tort law.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997).  See, e.g., Spradlin v. Acadia-St. 
Landry Med. Found., 758 So. 2d 116 (La. 2000); Fleming v. HCA Health Servs. of 
La., 691 So. 2d 1216 (La. 1997). 
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only to “malpractice” and all other tort liability on the part of a 
qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law.665 
The court clarified that “‘malpractice’ means any unintentional 
tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional 
services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health 
care provider, to a patient.”666  The court reasoned that both statutory 
patient dumping claims and medical malpractice claims are simply 
particularized forms of torts that often overlap; even though all 
medical malpractice claims are personal injury claims, not every 
personal injury claim is a medical malpractice claim.667  Consequently, 
“[i]t follows then that the court of appeal in this case legally erred in 
characterizing a claim for patient ‘dumping’ as always giving rise to 
an intentional tort and in reasoning that a bright line can be drawn 
between medical malpractice claims and patient ‘dumping’ claims.”668 
The second part of the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s opinion 
addressed the standards for defining a medical malpractice claim.669  
The court listed three factors that have been used in Louisiana to 
determine whether certain conduct by a health care provider 
constitutes “malpractice” as defined under the LMMA:  “(1) whether 
the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a dereliction 
of professional skill, (2) whether the wrong requires expert medical 
evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was 
breached, and (3) whether the pertinent act or omission involved 
assessment of the patient’s condition.”670  The court then adopted 
three additional factors:  “(4) whether an incident occurred in the 
context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of 
activities which a hospital is licensed to perform, (5) whether the 
injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment, 
and (6) whether the tort alleged was intentional.”671  The court 
reasoned that application of the six factors to the evidence in Coleman 
led to the “inescapable conclusion” that Coleman’s claim of improper 
transfer (patient dumping) against Dr. Deno was within the ambit of 
the statutory definition of “malpractice,” and therefore within the 
                                                          
 665. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315 (defining “malpractice,” “tort,” and “health care” 
as referenced in Louisiana tort law); see also infra note 672 (providing specific 
definitions of these terms). 
 666. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315. 
 667. Id. (citing Scott E. Hamm, Note, Power v. Arlington Hospital:  A Federal Court 
End Run Around State Malpractice Limitations, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 335, 347-48 (1993)). 
 668. Id. at 315. 
 669. See id. 
 670. Id.; see also Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 579 n.3 (La. 1992) (citing 
Rockwell, supra note 659). 
 671. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316. 
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scope of the LMMA.672 
In its analysis of the first factor, the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that Dr. Deno’s conduct did 
not involve a breach of professional duty that was beyond the realm 
of professional treatment because Dr. Deno’s decision to transfer 
Coleman was for economic reasons and not ordered for medical 
reasons.673  Rather, the court reasoned that Dr. Deno’s conduct 
consisted of properly diagnosing and treating, distinguishable from 
any decision to transfer him to Charity based on economic grounds.674  
The court’s analysis relied on two prior Louisiana cases:  Spradlin v. 
Acadia St. Landry Medical Foundation,675 and Bolden v. Dunaway.676  In 
noting that a decision to transfer a patient cannot easily be divorced 
from other treatment decisions, the court relied upon Vachon v. 
Broadlawns Medical Foundation677 to conclude that Dr. Deno’s decision 
as to where Coleman should be treated, Charity or JES, was a part of 
his medical treatment.678  The court noted that in Vachon, a decision 
                                                          
 672. Id. at 316-18 (applying the six factors to the facts of the case, and concluding 
that the statutory definition of “malpractice,” which expressly includes refusal to 
provide treatment that the plaintiff asserted “should have been performed or 
furnished” pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41A(8) and (9) (West 2001)). 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41A(8) provides: 
“Malpractice” means any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on 
health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been 
rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient . . . (emphasis added). 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41A(9) provides: 
“Health care” means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, or which 
should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, 
to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical care, treatment or 
confinement. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41A(7) provides: 
“Tort” means any breach of duty or any negligent act or omission 
proximately causing injury or damage to another. The standard of care 
required of every health care provider, except a hospital, in rendering 
professional services or health care to a patient, shall be to exercise the 
degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the 
members of his profession in good standing in the same community or 
locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best 
judgment, in the application of his skill. 
 673. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316 (rejecting Coleman’s argument that his transfer 
was directly related to his lack of insurance and ability to pay medical bills). 
 674. Id. at 316-17 n.17 (refuting Coleman’s argument that relied heavily on the 
court of appeal decision in Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical Foundation, 711 So. 2d 
699 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), aff’d, 758 So. 2d 116 (La. 2000)). 
 675. 758 So. 2d 116, 122 n.10 (La. 2000) (repudiating broad statements of dicta 
made by the court of appeal—the same statements relied upon by Coleman). 
 676. 727 So. 2d 597, 601 (La. 1998), writ denied, 739 So. 2d 801 (La. 1999) (stating 
that the “legislature did not intent for applicability of the medical malpractice act to 
depend on the motives of the doctors, be it greed or philanthropy, at the time of the 
alleged wrongful acts”); Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317. 
 677. 490 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1992). 
 678. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317 (holding that the decision to transfer a patient 
who had developed compartment syndrome to a charity hospital, or to a private 
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of whether a patient should be “transferred for care to charity 
hospital,” was part of the “treatment” of a patient who developed 
compartment syndrome.679 
Analyzing the second malpractice-determinative factor concerning 
expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate 
standard of care was breached, the court noted that it was necessary 
to use expert medical testimony when the facts of the case involved a 
professional act of medical practice.680  The Supreme Court of 
Louisiana bolstered its support for this factor by highlighting the 
“sheer number of experts that were called to testify”681 and that the 
type of evidence was beyond the common recognition of “obvious 
negligence.”682 
The third factor considered was whether the pertinent act or 
omission involved assessment of the patient’s condition.683  The court 
relied upon the evidence at trial that “the receiving facility [Charity] 
had better access to laboratory and radiology at the time of the 
transfer (in the middle of the night), and was better able to care for 
Coleman’s condition.”684  The court reasoned that access to resources 
for the plaintiff’s care was related to the assessment of the patient’s 
condition.685 
The fourth factor addressed was whether the incident in question 
was within the context of a physician-patient relationship.686  Here, 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana determined that the transfer 
decision “clearly occurred” in the context of a physician-client 
relationship, and any attempt to divorce transfer decisions from 
treatment decisions was without merit.687 
                                                          
hospital that was closer, was considered “treatment”) (citing Vachon v. Broadlawns 
Med. Found., 490 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1992)). 
 679. Id. 
 680. See id. (reasoning that expert testimony was necessary to determine whether 
there was a breach of care on the part of an emergency physician at a Level II trauma 
center, and if so,  the extent of that breach). 
 681. Id. 
 682. Id. (citing Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1234 (La. 1994) (giving 
examples of “obvious negligence” as the “[f]ailure to attend a patient when the 
circumstances demonstrate the serious consequences of this failure, and failure of an 
on-call physician to respond to an emergency when he knows or should know that his 
presence is necessary”)). 
 683. Id. at 318. 
 684. Id. 
 685. See id. (noting, however, that Dr. Deno’s inquiry into Coleman’s financial 
status did not “remove this matter from the arena of medical malpractice”). 
 686. See id.  (stating that an incident within the scope of activities which a hospital 
is licensed to perform is also within the scope of the inquiry). 
 687. Id. 
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Fifth, the court considered whether the injury would have occurred 
if the patient had not sought treatment.688  The court discounted an 
analogy to the transfer decision as “the cashier at the hospital’s 
window,” by an amicus party in this case.689  The court concluded that 
“common sense indicates that a claim based on failure to provide 
enough treatment is clearly linked to treatment.”690 
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether the 
tort alleged was intentional.691  It found the court of appeal’s 
characterization of Coleman’s dumping claim as an intentional tort 
“both procedurally and substantively flawed,”692 and concluded that 
the conduct in this case did not consist of “obvious negligence,” but 
instead required expert testimony.693  Consequently, it determined 
that the tort alleged cannot exist as intentional.694 
The third part of the court’s opinion addressed the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s arguments in respect to the medical malpractice claim.695  
The court responded to Dr. Deno’s medical malpractice arguments, 
stating that “[w]hile we admit it is a close call, the evidence 
sufficiently supports a finding of some fault by Dr. Deno, although 
not 100 percent of the fault.  In failing to allocate any fault to CHNO 
[Charity], we find that the jury manifestly erred.”696  The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, however, then relied upon the same arguments 
to attribute fault to Charity.697  As a result, the court attributed 
                                                          
 688. Id. 
 689. Id. 
 690. Id. (recognizing that Dr. Deno had, in fact, provided Coleman with 
treatment, including the correct diagnosis of cellulitis and his need for antibiotics). 
 691. Id. 
 692. Id. 
 693. See id. (finding the facts in this case to be outside the definition of negligence 
as set forth in Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1234 (La. 1994)); see supra note 682 
(providing examples of negligence). 
 694. See Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 318-21 (determining that Coleman’s claims are 
entirely governed by the LMMA, and citing with approval the appellate court’s 
reasoning and granting of the JNOV in respect to Dr. Sherman, and remanded the 
matter to the court of appeal on the issues of quantum and application of the 
LMMA’s limitations to the ultimate damage award). 
 695. Id. at 319-21. 
 696. Id. at 319. 
 697. Id. at 319-21 (supporting the court’s decision using the plaintiff’s two medical 
experts:  Dr. Paul Blaylock and Dr. Neil Crane).  Dr. Paul Blaylock, board-certified in 
both emergency and legal medicine, testified that, 
no valid medical reason existed for Dr. Deno to send the plaintiff to Charity, 
a Level I Trauma Center, at a time when his severe arm infection required 
immediate attention . . . [and] Dr. Deno should never have discharged 
Coleman without treatment because “the risk of the infection getting worse, 
much worse, was very high.” 
Id.   
Dr. Blaylock further testified that Dr. Deno should have initiated antibiotic 
treatment, taken both blood and infection site cultures, and transferred the patient 
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seventy-five percent of the fault to Charity and twenty-five percent to 
Dr. Deno.698 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the 
intentional tort finding of patient dumping by the court of appeal,699 
affirmed the finding of malpractice liability on the part of Dr. 
Deno,700 but modified the fault allocation and held that Dr. Deno was 
only twenty-five percent liable.701  The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
remanded the matter to the court of appeal for a quantum review of 
damages and to render a judgment in accordance with the limitations 
of the LMMA.702  On remand, the court of appeal was instructed both 
to conduct a meaningful quantum review and to render judgment in 
accordance with the limitations of the LMMA.703 
E. Supreme Court of Louisiana Opinion—Minority Opinion 
Justice Knoll and Justice Johnson wrote dissenting opinions in 
Coleman.704  Justice Knoll concurred with the majority opinion, finding 
                                                          
by ambulance. Id. at 320. Dr. Blaylock testified that “the sooner you diagnose the 
infection; the sooner you treat it, the better the progress.” Id.  Dr. Blaylock surmised 
that the plaintiff’s arm “would have been saved had proper medical treatment been 
provided [by Dr. Deno].”  Id. 
Dr. Neil Crane, board-certified in both internal and infectious disease medicine, 
testified that Dr. Deno was confronted with a “necrotizing cellulitis”—an infection 
which progresses exponentially.  Id.  Accordingly, Dr. Crane testified that, the earlier 
treatment was provided, the better the chance of achieving a good result.  Id.  Dr. 
Crane further testified that when Coleman was presented to Dr. Deno, his condition 
was both “limb threatening and life threatening,” and required immediate 
emergency treatment.  Id.   
While the plaintiff settled with Charity pre-trial for $25,000, the issue of Charity’s 
fault was put before the jury by way of special interrogatory.  Id. at 311. 
 698. Id. at 321. 
 699. Id. 
 700. Id.  (affirming, in addition, the grant of judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict dismissing the malpractice claim against Dr. Sherman). 
 701. Id.  The court’s final decree was concurred by Justices Knoll (in part), 
Johnson (in part), Victory (in part) and Traylor (in part), and was dissented by 
Justices Knoll (in part), Johnson (in part), Victory (in part for the reasons assigned 
by Justice Knoll) and Traylor (in part for the reasons assigned by Justice Knoll).  See 
id. at 321-25.  Justices Knoll and Johnson published the dissenting opinions.  Id. 
 702. See id. at 321 (finding that the “most glaring error in the appellate court’s 
analysis is in the treatment of damages, especially general damages”).  The court 
held that: 
[T]he appellate court’s one paragraph analysis of this sizeable general 
damage award was not sufficient to constitute a meaningful review of general 
damages.  Indeed, the appellate court failed to make even the initial inquiry 
required for a meaningful review of a general damage award of “whether the 
particular effects of the particular injuries to the particular plaintiff are such 
that there has been an abuse of the ‘much discretion’ vested in the judge or 
jury.” 
Id. at 321 (citing 1 FRANK L. MARAIST & HARRY T. LEMMON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE:  CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.14 (1999)). 
 703. Id. 
 704. Id. at 322-25. 
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that the lower courts erred in finding an intentional tort of “patient 
dumping.”705  Justice Johnson joined the majority in affirming the 
finding of medical malpractice liability on the part of Dr. Deno, but 
dissented from the majority’s finding that the plaintiff’s claim of 
patient dumping was one of medical malpractice.706  Rather, Justice 
Johnson believed that Dr. Deno’s conduct constituted an intentional 
tort.707 
Justice Johnson based his dissent upon the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana’s previous holding that patient dumping is governed by 
general tort law and not by the LMMA.708  Relying upon Spradlin v. 
Acadia-St. Landry Medical Foundation,709 Justice Johnson reasoned that 
despite the fact that the federal and state anti-dumping statutes 
prohibit action by hospitals and not physicians, “a hospital can only 
act through agents/employees and can be held accountable under a 
theory of vicarious liability.”710  Justice Johnson agreed with the 
reasoning of the court of appeal that the LMMA only encompasses 
unintentional acts of negligence and contractual issues.711  He 
emphasized that “it is impossible for a physician to negligently or 
unintentionally transfer an uninsured patient from a private hospital 
to a public hospital because of an inability to pay.”712  Accordingly, 
Justice Johnson concluded that “it is clear that plaintiff’s claim for 
‘patient dumping’ falls outside the scope of the Medical Malpractice 
Act.”713 
Further, Justice Johnson surmised that Dr. Deno’s testimony, 
referring to the transfer of the plaintiff from JESH to Charity because 
it had a better trauma center, is “clearly pretextual and not worthy of 
belief.”714  Justice Johnson pointed out that the plaintiff was diagnosed 
with cellulitis of the arm and “was not in need of trauma treatment. 
He simply needed to be admitted to the hospital for intravenous 
                                                          
 705. Id. at 322.  While Justice Knoll concurred with the majority opinion finding 
that the lower courts erred in finding an intentional tort of “patient dumping,” he 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that there was no manifest error in the jury’s 
finding of malpractice against Dr. Deno.  Id.  Justice Knoll believed the record clearly 
supported that Dr. Deno was not negligent in his medical treatment of Coleman, and 
consequently, Coleman’s allegations against Dr. Deno should be dismissed for lack of 
causation.  Id. 
 706. Id. 
 707. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 322. 
 708. Id. 
 709. 758 So. 2d 116 (La. 2000). 
 710. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 322. 
 711. Id. 
 712. Id. (first emphasis added and second emphasis in the original). 
 713. Id. 
 714. Id. 
_ZITO1.DOC 12/12/2002  10:04 AM 
288 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:173 
antibiotic treatment.”715  Thus, he concluded that “Dr. Deno decided 
to transfer plaintiff to Charity Hospital because he determined that 
plaintiff could not afford to pay for inpatient treatment at JoEllen 
Smith, not because he wanted plaintiff to have the benefit of a 
superior treatment facility.  He therefore made an economic and not 
a medical decision.”716 
F. Analysis of Supreme Court of Louisiana Opinion 
Utilizing sophistic logic, the Supreme Court of Louisiana opinion 
in Coleman v. Deno represents a strenuous effort to avoid recognition 
of reprehensible physician conduct known as patient dumping, and 
to avoid remedy of that conduct through tort law.  The court chose to 
lose sight of its legal duty to “resolve all reasonable inferences or 
factual questions in favor of the plaintiff,”717 which resulted in a 
flawed, yet outcome determinative, opinion.  There are at least eleven 
problems with the Supreme Court of Louisiana opinion. 
First, the Supreme Court of Louisiana re-casted the facts of the case 
in a manner most conducive with its desired outcome.  For instance, 
the court, as well as Dr. Deno, passed off quite lightly the significantly 
abnormal physical signs of the distress Coleman experienced.  They 
stated “[w]ith the exception of an elevated temperature (102.8 
degrees Fahrenheit), and heart rate (120 beats per minute), 
[Coleman’s] vital signs were normal.”718  However, a temperature of 
102.8 degrees Fahrenheit and a heart rate of 120 beats per minute 
are not so easily discounted, as demonstrated by the medical outcome 
of this matter—the amputation of an arm through shoulder 
articulation.  Remarkably, the court based its opinion, in part, upon 
its understanding that “Coleman was stable” and “in good 
condition.”719  Furthermore, to bootstrap its finding that transfer was 
permissible, the court appears to have adopted Dr. Deno’s 
characterization of Coleman’s condition as a “complicated 
                                                          
 715. Id. 
 716. Id. (emphasis added). 
 717. Id. at 319 (approving the court of appeal’s reasoning that even construing 
reasonable inferences and factual questions in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
a reasonable person still could not find, based on the evidence, that Dr. Sherman 
proximately caused the plaintiff’s loss).  The Supreme Court of Louisiana, therefore, 
affirmed the court of appeal’s grant of JNOV in favor of Dr. Sherman.  Id. 
 718. Id. at 308. 
 719. Id. at 309.  The court believed Dr. Deno’s testimony that the decision to 
transfer Coleman was made after a complete medical evaluation.  Id. at 318; see supra 
notes 683-85 and accompanying text (discussing the third malpractice-determinative 
factor considered by the court—whether the pertinent act or omission involved 
assessment of the patient’s condition). 
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infection.”720  In fact, while his infection represented a serious threat 
to life [and limb], it is of the type which responds to antibiotics—
assuming they are administered in the first instance.721 
Second, the court misunderstood the application of EMTALA to 
physicians.  The court relied on its distinction of the facts of Coleman 
with case precedents that concerned defendant hospitals.722  The 
significance of that distinction, the court believed, was two-fold.  First, 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana was under the impression that 
EMTALA’s statutory duties “apply only to participating hospitals, not 
physicians.”723  Second, the court noted that “hospitals are distinct 
legal entities that do not, in the traditional sense of the term, 
‘practice’ medicine; whereas, physicians do ‘practice’ their 
profession, and their negligence in providing such professional 
services is termed ‘malpractice.’”724  The court explained that 
attempts to imply a private cause of action against a physician have 
been rejected as inconsistent with EMTALA’s congressional history725 
and the court declined to say whether it was consistent with Louisiana 
anti-patient-dumping statutory scheme.726 
By misunderstanding that EMTALA duties in fact become 
physician duties, the court missed the point as to how physicians are 
duty bound—and legally bound—by EMTALA.727  It is precisely 
because hospitals do not practice medicine that the EMTALA duties 
of “appropriate medical screening examination”728 and “necessary 
                                                          
 720. Id. at 308. 
 721. See id. at 319-320 (relying upon the medical testimony of plaintiff’s two expert 
witnesses, Dr. Blaylock and Dr. Crane); see supra note 697 (describing the plaintiff’s 
expert witness testimony). 
 722. See Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 314 (relying on Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Med. 
Found., 758 So. 2d 116 (La. 2000); Fleming v. HCA Health Servs. of La., Inc., 691 So. 
2d 1216 (La. 1997)). 
 723. Id.  The court held the same for the Louisiana statutory counterpart to 
EMTALA.  Id. 
 724. Id. at 314-15 (citing FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA 
TORT LAW § 21-2 (1996)).  The Supreme Court of Louisiana further explained that 
the significance of the term “malpractice” was that it is used to “differentiate 
professionals from nonprofessionals for purposes of applying certain statutory 
limitations of tort liability” which was at issue in Coleman under the LMMA.  Id. 
 725. See id. at 314 n.15 (declaring that the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) 
allows a civil action against only the participating hospital, not the physician) (citing 
Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 726. Id. (noting that even though the Louisiana “anti-dumping” statutory scheme, 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2113.4 to :2113.6 (West 2001), establishes a duty for 
hospitals to provide emergency treatment, the issue of whether the scheme can form 
the basis of a private cause of action under general tort law was factually not before 
the court because the defendant in Coleman was a physician and not a hospital). 
 727. See supra Part III.C.2 (describing EMTALA duties and physician duties). 
 728. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000) (defining “appropriate medical screening 
examination”). 
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stabilizing treatment”729 become duties of the physician.730  By 
concentrating on the fact that the remedy for failures to perform 
those duties are in the form of a private action against the hospital, 
and not the physician, the court misunderstood the essence and 
purpose of EMTALA.  Indeed, it is because there is no private action 
against physicians, either through EMTALA or through state law, that 
patient dumping flourishes.731 
Third, with respect to the nature of a medical malpractice claim, 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana used flawed logic to suggest that the 
court of appeal erred in deciding that claims of patient dumping 
always give rise to an intentional tort and in claiming that a “bright 
line can be drawn between medical malpractice claims and patient 
‘dumping’ claims.”732  The court reasoned that although both 
statutory patient dumping claims and medical malpractice claims are 
particularized forms of torts that often overlap, and even though all 
medical malpractice claims are personal injury claims, not every 
personal injury claim is a medical malpractice claim.733  By such a 
characterization, the court evidences its misunderstanding of what 
patient dumping is.  That is, although the particularities of patient 
dumping may overlap with medical malpractice and personal injury 
claims, the nature of the tort of patient dumping is non-medical 
decision-making founded upon discrimination based on non-medical 
factors, e.g., race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socially unacceptable 
disease, financial status, etc.734 
Fourth, in considering whether the particular wrong in Coleman was 
a “treatment related” dereliction of professional skill, the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana simply re-characterized the plaintiff’s 
denomination of Dr. Deno’s conduct into one of properly 
diagnosing-treating rather than one based on economic grounds.735  
                                                          
 729. Id. § 1395dd(b) (defining “necessary stabilizing treatment”). 
 730. See supra notes 540-83 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment 
of physician duties and obligations, and therefore liability, under EMTALA). 
 731. See H.R. REP. NO. 241(III) (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 728 (noting 
that “the ability to assess this fine against the responsible physician as well as the 
hospital will be a strong incentive for both to respond to the medical needs of 
individuals with emergency medical conditions and women in active labor”).  
 732. Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 316 (La. 2002). 
 733. Id. at 315. 
 734. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 
1990) (noting that a “hospital that provides a substandard (by its standards) or 
nonexistent medical screening for any reason (including, without limitation, race, 
sex, politics, occupation, education, personal prejudice, drunkenness, spite, etc.) 
may be liable under EMTALA”). 
 735. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316 (citing Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Med. Found., 
711 So. 2d 699 (2000); Bolden v. Dunaway, 727 So. 2d 597 (1999)).  The court in 
Spradlin held that the LMMA was not applicable to suits against physicians or 
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Such reasoning by the court is odd, as the court admitted that Dr. 
Deno’s reason, in part, to transfer the plaintiff to Charity was based 
on “economic grounds.”736  In order to support its re-characterization 
of the plaintiff’s assertions regarding Dr. Deno’s conduct being 
beyond the realm of the LMMA, the court discounted the Coleman 
plaintiff’s reliance on Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical 
Foundation.737  Although Spradlin was affirmed,738 the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana  reasoned that the language in Spradlin relied on by the 
Coleman plaintiff was merely dicta, as the court did not address the 
nature of the EMTALA claim in Spradlin.739  Even the dissent by 
Justice Johnson identified the supreme court’s reasoning as 
strained.740  Additionally, in relying on Bolden v. Dunaway741 to defeat 
plaintiff’s characterization of Dr. Deno’s conduct,742 the court’s logic 
again was flawed.  In Bolden, a physician’s decision to leave the 
hospital and not operate on his patient who had been prepped for 
surgery, because his fee was not in his pocket, was not deemed a non-
medical related intentional act, but rather an act based on rendering 
professional health care services because such a decision was a breach 
of contract based on a failure to render professional services that the 
physician had previously agreed to provide.743  The facts in Coleman do 
                                                          
hospitals for damages resulting from economic decisions.  Spradlin, 711 So. 2d at 701. 
The court in Bolden held that the LMMA applied to a suit in which a physician 
refused to perform surgery on a patient who had not made appropriate financial 
arrangements.  Bolden, 727 So. 2d at 602.  
 736. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 308 n.3 (admitting that Dr. Deno’s reason for transfer 
was financially-based, but that Dr. Deno would have arranged for the plaintiff’s 
treatment at JESH if he was not able to transfer the plaintiff to Charity). 
 737. 711 So. 2d 699, 699-700 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Sprandlin I).  In Sprandlin I, the 
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, affirmed the judgment of the trial court 
on the issue of whether a cause of action alleging the failure of a hospital’s 
emergency department to treat and stabilize a patient based on lack of means bypasses 
the procedural and substantive limitations imposed by the LMMA.  Sprandlin I, 711 
So. 2d at 699-700.  The court in Sprandlin I held that, while the LMMA governs suits 
involving malpractice, it does “not control suits for damages not contemplated by the 
LMMA,” including indigent patient dumping.  Id. at 699. 
 738. Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Med. Found., 758 So. 2d 116 (La. 2000) 
(Sprandlin II).  Although the court affirmed Sprandlin I in Sprandlin II, the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana in Coleman noted that it had “repudiated” various “broad 
statements” of the dicta in Sprandin I.  Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316 n.17. 
 739. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 316.  In Sprandlin II, on petition for certiorari, the 
judgment of the court of appeal was affirmed, holding claims under EMTALA and 
the state anti-patient-dumping statute, when joined with medical malpractice claims, 
were subject to the pre-suit medical review panel requirement of the LMMA.  
Sprandlin II, 758 So. 2d at 124. 
 740. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 322 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 741. 727 So. 2d 597 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 739 So. 2d 801 (La. 1998). 
 742. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317. 
 743. See Bolden, 727 So. 2d at 600 (stating that the plaintiffs’ restructuring of their 
claims does not escape the fact that there was a contractual relationship with the 
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not support the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s contractual theories of 
Bolden. 
Fifth, the court’s interpretation of and reliance on Vachon v. 
Broadlawns Medical Foundation,744 with respect to the location where 
the plaintiff should have been treated, was disheartening.745  The 
court either misunderstood Vachon, or its implications regarding 
Vachon are disingenuous for at least three reasons.  First, the phrase 
“charity hospital” does not appear in the Vachon decision; rather, 
“Charity” was the name of the hospital in Coleman.746  This was as an 
improper characterization of the facts of Vachon by the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana in an attempt to make it analogous to Coleman.  
The transfer in Vachon was to the University Hospital in Iowa City.747  
Second, the decision in Vachon was not merely a decision to transfer 
to a “charity” hospital or to a “closer hospital,” as implied by the 
court.748  Rather, the patient in Vachon had “severe multiple trauma 
injuries,”749 and as such the transfer obviously involved the decision to 
send the patient to a facility which had a higher level of care so the 
patient could receive treatment for the “multiple trauma” that was 
not otherwise available.750  Third, the University hospital in Vachon was 
not just the only Level I full tertiary care center in the area; it also was 
the only center for specialized treatment of orthopaedic trauma in 
the entire state of Iowa.751  As Justice Johnson’s dissent pointed out, 
the plaintiff in Coleman did not have multiple traumas—he had a 
simple infection, uncared for due to economic grounds.752  Even if, 
arguendo, the plaintiff’s infection in Coleman were due to trauma, 
                                                          
defendant).  The court of appeal also noted that the motives of the physician at the 
time of the alleged wrongful act are not dispositive in deciding whether LMMA 
applies.  Id. at 601. 
 744. 490 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1992). 
 745. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317. 
 746. See id. (stating the Vachon court held that the “decision of whether patient 
should be transferred for care to charity hospital, which was the only Level I full 
tertiary care center, or to private a hospital that was closer was part of ‘treatment’ of 
patient who developed compartment syndrome”) (emphasis added). 
 747. Vachon, 490 N.W.2d at 823. 
 748. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317. 
 749. Vachon, 490 N.W.2d at 823. 
 750. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317.  The Supreme Court of Louisiana is obviously 
unaware that most Emergency Medical Systems throughout the nation utilize various 
treatment protocols wherein patients with multiple trauma are taken by paramedics 
preferentially to regional trauma center.  ADVANCED TRAUMA LIFE SUPPORT FOR 
DOCTORS, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, COMMITTEE ON TRAUMA, INSTRUCTOR 
COURSE MANUAL 23, 25 (1997). Alternatively, also per most Emergency Medical 
Systems treatment protocols throughout the nation, where a multiple injured trauma 
patient is first taken to a non-trauma treatment facility, the patient generally is 
stabilized and then transferred to the trauma center.  Id. 
 751. Vachon, 490 N.W.2d at 823. 
 752. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 322-23. 
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there is no indication of “multiple trauma” as in Vachon.  
Additionally, Vachon involved a patient being transferred because 
medical services were not available at the initial treating hospital.753  
However, in Coleman, the opposite was true—antibiotics were 
available, but Dr. Deno did not administer them for economic 
reasons.754  Such services—the administration of intravenous 
antibiotics—are commonly available to patients in any hospital 
emergency department in the United States. 
Sixth, the court’s opinion again was logically and legally 
inconsistent with respect to whether a wrong requires expert medical 
evidence to determine if the appropriate standard of care was 
breached.755  Oddly, the court based the need for expert testimony on 
the fact that a large number of experts had testified.756  Thus, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana mistakenly decided that expert 
testimony was legally required simply because many experts in fact 
testified. 
Seventh, the court’s opinion is heavily burdened with reliance on 
Dr. Deno’s arguably pretextual statements.757  The court adopted the 
defendant’s assertion that the decision to transfer was made after an 
assessment of Coleman’s condition.758  However, in its attempts to 
make medical determinations, the court erred.  The court assumed 
that “the receiving facility [Charity] had better access to laboratory 
and radiology at the time of the transfer (in the middle of the night) 
and was better able to care for Coleman’s condition.”759  However, the 
court apparently forgot that the patient did not want for “better 
access to laboratory and radiology;”760 the patient required something 
as simple as the administration of intravenous antibiotics.761  After all, 
as the court notes, Dr. Deno determined that the patient’s medical 
status was stable.762  If the necessity of transfer was truly dependent 
upon the need for access to laboratory and radiology services, then 
Dr. Deno’s conclusion regarding stability, upon which the court 
depended, would have been illogical.  The court’s acceptance of Dr. 
Deno’s pretext was also addressed by Justice Johnson’s dissent, which 
                                                          
 753. Vachon, 490 N.W.2d at 822. 
 754. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 308.  In fact, Dr. Deno testified that he would have 
treated the plaintiff at JESH if he was not accepted at Charity.  Id. at 308 n.3. 
 755. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 317. 
 756. Id. 
 757. Id. at 318. 
 758. Id. 
 759. Id. 
 760. Id. 
 761. Id. at 308. 
 762. Id. at 318. 
_ZITO1.DOC 12/12/2002  10:04 AM 
294 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:173 
noted that Dr. Deno’s testimony in regard to his reasons for transfer 
was “clearly pretextual and not worthy of belief.”763 
 Eighth, the court, with little inquiry and citing no authority, 
addressed the issue of whether the incident occurred in the context 
of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of 
activities which a hospital is licensed to perform.764  Here, the court 
summarily deemed the transfer decision to have occurred in the 
context of a physician-client relationship, and that any attempts to 
divorce transfer decisions from the treatment decisions are, ipso facto, 
made without merit.765 
Ninth, the court’s analysis disregarded the crux of patient dumping 
when it considered whether the injury would have occurred if the 
patient had not sought treatment.766 The court concluded that 
“common sense indicates that a claim based on failure to provide 
enough treatment is clearly linked to treatment.”767  The court failed 
to perceive that, in patient dumping, the critical inquiry is not 
necessarily what was done for a patient, but rather what was not 
done.768  Here, the plaintiff did not receive the simple administration 
of intravenous antibiotics, inaction that was based on non-medical, 
economic motivating factors.769 
Tenth, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, with strained logic and 
little analysis, summarily concluded that because the “court of 
appeal’s characterization of Coleman’s dumping claim as an 
intentional tort is both procedurally and substantively flawed,” and 
because the conduct in this case does not consist of obvious 
negligence, but rather requires expert testimony, the tort alleged 
cannot exist as intentional.770  However, only a sophist’s logic would 
require a matter to be first denominated as “obvious negligence” as a 
condition precedent to its classification as an “intentional tort.” By 
such logic, the Supreme Court of Louisiana is apparently advocating 
that for a matter to be considered an intentional tort, there must be 
first, a priori, a determination of negligence. Furthermore, apparently 
                                                          
 763. Id. at 322. 
 764. Id. at 318. 
 765. Id. 
 766. Id. 
 767. Id. 
 768. See Robert M. Ey, Establishing Hospital Liability Under the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act for “Patient Dumping”, 62 AM. JUR. TRIALS 119, § 6, at 
135-36 (1997) (noting that the typical screening violation will be established “by 
identifying some component of the defendant’s standard or usual screening 
procedure that was omitted in the plaintiff’s case”). 
 769. Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 308. 
 770. Id. at 318 (citing Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1234 (La. 1994)). 
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the Court proposes that because expert testimony is required, the 
matter cannot be denominated as an intentional tort, but rather 
must, therefore, be classified as negligence. 
Finally, the court used the strong arguments that were employed to 
find fault with Dr. Deno771 as a way to attribute fault to Charity—a 
non-party defendant.772  The court relied heavily on the strong 
testimony of both plaintiff’s experts, who opined that Dr. Deno 
breached the standard of care for an emergency physician at a Level 
II Trauma Center by failing to provide immediate antibiotic 
treatment,773 and that such a breach led to the subsequent 
amputation of the plaintiff’s arm.774  However, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana re-casted the import of such expert testimony.  Whereas 
the expert testimony severely ridiculed the lack of treatment by Dr. 
Deno in his failure to provide any antibiotics to the plaintiff,775 the 
court relied on the importance of the use of such antibiotics in 
proclaiming that the delay of such antibiotics by Charity was 
commensurate with an appropriation of seventy-five percent fault to 
Charity and only twenty-five percent to Dr. Deno.776  In that way, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana attributed seventy-five percent fault to a 
non-party defendant and achieved the result it desired. 
V. THE NEW INTENTIONAL TORT OF PATIENT DUMPING 
Over the past sixteen years, numerous suggestions have been made 
to resurrect the sloppy EMTALA legislation to curb the rise of patient 
dumping.  Some have suggested even more federal legislation.777  
Others have suggested segmental statutory resurrection by either 
                                                          
 771. Id. at 320. 
 772. Id. at 320-21.  The plaintiff settled with Charity pre-trial for $25,000; however, 
the issue of Charity’s fault was put before the jury by way of special interrogatory.  Id. 
at 311. 
 773. Id. at 319. 
 774. Id. at 320. 
 775. Id. 
 776. Id. at 321. 
 777. See, e.g., Access to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1999, S. 517, 106th 
Cong. § 2 (1999) (incorporating by reference the vague language of EMTALA); 
Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, S. 644, 105th Cong. § 2771, H.R. 
1415, 105th Cong. § 2771 (1997) (providing that health insurance providers establish 
care for enrollees); Quality Health Care and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1222, 
105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (stating that the purpose of the proposed legislation is to 
ensure that managed health care services provide enrollees with access to adequate 
health services); Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, 105th Cong. 
§ 2771, H.R. 820, 105th Cong. § 2771 (1997) (prohibiting specified restrictions on 
access to emergency services); Managed Care Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 
337, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing for access to health care services and protections 
for enrollees of such services generally by amending the Internal Revenue Code Act 
of 1986 and the Social Security Act). 
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including new phrases,778 providing definitions for clarity,779 including 
the language of tort,780 or even by having Congress attempt to repair 
curatively the mis-match between its original congressional intent and 
the final statutory language.781  Some have suggested criminal action 
against hospitals, physicians, and nurses.782 Although complex, our 
solution is the creation of a new783 state cause of action:784 the 
                                                          
 778. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE:  LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET 85 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (asserting that emergency care legislation should hold 
treating hospitals and physicians to a legal standard that is “consistent with 
reasonable medical standards”). 
 779. See Mark Strasser, The Futility of Futility?:  On Life, Death, and Reasoned Public 
Policy, 57 MD. L. REV. 505, 509 (1998) (suggesting that Congress amend the Act to 
“clarify what it intends EMTALA to include” such as “specifying that the Act is 
intended to apply only to indigent care”). 
 780. See Singer, supra note 14, at 160 (suggesting that Congress should amend 
EMTALA to “define an appropriate screening examination as one that is free from 
gross misconduct”).  Singer comprehensively dissects the judicial schizophrenia 
interpreting what an “appropriate medical screening examination” means (or should 
mean) by identifying three schools of thought amongst the federal courts:  (1) the 
use of a “comparability test,” (uniform, non-disparate treatment standard) which holds 
that a particular hospital must give all patients the same screening based on 
particular procedures and standards developed by the hospital, id. at 139-43; (2) the 
use of a “bad motive test,” which interprets “appropriate” as referring to the motive 
behind the particular screening given rather than the actual procedures, id. at 143-
46; and (3) the use of a “capability test,” whereby courts define “appropriate” in terms 
of hinging liability on whether or not the hospital personnel screened the patient to 
the extent of the hospital’s capability.  Id. at 146-52. 
 781. See Scott B. Smith, Note, The Critical Condition of the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act:  A Proposed Amendment to the Act After In the Matter of 
Baby K, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1528-29 (1995) (noting that “Congress should amend 
its sloppy legislation” by “eliminat[ing] the inconsistency between the Act’s original 
intent and its statutory language”). 
 782. See Annas, supra note 1, at 76 (discussing a New York statute that imposes 
fines and jail time upon doctors, nurses, and hospital employees who deny 
emergency medical treatment to patients) (citations omitted). 
 783. Although time will tell, this introduction of the new tort of intentional 
dumping is made with the understanding of the cautionary admonitions in respect to 
the paradox of novelty, the paradox of agency, and the tort paradox as described by 
Professor Anita Bernstein.  See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort:  Three 
Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1544 (1997) (discussing the three forms of 
opposition tort reformers might face when they attempt to introduce a new cause of 
action in tort). 
 784. For a thorough discussion of federalism, tort remedies involving 
constitutional rights, and policy considerations affecting federal tort legislation, and 
the Commerce Power, see Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism:  Whatever 
Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 456-57 (1996) (asserting that 
both the practice of medicine and the practice of law remain local, stating, “[d]espite 
the growth of tertiary care facilities, medical practice remains largely local [not 
federal] . . . .  Despite the globalization of legal practice, regulation of the legal 
profession remains largely a state matter . . .”).  Additionally, in choosing a state law 
remedy, rather than resurrecting segmental, federal statutory EMTALA infirmities, 
we are mindful of Justice Posner’s remarks in Great Central Insurance Co. v. Insurance 
Services Office, Inc., 74 F.3d 778, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“[W]hat Great 
Central really wants . . . is for us to create in the name of Illinois law a new tort . . . .  
We keep warning the bar that a plaintiff who needs a common law departure or 
innovation to win should bring his suit in state court rather than in federal court.”).  
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intentional tort of patient dumping.785 
In making our proposal, we rely, in part, upon the axiom that while 
the main purpose of tort law is to provide a remedy for individuals 
wrongly harmed, it also must serve to deter wrongful behavior.786  We 
are mindful that “without potential tort liability, profit driven entities 
may find it cost-effective to engage in behaviors that pose 
unreasonable threats to human society.”787  As one commentator has 
noted, the lack of compliance with prior federal legislation involving 
medical care is due to the following fact:  
[T]here is little incentive for hospital compliance with HHS 
enforcement of Hill-Burton; neither the statute nor the regulations 
provide punitive measures for violations.  Without fear of punishment, 
hospitals feel free to disregard their obligations.  If they get caught cutting 
corners, they are merely reprimanded and told to do better next 
time.788 
New causes of action are generally proposed to right a neglected 
wrong and adjust the fit and balance between injuries and remedies 
in a modern society.789  In this regard, the law enters the fluidity of 
balance between life and the ongoing recognition of legally 
cognizable rights, duties, interests, and injuries which intersect such a 
balance.790  Tort law is at the heart of such recognition and as such 
                                                          
We are further mindful that the law permits a particular conduct to be actionable 
under more than one legal theory.  See Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 
(Minn. 1980) (stating that a claim for legal malpractice against an attorney is legally 
cognizable as either a tort or contract action). 
 785. We purposefully do not call this the intentional tort of improper patient 
transfer as “patient transfer” implies a medical decision based on medical criteria 
falling within the duties and obligations of a physician with the doctor-patient 
relationship—the antithesis of the nature of patient dumping. 
 786. See Tamsen Douglass Love, Deterring Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic 
Substances:  The Case for Legislative Recognition of Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 789, 796 (1996) (asserting that well-defined laws on increased risk causes of 
actions will deter irresponsible behavior). 
 787. Id. at 793. 
 788. Treiger, supra note 54, at 1199-1200 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 789. See S.F.C. Milsom, A Pagent in Modern Dress, 84 YALE L.J. 1585, 1585 (1975) 
(book review) (commenting that this attempt of adjustment between injuries and 
remedies is ever changing and that the attempts of law to correct this fit may render 
the law as a “reiterated failure to classify life”). 
 790. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(noting that the law of torts is fluid) (quoting PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 1, at 3-
4); E.F. Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CAL. L. REV. 
461, 461-62 (1922) (discussing the evolution of tort law from remedy-duty-right-
interest to interest-right-duty-remedy); Robert F. Blomquist, “New Torts”:  A Critical 
History, Taxonomy, and Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REV. 23, 36-37 (1990) (describing new 
tort development in modern and judicial society); Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech 
from Private Abridgement:  Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 238-
43 (1996) (discussing the policies and continuous evolution of tort law). 
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continues to grow,791 notwithstanding that newly recognized torts may 
not necessarily fit standard denominations.792 
                                                          
 791. See Lancman, supra note 790, at 239 (asserting that the growth of tort law 
reflects “personal, social, and economic rights”); see also PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, 
§ 1, at 4: 
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are 
never set.  When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to 
legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the 
claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy. 
Id. 
 792. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 1, at 3-4 (listing torts that did not fit into 
standard categories when they were first introduced “but nevertheless have been 
held to be torts,” including: 
the intentional infliction of mental suffering, the obstruction of the right to 
go where the plaintiff likes, the invasion of the right of privacy, the denial of 
the right to vote, the conveyance of land to defeat a title, the infliction of 
prenatal injuries, the alienation of the affections of a parent, and injury to a 
person’s reputation by entering the person in a rigged television contest . . .  
Id. (citations omitted); see also Bernstein, supra note 783, at 1545 n.30 (citing 
Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2,575) (awarding 
monetary damages to a woman passenger and her husband for the “‘habitual 
obscenity, harsh threats, and immodest conduct’ of a ship captain”)). 
For other “new” torts that don’t quite fit the traditional pigeon-holes of tort law 
categorization, see Buckley v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 79 F.3d 1337, 1346 (2d Cir. 
1996) (allowing a claim for emotional distress for fear of cancer based on asbestos 
exposure); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn. Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 346 (Haw. 1996) 
(holding that an independent tort cause of action exists where an insurer fails to act 
in good faith towards its insured); Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 272 
(Nev. 1996) (recognizing that an insurer’s tortious breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith is not limited to unreasonable denial or delay of payments for valid 
claims); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154, 1163 (N.M. 1996) 
(recognizing an emotional distress claim for fear of developing AIDS from a 
“medically sound channel” due to negligence); Blomquist, supra note 790, at 41-52 
(providing an overview of “new tort” litigation, including negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, wrongful life, and wrongful birth); Lancman, supra note 790, at 
242-43 (introducing the tort of suppression to prevent an individual from infringing 
on another’s right to speech); Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call 
My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”:  A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 453 
(1993) (describing the tort of sexual fraud where one “fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, for the purpose of inducing 
another to consent to sexual relations in reliance upon it”); William L. Prosser, 
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:  A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939) 
(discussing the development of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a 
redressible harm); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) 
(identifying four “new” torts in the law of privacy:  “intrusion upon . . . [an 
individual’s] private affairs”; “public disclosure of . . . private facts [about an 
individual]”; “publicity which places [an individual] in a false light in the public eye”; 
and “appropriation . . . of [an individual’s] name or likeness”); Krista J. 
Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1461, 1485-94 (1986) (proposing tort liability for sexual harassment in the 
workplace when, based on a reasonable woman standard, an individual unreasonably 
interferes with another individual’s “right to work in an environment free from sex-
based intimidation or hostility”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 192, 197 (1890) (discussing whether the law in 1890 
protected an individual’s privacy and noting that the laws of libel and slander did not 
adequately cover against invasions of privacy). 
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The intentional tort of patient dumping is based in public policy, 
although influenced by antecedents in the law of contract, medical 
malpractice tort, the constitutional right to be free from 
discrimination, and the federal statutory right to emergency medical 
care.793  Clearly, however, although influenced by other bodies of law, 
the true nature of patient dumping has not been duly recognized by 
contract, tort, constitutional or federal law.  Thus, without duly 
recognizing the nature of the act and harm of patient dumping, 
current law does not fit the circumstances of patient dumping and 
therefore is unable to provide proper redress.  And, notwithstanding 
influences from other branches of law, because the nature and harm 
of patient dumping remains unredressed, it continues to grow and 
cause harm to thousands of unsuspecting individuals at their 
moments of greatest need and reliance upon those expert in 
emergency care.794 
Conceptually, the basis for our proposal of a new intentional tort of 
patient dumping is taken from the teachings of Justice Holmes, which 
include the organization of tort law into the three categories of 
liability without fault, negligence, and intentional tort.795  Holmes’ 
categorizations of law either imposed an absolute duty to avoid 
causing injury, imposed a duty to avoid only harm that was 
foreseeable (negligence), or imposed a duty to avoid harm that was 
foreseeable with substantial certainty (intentional tort).796  In that 
regard, intentional tort law has rested on the outer limits of tort 
liability, but attempts to define the line between duty and no-duty.797  
That is, in the balance of injuries and remedies, where negligence law 
addresses recognized duties to avoid forseeable harm, intentional tort 
law reaches beyond the line of traditional duty into an expanding 
                                                          
 793. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000) (codifying requirements for emergency 
medical care and creating remedies for statutory violations); see also BITTERMAN, supra 
note 18, at 15 (stating that EMTALA created a federal cause of action for individuals 
denied emergency medical care). 
 794. In this regard there are no non-tort protections for the act of patient 
dumping.  See supra note 22 (describing the increase in health complications and 
mortality when patient dumping occurs). 
 795. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 104 (M. Howe ed., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1963) (asserting that tort liability was not derived by reasoning from 
principle, but rather imposed by the state for policy reasons). 
 796. See id. at 128 (stating that, although the law began with liability for 
intentional harms, it grew to include liability for “conduct [that] would have been 
wrong in the fair average member of the community, whom he is expected to equal 
at his peril”). 
 797. See id. (“In general, this question will be determined by considering the 
degree of danger attending the act or conduct known under the circumstances.  If 
there is danger that harm to another will follow, the act is generally wrong in the 
sense of the law.”). 
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sphere of harm and liability, which exists concomitant with the 
growth of  a modern society. It is within this sphere where, although 
no duties may have been imposed, intentional tort law grows to 
further avoid harm that may be foreseeable with substantial certainty. 
The intentional tort of patient dumping will attempt to define 
further an imposed duty to avoid harm that is foreseeable with 
substantial certainty when a patient is transfered solely for economic 
or non-economic, non-medical discriminatory reasons.798 
Lastly, we define the nature and act of patient dumping as 
completely distinct from a patient’s medical care or medical transfer 
decision.  That is, it is an intentional act of depriving a person of 
emergency medical care not based upon any medical reason, but 
rather based on discrimination; either  economic799 or non-
economic800 non-medical grounds.801  Accordingly, we anticipate that 
its use will be strictly reserved for application to patient transfers that 
are the result of shameful acts of discrimination. 
A. Elements of the Intentional Tort of Patient Dumping 
The general premise for the intentional tort of patient dumping is 
that one who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to 
liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is without 
justification under the circumstances.802  Accordingly, the intentional 
tort of patient dumping will exist only where a physician, or other 
person(s), organization, or entity, causes a patient with an emergency 
medical condition803 to be transferred to another healthcare facility 
without first having stabilized the patient’s emergency medical 
                                                          
 798. See supra note 51 (discussing several reasons why a hospital might engage in 
patient dumping). 
 799. See Harvard Medical Study, supra note 5, at 495 (discussing study of hospital 
transfers and providing statistics on insurance held by transferred patients). 
 800. See Cleland v. Broson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 
1990) (noting factors that result in discriminatory treatment by hospitals may include 
“prejudice against the race, sex, or ethnic group of the patient; distaste for the 
patient’s condition (e.g., AIDS patients); personal dislike or antagonism between the 
medical personnel and the patient; disapproval of the patient’s occupation; or 
political or cultural opposition”); see also Hines v. Adair County Pub. Hosp. Dist. 
Corp., 827 F. Supp. 426, 431 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (referencing the Cleland factors for 
discriminatory non-treatment). 
 801. This represents a partial list and is not intended to be limiting. 
 802. Cf. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 39  (explaining that the premise of 
the tort of battery is that one who harmfully contacts another, with the intent to 
cause such contact, will be liable for any injury unless the batterer is justified in the 
intent behind that contact). 
 803. The term “emergency medical condition” is to be defined using an objective 
(reasonable person) standard, and in that regard, will depend on medical expert 
testimony and evidence, whereby common law, statutory, or professional medical 
standards may be relied upon. 
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condition.804  The patient transfer must be on the basis of either 
economic status (e.g., the patient’s financial status),805 non-economic 
status (e.g., race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socially unacceptable 
disease),806 or any other reason not based on professional medical 
standards related to the medical care of the patient.807  The elements 
which should, therefore, serve as the foundation for the intentional 
tort of patient dumping include:  (1) intent to injure; (2) absence of 
justification; (3) causation; and (4) injury. 
1. The intent to injure 
The first element of the intentional tort of patient dumping is an 
intent to injure the plaintiff.  Satisfaction of this element occurs when 
the defendant knows or should have known that the consequences of 
his act were certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act.808  
Thus, this element does not require that the defendant acted with a 
purpose of causing injury to the plaintiff, but rather only requires 
that the defendant have acted with substantial certainty that injury 
would occur.809  An objective standard should be used to determine 
whether there was a substantial certainty that the injury would occur.  
The plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that the defendant, 
as a reasonable person, knew or should have known that the 
consequences were certain, or substantially certain, to result from his 
act.810 
                                                          
 804. The term “stabilized” is to be defined using an objective (reasonable person) 
standard, and in that regard, will depend on medical expert testimony and evidence, 
whereby common law, statutory or professional medical standards may be relied on. 
 805. This represents but one example of economic causes; others might include 
no insurance, under insurance, etc. 
 806. This represents only a partial list; other non-economic causes may also be 
included as discussed in the text of this Article. 
 807. For instance, this may include political, religious, or other non-medical or 
non-treatment related reasons. 
 808. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. b (1979) (describing the 
concept of intentionally causing harm). 
 809. See id. § 8A cmt. b (“Intent is not, however, limited to consequences that are 
desired.”); PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 8, at 36 (“The intent with which tort 
liability is concerned . . . is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the 
interests of another in a way the law forbids.”). 
 810. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 269 (“The plaintiff must introduce 
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely 
than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.”); see also 
HOLMES, supra note 795, at 108 (noting that using an objective standard for this basis 
ensures the evidence is looked at from the view of a reasonable person, rather than 
any subjective standards the defendant may have had as a measure of his own 
conduct). 
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2. Absence of justification 
The second element of the intentional tort of patient dumping is 
that the defendant has acted in the absence of justification.  This 
factor is influenced by public policy such that, where public policy 
seeks to discourage a defendant’s conduct, that defendant’s conduct 
will likely be deemed unjustified.811  This element should be evaluated 
by an objective standard of conduct; that is, tort theory and tort 
liability, especially with respect to the nature and harm of patient 
dumping, should be based upon public policy and not the individual 
defendant’s moral blameworthiness.812  As such, an objective standard 
should apply, and the particular defendant’s state of mind should 
serve neither as a measure of his conduct nor of his justification, 
thereby making state of mind irrelevant.813  Accordingly, conduct will 
be actionable only where it falls below the standard demanded by the 
reasonable person on public policy grounds.814  The plaintiff should 
bear the burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct was not 
                                                          
 811. Public policy demands justification for a defendant’s conduct because there 
are certain behaviors that are discouraged in society.  See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 
60, § 3, at 16 (“There is good reason, therefore, to make a conscious effort to direct 
the law along lines which will achieve a desirable social result.”). 
 812. See HOLMES, supra note 795, at 116 (noting that the objective standards by 
which intentional torts are reviewed are based on public policy issues rather than any 
individual moral blameworthiness of a defendant). 
 813. An objective standard was selected here, rather than a subjective or 
combination of objective—subjective standard (Restatement (Second) of Torts 
approach) to avoid recasting the nature of patient dumping with every judicial 
balancing act which would be required under either a subjective or combination of 
objective-subjective standard.  For instance, although in prima facie tort, the 
Restatement adopts a standard which is both objective and subjective, it then requires 
re-evaluation of the defendant’s conduct to determine if is was “generally culpable 
and not justifiable under the circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 
(1979).  Thus, a determination must be made whether the defendant’s conduct is 
generally culpable where it is “improper or wrongful,” or “blameworthy” or “not in 
accord with community standards of right conduct.”  Id. § 870 cmt. e.  This re-
evaluation of the defendant’s conduct in patient dumping denigrates the nature of 
the tort and harm suffered by the patient.  In prima facie tort, for instance, factors 
such as the nature and seriousness of the harm, the means used by the defendant, 
and the defendant’s motive may be used by the court to make the determination of 
justifiability.  This is avoided under an objective standard.  See also HOLMES, supra 
note 795, at 116 (advocating tort liability is based on public policy, not individual 
moral blameworthiness, and therefore a particular defendant’s actual state of mind 
was not the measure of his conduct). 
 814. Acceptable forms of justification, which would avoid defendant liability, 
include, but are not limited to, (a) patient consent; (b) lack of facility capacity, 
evidenced by insufficient bed capacity, nursing capacity, or other medical resources; 
or (c) availability of a higher level of care, where a particular form of medical 
therapy, treatment, specialist or specialty care is unavailable at the originating 
hospital.  See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 16, at 109 (noting that justification 
“signifies that the defendant has acted to further an interest of such social 
importance that it is entitled to protection, even at the expense of damage to the 
plaintiff”). 
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justified, and the defendant may rebut.815  If the defendant intends to 
rely upon privilege or other forms of justification, then the defendant 
shall have the burden of proving his justification as to this element.816 
3.  Causation 
The third element necessary to establish the intentional tort of 
patient dumping is that of causation.  Causation requires that the 
defendant’s act of patient dumping cause injury to the plaintiff, such 
that the injury to the plaintiff would not have occurred in the 
absence of the defendant’s act of patient dumping.817  In that regard, 
as Dean Keeton makes clear, causation is a required element of any 
tort.818  The plaintiff should bear the burden of proving the element 
of causation.819 
4. Injury 
The fourth element requires that the plaintiff has suffered some 
damage, actual loss, injury, or legally cognizable harm as a result of 
the defendant’s act.820  Further, the injury that the plaintiff suffered 
must not have been able to occur without the defendant’s act or 
conduct.821  The plaintiff should bear the burden of proving damage, 
actual loss, injury or legally cognizable harm suffered.822  Damages 
should include compensatory,823 special,824 and punitive damages.825  
                                                          
 815. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5122 (1977) (justifying the placing of the burden on the plaintiff 
by the fact that “it is the plaintiff who is asking the court to alter the status quo and it 
is therefore fair that he should have the burden of proving the facts in support of his 
demand.”). 
 816. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 16, at 108 (noting that, as it is impractical 
to require a plaintiff to negate all possible justifications at the outset, matters that 
may be asserted as justification for defendant’s conduct that would ordinarily be 
actionable are left for the defendant to prove). 
 817. See id. §§ 41, 42 (noting that an essential element for any tort is that there be 
a reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the 
damage which the plaintiff suffered). 
 818. Id. 
 819. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(1) (1979) (stating that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that the defendant’s tortious conduct 
caused the plaintiff’s harm). 
 820. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Am. Inst. of C.P.A., 177 F. Supp. 345, 349 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (noting that an essential element of prima facie tort is that “[t]here 
must be an intent to injure plaintiff, at least to the extent of infliction of wrongful 
harm upon plaintiff without just cause or excuse.”). 
 821. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, §§ 41, 42 (stating there must be a 
connection between the defendant’s act or omission and the plaintiff’s damage or 
injury). 
 822. See id. at 239 (noting that this burden “is quite uniformly on the plaintiff, 
since he is asking the court for relief, and must lose if his case does not outweigh that 
of the defendant’s”). 
 823. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (“Compensatory damages are the 
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Because the nature of patient dumping involves intentional non-
negligence based conduct, when it occurs as the result of the 
physician’s act, recovery should not be subject to the limitations of 
state medical malpractice tort reform.826 
B. Limitations 
We are aware that the introduction of any new tort will raise 
premonitions of triviality, unmanageability, and “opening of the 
flood gates” of litigation.827  Although these issues must be addressed, 
courts must meet the demands of a changing society where the 
existing law does not adequately address a particular harm.828  We 
                                                          
damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm 
sustained by him.”).  For example, awarding a person lost wages for time missed from 
work because of an injury. 
 824. Id. § 904(2) (“Special damages are compensatory damages for a harm other 
than one for which general damages are given.”).  For example, “in personal injury 
cases, harm to earning capacity, expenses for medical treatment and similar items 
are ordinarily treated as bases for special damages.”  Id. § 904(2) cmt. b. 
 825. Id. § 908(1) (“Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or 
nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous 
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.”).  
For example, imposing punitive damages on a drunk driver beyond injuries caused is 
both a punishment to the driver, and a deterrent to other persons who may consider 
the same behavior. 
 826. See, e.g., Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 1992) (noting that 
“[t]he [Louisiana] Medical Malpractice Act’s limitations on the liability of a health 
care provider are special legislation in derogation of the rights of tort victims” and, 
therefore, liability limitations under the Act should be strictly construed to “apply 
only in cases of liability for malpractice as defined in the Act,” and not to “any other 
liability of the health care provider”). 
 827. See, e.g., Miller v. Balt. & Ohio S.W. R.R. Co., 85 N.E. 499, 502 (Ohio 1908) 
(discussing the concern that a “flood of litigation” would “naturally” result should 
the court recognize a right of recovery on a novel basis of “fright”). 
 828. For instance, this may occur where either the law fails to redress fully the 
harms of a certain type of wrongful conduct, or where the current law simply does 
not fit the circumstances of the wrongful conduct or harm.  See Nees v. Hocks, 536 
P.2d 512, 514 (Or. 1975) (noting that the creation of new tort law, where necessary, 
would avoid the “rigidities of existing causes of action”); Jane Byeff Korn, The Fungible 
Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1379 (1993) 
(noting that, when the state of the law did not recognize a cause of action for sexual 
harassment, plaintiffs were forced to attempt to fit their sexual harassment claims 
into a tort claim that was never designed to address the problem of sexual 
harassment); Krista J. Schoendhelder, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1463, 1481-85 (1986) (noting 
that federal law and state tort law fail to redress fully the harms of sexual 
harassment).  We believe, with respect to patient dumping, that the law has failed to 
redress fully the harm of such wrongful conduct and that the current law does not fit 
the circumstances of the wrongful conduct that continues to persist and increase.  See 
Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (“It is clear that 
modern legal thought considers that ‘there exists a residue of tort liability which has 
not been explicated in specific forms of tort action and which is available to the 
courts to develop as common law actions as the needs of society require such 
development.”) (citing Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort 
Principle, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 563, 573 (1959-60); see, e.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 
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believe that the data presented herein suggest that the shortcomings 
of EMTALA have precluded the control of patient dumping and that 
the harm of patient dumping has not been properly redressed. 
In considering the various concerns associated with the 
introduction of any new tort, we first reiterate that the intentional 
tort of patient dumping is to be limited to instances of explicitly 
egregious behavior outside the practice of medicine; the tort does 
not involve substantive issues of patient care or medical decision-
making (e.g., transfer of a patient for higher level of care not 
available in the transferring hospital).829  Thus, it is to be applied only 
in circumstances where the sole basis for transferring a patient is 
discrimination due to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socially 
unacceptable disease, or other socioeconomic factors. 
Second, with respect to fraudulent or fictitious claims, as Dean 
Prosser points out, “the problem is one of adequate proof, and it is 
not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases because some claims may 
be false.”830  The general standard of proof required to support each 
element of a claim of the intentional tort of patient dumping will 
provide a sufficient degree of guarantee of genuineness under the 
circumstances of each case.831 If the plaintiff can prove each element 
of the intentional tort of patient dumping, the reliability and 
reasonableness of the claim is assured.832  Further, we are mindful that 
“factual, legal and medical charlatans are unlikely to emerge from a 
trial unmasked.”833 
                                                          
833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992) (affirming non-statutory public policy wrongful 
discharge claim based on race discrimination and racially motivated retaliatory 
discharge); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970) (permitting an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based in part on racial epithets); 
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:  A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134 (1982) (noting the limitations of 
current law with respect to protection from racial insults, and proposing a new cause 
of action based on defendant’s intent to demean through reference to race); John T. 
Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context:  The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 653, 699-
711 (1994) (proposing a tort of racial intimidation). 
 829. See supra note 814 (noting that the substantive issues of patient care and 
medical decision making are acceptable forms of justification, which would allow the 
defendant to avoid liability). 
 830. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 60, § 47, at 327-28. 
 831. Cf. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (claiming the “general 
standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of 
genuineness in the circumstances of the case”). 
 832. Cf. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1985) (setting forth each element the plaintiffs would need to prove in order to 
recover under an emotional distress claim, and stating that should the plaintiffs meet 
these standards, the “reliability and reasonableness” of their claims would be 
assured). 
 833. Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 88 (Pa. 1970) (refusing to accept the 
proposition that the judicial system cannot, in general, deal with fraudulent claims). 
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Third, as to each element of the tort, we rely heavily on the 
objective test of reasonableness through use of the reasonably 
prudent person standard.  We believe the combination of strict 
application of the reasonable person standard, judicial scrutiny of the 
pleadings,834 and charging the plaintiff with the burden of proof as to 
each element of the cause of action will properly limit the application 
of the intentional tort of patient dumping and will provide sufficient 
protection against unlimited defendant liability.835 
Fourth, we believe that any notion that the recognition of the 
intentional tort of patient dumping may encourage litigation and 
expand liability will be unjustified.  This is especially true in light of 
the fact that neither the recognition of prima facie tort, nor the 
emotional distress torts, have led to an increase in litigation.836  
Similarly, the feared flood of litigation, resultant increasing costs of 
insurance, and untold impact upon the healthcare industry has not 
occurred with respect to the recognition of any link between toxic 
torts and emotional distress.837  Further, we find the words of Dean 
Prosser instructive: 
                                                          
 834. In fact, in Coleman, the Supreme Court of Louisiana  specifically noted that 
the tort of patient dumping was not initially specifically pled, but was merely 
submitted as a supplemental pleading.  Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 313 (La. 
2002).  Specifically, the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted, 
Procedurally, neither Coleman’s original nor amended petition alleges an 
intentional tort.  The original petition alleges only medical malpractice; the 
amended petition alleges only negligence per se based on EMTALA.  Nor 
were the pleadings expanded at trial, as provided for in [LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 1154 (West 1997)], to include such an alleged intentional tort.  To the 
contrary, the effect of the trial court’s granting of Dr. Deno’s combined 
exception of no cause of action and motion in limine was to exclude any 
mention before the jury of either the financial reasons for the transfer or the 
EMTALA claim.  The court of appeal thus crafted an intentional tort that 
was not plead, not prayed for in relief, not argued, not tried, and not 
submitted to the jury. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 835. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519 (noting that strict application of the reasonable 
person standard is sufficient protection against unlimited defendant liability). 
 836. See Leslie Benton Sandor et al., Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Attendant to Economic Loss:  A Reassessment, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1247, 1253-59 
(1995) (discussing erroneous fears about triviality, fraudulent claims, and 
unmanageability that accompanied resistance to the recognition of the new 
emotional distress torts); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 
79 KY. L.J. 519, 544-46 (1991) (noting that the experience in New York, despite the 
recognition of the prima facie tort doctrine, was not in any discernible way found to 
be an increase in the number of legal actions filed). 
 837. See Kenneth W. Miller, Note, Toxic Torts and Emotional Distress:  The Case for an 
Independent Cause of Action for Fear of Future Harm, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 691 (1998) 
(noting that  “the predictions about a flood of litigation have been unpersuasive to 
many jurists and commentators” and the predictions have failed, in any case, to 
materialize). 
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It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even 
at the expense of a “flood of litigation”; and it is a pitiful confession 
of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief 
upon the ground that it will give the courts too much work to do.838 
Thus, when justice calls for a remedy for a patient who has been 
wrongfully withheld emergency medical care or necessary stabilizing 
treatment solely because of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socially 
unacceptable disease, or socioeconomic factors, the doors to the 
courthouse should always be open. 
CONCLUSION 
Patient dumping is a dangerous but predictable accompaniment to 
the market-driven health care system in the richest nation in the 
world.839  As there is little incentive for compliance with EMTALA, 
some healthcare professionals and facilities have disregarded their 
obligations and engaged in patient dumping, on the basis of purely 
economic or non-economic, non-medical discriminatory grounds, 
without apparent fear of punishment.840  Indeed, no measure in law 
currently exists to provide punitive measures for patient dumping.  
Both state and federal government performance in enforcing anti-
patient-dumping law have been recognized as disgraceful, especially 
when considering that although the average emergency department 
facility transfers from 1992 to 1999 were approximately 1.6 million 
patients per year, the federal government initiated an average of only 
384 (0.02%) EMTALA investigations and found an average of only 
184 (0.01%) EMTALA violations per year.841 
The American public has every right to be outraged at a healthcare 
system that fails to properly treat a patient with an emergency 
medical condition just because the patient is of a particular 
race/ethnicity or is poor.  Congress, as early as 1988, anticipated such 
abhorrent and grave circumstances—then a reality as well—and 
enacted EMTALA specifically to deter patient dumping and attempt 
to save the lives of patients with emergency medical conditions.842  
                                                          
 838. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:  A New Tort, 37 
MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939), cited in Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 
111 (Ohio 1983). 
 839. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HRG #6, supra note 166, at 11 (noting that patient dumping 
from American hospital emergency departments is a “dangerous, disgraceful but 
predictable accompaniment to the market-driven health care system in the richest 
nation in the world”). 
 840. Treiger, supra note 54, at 1200 (noting that “[w]ithout fear of punishment, 
hospitals feel free to disregard their obligations.”).  
 841. See supra Table 2. 
 842. See supra note 38 (stating that Congress enacted EMTALA to address its 
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However, extensive ambiguities and inconsistent interpretations have 
frustrated EMTALA’s effectiveness in preventing patient dumping.843  
Nationwide, as demonstrated above, there continues to be evidence 
indicating that the reprehensible patient dumping conduct persists 
on the part of some emergency physicians and healthcare facilities.844  
Although relatively uncommon, such behavior contributes to the 
increase in patient dumping.845 
As state regulatory and federal legislation have been unsuccessful 
in their attempt to thwart patient dumping, and because the federal 
government simply cannot regulate patient transfers in distant 
emergency departments, we believe it is time for state courts to 
recognize the intentional tort of patient dumping and place civil 
actions in the hands of the victims, rather than in the hands of a 
federal prosecutor.  Because such a cause of action recognizes that 
patient dumping is intentional, not negligence based, and occurs in a 
zone outside the practice of medicine and professional medical care 
decision making, it should sound in intentional tort.  It should not be 
constrained by state medical malpractice recovery limitations, which 
specifically are concerned with the practice of medicine and not the 
shameful practice of discrimination.846 
We believe that permitting a jury to know that a patient has been 
seriously harmed or died solely because of the patient’s race, 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or other non-medical discriminatory 
reasons, will likely be more effective in controlling patient dumping 
than the continued manipulation of federal legislation and 
regulation, which will invariably lead to further judicial discord.  
Accordingly, an intentional tort of patient dumping would have a 
strong and beneficial effect on the attention and care provided those 
who present to emergency departments with emergency medical 
conditions.  Finally, justice requires that the ongoing harm caused by 
patient dumping be properly redressed. 
                                                          
concern with the practice of patient dumping). 
 843. See Singer, supra note 14, at 121 (noting that the law threatens to implode 
upon itself as contrary and harmful interpretations threaten the law’s utility). 
 844. Supra note 183 and accompanying text (summarizing findings with respect to 
patient dumping incidents between 1992 and 1999). 
 845. Supra note 21. 
 846. Supra note 826 and accompanying text. 
